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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the affective and embodied ways in which representations of 
celebrity on gossip blogs generate ideas about femininity, queerness and whiteness. To 
date, celebrity studies has largely focused on how celebrity representations shape 
cultural ideas about proper and improper forms of subjectivity through discursive or 
semiotic approaches. I extend these readings by drawing attention to the technological 
and affective specificities of celebrity representations on such gossip blogs as 
Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com. I do so by bringing feminist work on the 
politics of emotions into dialogue with key new materialist and phenomenologist 
thinkers. Using the concept of skin as a heuristic device to read these representations of 
celebrity allows me to think through the relations of affect, embodiment and technology 
that shape our meaning-making processes. Skin enables us to understand online 
representations not as fixed texts on the screen but as dynamic and sensuous interfaces 
that affect and are affected by that with which they come into contact. This thesis is 
comprised of three core chapters. The first focuses on the affective production of 
femininity in these gossip websites. Drawing on feminist theorisations of touch, I 
demonstrate how meaning is produced beyond the realm of visibility. The affective-
discursive force of humour is a central concern throughout the thesis, but the second 
core chapter explores the role of humour in some depth in order to tease out how it 
serves the creation of queerness in these websites. The third main chapter examines 
some of the ways in which the technological affordances of online blogs influence the 
affective production of whiteness. The thesis places these gossip blogs within the 
context of neoliberal consumer culture in which the production and modulation of affect 
is vital for the creation of profit. Far from locating these online productions as mere 
products of market forces, however, I argue that they can move the reader in new 
critical directions, thereby challenging dominant ideas about femininity, queerness and 
whiteness. This potentiality lies in the complex ways in which the humour and the 
affective force of these online representations move and touch the offline reading body. 
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Introduction 
Reading Celebrity Gossip Blogs through Skin: 
Why Skin, Why Now? 
 
 
In this thesis, I explore the embodied and affective ways in which online representations 
of celebrity on gossip websites generate and circulate ideas about gender, sexuality and 
race. Specifically, I elaborate how celebrity gossip blogs like Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com 
and Perezhilton.com, which lampoon and ridicule celebrities through witty commenting 
or image manipulation, shape and reshape our ideas about femininity, queerness and 
whiteness.1 Celebrity gossip blogs are websites with frequently updated, short, often 
single-topic posts in which the blogger comments on a celebrity gossip story she/he read 
in print magazines or on other webpages.  The single post consists of a headline 
followed by a captivating celebrity image (usually a paparazzi snapshot), the blogger’s 
text and user comments. As it is characteristic for a blog format, the most recent post 
appears with a date stamp on the top of the webpage, usually below the title banner of 
the blog. Previous posts can be viewed by scrolling down or clicking on hyperlinks 
within the new blog post. Even though these blogs do not ‘break’ celebrity news but 
rather re-tell the story in their own style, their influence has increased over the last 
decade significantly: Blogs like Perezhilton.com or Jezebel.com are by now influential 
players in the production and consumption of celebrities and are serious competitors to 
more traditional forms of celebrity media like print magazines (Meyers, 2012). The 
production and distribution of a new gossip story is less time consuming and less 
                                                             
1
 ‘Celebrity’ functions in this thesis as an umbrella term that includes a variety of people who are 
celebrated – even if only momentarily – for different reasons (Rojek, 2001: 9-10). Celebrity means 
traditionally to be famous ‘not by achieving great things, but by differentiating their own personality from 
those of their competitors in the public arena’ (Boorstin, 1962: 65); or when his/her fame rests 
predominantly on the private life of the person as opposed to their performing work and skills (Geraghty, 
2007: 99). I follow Su Holmes’ definition of celebrities as ‘people who enter into media representation to 
attain a degree of public visibility, whether this be film, television or music’ (2005: 36). 
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expensive for blogs than for other more professionalised news media outlets. For 
instance, google alerts inform bloggers instantly about any new celebrity story that 
appears online (Meyers, 2012: 1030). Less constrained by journalistic standards like 
fact-checking, copy editing and in-house-deadlines, bloggers like Michael K. of 
Dlisted.com can publish their story within minutes. Photo agencies like Bauer-Griffin or 
Getty provide a constant flow of paparazzi images which can be downloaded, 
manipulated and published at any time. More professionalised blogs like Jezebel.com 
that are part of media conglomerates such as Gawker adhere to journalistic standards 
like fact- and spell-checking yet they are still much more flexible and fast paced than 
any print or TV format. 
In trying to keep up with these blogs many print magazines have introduced 
online versions of their publication which can be easily accessed and offer interactive 
elements. Gossip blogs however have an aura of authenticity and witty criticism that 
cannot be copied by online formats of mainstream entertainment news media. Websites 
like people.com or hellomagazine.com are quickly identified by readers as part of the 
media industry which is often viewed as compliant with the regulations that celebrity 
producers prescribe. They are therefore perceived as deceiving while gossip blogs seem 
to reveal a story behind the story. Gossip bloggers do not simply repeat what celebrity 
producers and other entertainment news media prescribe but rather ‘see-through’ the 
celebrity image and re-tell the story from their own point of view. I suggest, that the 
ambiguous in-between position that the blogger inhabits adds symbolic value to the 
celebrity gossip blogs: On the one hand, the blogger is like us, an outsider to the media 
industry and therefore merely a consumer of gossip. Yet on the other hand, bloggers 
symbolise the sceptical reader who produces her or his own, independent reading of 
celebrities. Hence, blogs are not understood as simple ‘infotainment’ but as the result of 
a clever and industry-critical engagement with gossip.  In this sense, bloggers, as witty 
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‘produsers’ (Bird, 2011) who wholeheartedly embrace celebrity culture while at the 
same time deconstructing it through puns and jokes, create online texts which enable 
their reader a flattering position: Clearly, the reader has to share this well-informed and 
critical view in order to ‘get the joke’ and enjoy the post. This shows that gossip blogs 
produce the humorous and highly subjective online texts for media savvy readers who 
are sceptical of the glossy and glamorised images of celebrities. Celebrity gossip blog 
readers are much more interested in the everyday life of celebrities which includes first 
and foremost their failures and downfalls.   
The three blogs that I am analysing in this thesis are produced in New York 
(Dlisted.com and Jezebel.com) and Los Angeles (Perezhilton.com) and focus mainly on 
American or UK celebrities. Therefore they are mostly accessed from within the US, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom (Quantcast, 2013). These blogs attract mainly female 
audiences (with no children) who hold a college degree and they are more often 
accessed through computer browsers than mobile devices (Quantcast, 2013). This 
suggests that users check and re-check gossip blogs also during their work day for a 
little distraction and pleasure. Erin Meyers found out that celebrity gossip bloggers 
know about these reading habits and produce their content accordingly mainly between 
9am-8pm and less so during the weekend (2010: 132). Furthermore, gossip blogs have a 
relatively young readership (between 18-34 years old) who earn more than the US 
average (over 51.000 US Dollars per year) (Quantcast, 2013).  
The affluent readership as well as the celebrity centred content of these blogs 
attracts advertisers. Keith O’Brien head of social media activation at Horizon Media 
explains: 
Advertisers like that these sites are highly visited by all types of people so it’s 
possible to reach a wide audience, even if some are just coming for the 
schadenfreude and may not return until the next scandal. Everyone loves a 
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celebrity’s fall from grace [and] it doesn’t hurt that these sites get to write very 
specific headlines that easily catch the eye (O’Brien cited in Goodson, 2013). 
As this comment shows celebrity gossip blogs might be accessed and read for free, yet 
in order to be profitable, they have to feature a lot of advertisement. Adverts appear not 
only directly under the blogs title banner where they catch the eye of the reader 
immediately but also next to particular blog posts and in between them. The main focus 
of the website layout might be on catchy headlines and intriguing celebrity photographs 
yet advertising spaces target readers throughout the well-known blog order of headline, 
image, text and user comments. Google’s advertising software allows blogs such as 
Perezhilton.com and Dlisted.com to target specific readers by tracking the user’s 
personal web-surfing trends: Websites that the user visited prior to the celebrity gossip 
blog reappear now in form of advertising throughout the blog. The online advertising 
strategies on these blogs become increasingly more sophisticated because advertising is 
the main revenue for celebrity gossip blogs: Between November 2012 and November 
2013 Dlisted.com earned around 211.000 US Dollar through advertising.  Jezebel.com 
made in the same time circa 424.000 US Dollar while Perezhilton.com leads with 
503.000 US Dollar (Mustat, 2013). These numbers show that gossip blogs are deeply 
entangled within the capitalist logic of networked societies and provide a useful 
background for my analysis of the affective ways in which femininity, queerness, and 
whiteness are produced in celebrity gossip blogs.  
Details about the readership of these blogs demonstrate which bodies gain 
pleasure from interacting with these websites and where the affects that these blogs 
produce travel. I focus on these humorous websites because their highly affective online 
celebrity representations, that aim to make the reading body laugh, are ideal sites for 
exploring how the complex relationships between affect, embodiment and technology 
inform our meaning-making process. Rather than situating these blogs as sites of banal 
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entertainment, I argue that they are illustrative of more general understandings about the 
complex ways in which power and resistance work today through affect and 
feelings.2Many have argued that celebrity representations shape cultural ideas about 
proper and improper forms of identity, and yet these same critics have not paid much 
attention to the material and affective specificities of the medium through which these 
representations are produced and mediated.3  Much of this work conceptualises celebrity 
representations as cultural texts or social signs whose effects and impacts on the ‘real’ 
world are elaborated though discursive or semiotic approaches.4 I argue that the ways in 
which humorous blogs such as Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com make 
meaning cannot be separated from their technological affordances and the different 
affects they engender. Hence, this thesis extends traditional textual readings of celebrity 
representations by paying close attention to the technological and affective qualities that 
produce, circulate and animate these celebrity representations in cyberspace. 5In his 
definition of cyberspace, David Bell hints towards the material and affective quality of 
                                                             
2
 I do not argue that power and resistance stand in opposition to each other. Taking on a 
Foucauldian understanding of power as productive, I see resistance as enabled through power and 
therefore part of power (Foucault, 1998). In this argument, however, I refer to power as dominant 
discourses and practices that pigeonhole identity and ways of knowing and feeling.  
3
 Graham Turner argues, for instance, that through new media our proximity to celebrities 
appears to have increased, and they play an ‘increasingly significant role in the process through which we 
construct our cultural identities’ (2006: 499). And Rebecca Tiger maintains that on blogs like 
Perezhilton.com ‘celebrity becomes a text through which bloggers and readers negotiate and reinvigorate 
the concepts ‘‘deviant’’ and ‘‘normal’’ through their discussions of celebrity (mis)behavior’ (2013: 189). 
Even though both scholars gesture towards qualities of new media such as interactivity and proximity, 
they do not explore how the sensuous and affective site of these changes. 
4
 Important in this context is Richard Dyer’s (1979) seminal work on stars, which argues that 
stars work like signs which are embedded within a semiotic system but need to be decoded by an active 
audience. In this decoding process, the audience is not entirely free, but rather is restricted by an 
ideological background. From Dyer’s perspective, stars work like ‘signs’ that define what kind of 
gendered, classed and raced identity and sexuality is intelligible at a particular historical moment. 
5
 The metaphor of cyberspace (coined by William Gibson in his science fiction novel 
‘Neuromancer’, 1984) has been used for rethinking the relationship between the human body and the 
advanced technologies of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. One the one hand, cyberspace 
was celebrated as a space in which new technologies could enable novel ways of living and feeling; a 
space for ‘consensual hallucination’ (1984: 12) in which technology enabled new visceral experiences 
and ideas and was as such not distant from the body but utterly intimate. As such, cyberspace seemed to 
dissolve the imagined boundaries between body/technology, feeling/mind and text/experience while 
providing a vocabulary for reconceptualising this new experience in potentially non-hierarchical and non-
binary terms. More critical accounts highlighted that its representation as a ‘space’ mark cyberspace as a 
new (feminine) territory that is passively awaiting to be colonised by the rational (masculine) subject that 
reinscribes it with normative ideas and values turning it into a new site for commodification and profit. 
For a detailed discussion of these debates see Barbara Kennedy and David Bell (2000/2007) and Jenny 
Wolmark(1999). 
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it. According to Bell, cyberspace can be defined in terms of hardware, as the global 
network of computers that facilitates interaction between remote actors. It can also be 
described as the imagined space between computers in which people build new selves 
and new worlds, and it can be further understood as a space that enables particular 
experiences (Bell, 2000: 7). As such, Bell’s definition shows that cyberspace is indeed 
an assemblage of hardware, software, images and ideas which enable through their 
criss-crossing and intersecting particular visceral and emotional experiences.6 Hence, if 
we aim to tease out how online celebrity representations produce ideas about gender, 
sexuality and race then we need to go beyond a traditional textual analysis. 
In bringing feminist work on the politics of emotions into dialogue with 
scholarship on (new) media and digital cultures, I flesh out an interpretative framework 
that combines considerations of textual analysis, discourse and semiotics with those 
concerning the material and the sensory. Feminist scholars such as Sara Ahmed (2004a, 
2010) and Lauren Berlant (2004, 2011) illustrate in their work the social and political 
character of affect and emotions, and (new) media scholars such as Susanna Paasonen 
(2011) and Laura U. Marks (2000) enable us to account for the material and sensuous 
quality of media representations. Hence, even though this thesis is ‘part of a move 
toward the sensory and the affective in studies of culture and media’ (Paasonen, 2011: 
8) it does not understand affect as pre-social, apolitical and outside of cultural 
investments.7 Rather affect is conceptualised here as an ambiguous, alternating force: on 
the one hand, it is understood as something that circulates along already defined lines of 
                                                             
6
 David Bell’s definition shows also that cyberspace encompasses so many different factors and 
actors that any meaningful statement about the social and cultural function of online representations needs 
to be limited to specific examples. This is why I refer in this thesis to very specific pockets of cyberspace, 
namely Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com. 
7
 Scholars like Brian Massumi (2002),who argue for the pre-social  and pre-subjective character 
of affect, are critiqued by feminist scholars such as Clare Hemmings (2005), who illustrates in her work 
the limits of such claims. A similar argument is made by Imogen Tyler, who maintains that a ‘post-
political ‘understanding of affect deprives feminist media research of its potential to make valuable 
impact (Tyler et al., 2008: 83). 
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cultural discourses and practices.8 As such, representations are seen to build upon pre-
existing embodied histories that convert into affect; this, in turn, shapes our 
understandings and responses towards it. My use of affect is informed by feminist, 
queer and critical race scholars who understand emotions, feelings and affects as 
culturally embedded, and who recognise their role in gendered, sexualised, racialised 
and classed political and social structures, while at the same time acknowledging that 
they are felt in specific bodies.9However, on the other hand, affect cannot be completely 
controlled and it opens representations up to a productive ‘misreading’, which differs 
from the preferred reading. This means that I understand affect, feelings and emotions 
as shaped by cultural discourses and practices while realising that ‘affect is always the 
unpredictable element in a social encounter […] [that] cannot be subject to regulation’ 
(Skeggs and Wood, 2012: 49). As such, emotions are here not conceptualised as 
‘affective lenses on “truth” or “reality”, but rather as one important (embodied) circuit 
through which power is felt, imagined, mediated, negotiated and/or contested’ (Pedwell 
and Whitehead, 2012: 120). Such an ambivalent understanding of affect allows me to 
explore how affects can be manipulated while accounting for the surprising and 
contradictory feelings that are enabled through our contact with humorous celebrity 
online representations.10 
Throughout this thesis, I explore the ways in which feelings and emotions work 
through humorous celebrity online representations to produce ideas about femininity, 
                                                             
8
 I refer here specifically to Ahmed’s work on the politics of emotions (2004a, 2010) and 
Hemmings’s seminal essay Invoking Affect (2005). Both illustrate the socio-political and cultural 
character of affect, arguing that affect is not pre-social instincts but instead emerges through cultural 
discourses and practices. Ahmed argues that we commonly perceive feelings and emotions as natural and 
pre-social because their constructed nature is covered over. 
9
 Ahmed shows in her work how the dominant discourses of whiteness and heterosexuality shape 
particular structures of feelings, and how bodies that do not align themselves to those structures might 
feel pain and are understood to evoke anger, fear and pity in other bodies (2000, 2007a, 2007b). Berlant 
explores how feelings like compassion might be felt in particular bodies when they encounter other 
bodies, but suggests that this feeling is created through wider socio-political structures of power (Berlant, 
2004). Ann Cvetkovich argues that bodies can feel depressed, but that these feelings of exhaustion and 
despair, which are felt individually, might be the consequence of a socio-political situation around us 
(2012a, 2012b).  
10
 I develop my understanding of affect and emotion in more detail in Chapter One. 
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queerness and race. I understand these gossip blogs as ‘affect-producing technologies’ 
(Skeggs and Wood, 2012: 68) that are constitutive of what it means to be a socially 
intelligible subject in our ‘society of control’.11 Key questions that guide this project are 
how the virtual contact, which these gossip blogs engender, shapes and reshapes how 
we feel about particular forms of femininity, queerness and whiteness, and if this 
affective contact can challenge dominant ‘offline’ discourses and the unequal subject 
positions they create. Through which methodology can we make the disruptive potential 
of these online spaces visible and palpable without glossing over the discourses that 
‘stubbornly persist’ (Gill and Tyler, 2013: 80), such as racism, classism and sexism? 
How can we reconceptualise ‘contact’ in the context of cyberspace? How do 
technological and material specificities influence the affective quality of these online 
representations? In order to explore these questions I use skin as a heuristic device to 
read celebrity online representations. I understand skin not only as a bodily surface that 
can be decoded through the gaze, but also as the porous border or affective interface 
through which meaning is conceived through touching and feeling. In this sense skin 
invites us to think through not only how online celebrity representations make us feel, 
but also how it would feel to touch them. As such, the concept of skin draws attention to 
questions about emotions and feelings that these humorous celebrity representations 
engender within us and to the materiality and texture of online representations. As the 
affective interface through which we stay in contact with the world and make meaning 
out of it, skin allows me also to theorise the role of contact in our meaning-making 
processes.  I not only explore the contact between the reading body and online celebrity 
representation on the screen, but also the connections between different elements on the 
screen that shape particular online celebrity representations. To put this another way, 
                                                             
11
 The ‘society of control’ is a concept developed by Gilles Deleuze and marks a social formation 
in which subjects are no longer governed through a mechanism of enclosure and discipline, but rather 
through affect and a permanent mechanism of control (1992). I develop this in more detail in the last 
chapter of this thesis.  
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skin allows me to understand the relationship between the reading body and 
representation as affective and embodied because reading a blog implicates not only 
looking but also touching (the keyboard, the mouse, the screen with our finger) and 
feeling (I might be moved emotionally or viscerally by what I encounter online). The 
concept of skin enables me also to explore how the different elements and media 
formats (texts, still and moving images) connect to each other on screen. How text and 
image or hyperlink and image are connected to each other is crucial for our reading of 
them, because this influences how particular online celebrity representations materialise 
before us. Overall, through the concept of skin, I think through the relations of affect, 
embodiment and technology that shape our meaning-making processes. 
I organise this thesis along the categories of femininity, queerness and whiteness 
because Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com lend themselves towards these 
critical lenses. This is mainly because representations of white female celebrities seem 
to dominate their content of all of the blogs. Furthermore, their gossip stories about 
celebrities are often linked to questions (and jokes) about their sexuality and how they 
disturb notions of heteronormativity. The gay subject positions of Michael K. and Perez 
Hilton, the bloggers of Dlisted.com and Perezhilton.com, and the lesbian or queer 
identity that some guest bloggers of Jezebel.com take on, motivated me to explore how 
queerness is constructed in these websites. Clearly, this organisation does not mean that 
I understand femininity, queerness and whiteness as categories that are separate from, or 
more important than, other axes of difference such as class or nationality. Rather, I 
understand these categories as constructed within and through each other. In the rest of 
this Introduction, I first describe the three celebrity gossip blogs that I explore in more 
detail. I then elaborate how these humorous gossip websites raise questions about affect, 
and subsequently I outline my affective methodology of ‘reading through skin’. I 
conclude with an outline of this thesis that illustrates how my discussion will unfold. 
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Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com 
Celebrity gossip blogs such as Perezhilton.com, Jezebel.com, LaineyGossip.com, 
Dlisted.com and TheSuperficial.com are often discussed as having an increasingly 
profound impact on the way that celebrities are mediated in contemporary media culture 
(Fairclough, 2008; Meyers, 2012). 12  With their interactive and dynamic qualities, 
celebrity gossip websites overcome the limitations of more traditional gossip sources 
such as the weekly print magazine. Their eye-catching websites provide endless choices 
for readers to browse, click, comment, tag or share, while reporting ‘the scandalous, 
glamorous and everyday behaviours of celebrities at such a frenetic pace that traditional 
celebrity gossip delivery mechanisms are struggling to compete’ (Fairclough, 2008: 
n.p.). Furthermore, celebrity gossip blogs do not simply report celebrity news, but rather 
they offer a subjective commentary on stories. In order to produce their blog content, 
bloggers engage with celebrity culture as an audience member by consuming that which 
the traditional celebrity media industry makes available. Out of this, they then produce 
their own reading of celebrity figures based upon their specific cultural or political 
orientations. These orientations often find expression via their use of humour, i.e. which 
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 I define Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com as blogs. However, it has become 
increasingly difficult to define the term ‘blog’. Whereas in the 1990s blogs would either take the form of 
‘filter blogs’ (sites with links for news about the web) or ‘diary blogs’ (sites that reported the personal 
everyday life of the [often female] blogger), nowadays ‘the literature reveals ambiguity and a lack of 
clarity in the way these terms [blog and blogger] are being conceptualized and used’ (Garden, 2011: 484. 
For more information on the history of blogs see Ignacio Siles, 2011 and Jill Walker Rettberg, 2008). 
Blogs have spread into social network sites like Tumblr.com and Twitter.com which allow 
‘microblogging’, and there has been a shift towards professionalisation in the blogosphere. Top sites that 
web traffic tracker Technorati.com detects, for instance, are all ‘highly professional, multiple-author ad 
supported newsrooms’ (Garden, 2011: 489). While Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com can be 
defined as websites owing to their professional production and their similarities to celebrity websites and 
print magazines in their layout and content, I position them as blogs. This is firstly because I understand 
blogs as ‘a type of website or web page which uses blog software such as WordPress to simplify the 
creation and maintenance of content’(Garden, 2011: 487). Dlisted.com and Perezhilton.com use 
WordPress, and Jezebel.com uses Gawker Media’s own, custom-made blog platform. Secondly, all three 
blogs contain the typical markers of weblogs, such as posts in reverse chronological order, blogrolls, 
comment systems, archives, and search functions. It is especially the interactive dynamic between blogger 
text and reader comment that is of central concern for my thesis, and some have argued that the 
interactive format provided by a comment-facility is the defining part of a blog (Garden, 2011: 494). 
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celebrity they mock, through what kind of humour and to what ends. Erin Meyers 
argues that readers find pleasure in, and are encouraged to return to the website by, the 
particular type of humour used by the blogger to enhance and extend the original 
celebrity gossip stories (2012: 1025). Hence humour functions in these blogs not only as 
an affective-discursive tool through which particular celebrity figures may be praised 
and celebrated or, alternatively, become excluded and othered, but also as a bonding 
device between the blogger and his/her readers, as well as amongst the readers 
themselves.  
I chose Dlisted.com because I, as the researcher, was drawn to its witty and self-
deprecating humour. Jezebel.com, I learnt early from friends and colleagues, was the 
blog that should resonate with me because of its allegedly feminist orientation. 
Perezhilton.com is one of the blogs I examine for this thesis because of its mainstream 
status and because of its high affective charge as ‘Hollywood’s most hated website’ 
(Perezhilton Media Kit, 2013). These different affective ties that connect me with these 
three blogs influence my reading of them. Rather than claiming to undertake an 
objective and detached reading of these online formations and their celebrity 
representations, my thesis follows a history of feminist work that sees the productivity 
of subjective affective reading.13 The concept of skin, as I argue in the next section in 
further depth, attunes us to the fact that one cannot read and understand outside of one’s 
own skin, which registers social location and embodied experiences. Furthermore, all 
three blogs seem, from different angles, to take a critical stance towards celebrity 
culture and the industry that produces and distributes stars while clearly being a part of 
this industry. Like the concept of skin, these blogs and their online celebrity 
                                                             
13
 I refer here to feminist scholars like Lynne Pearce (1997), Isobel Armstrong (2000) and 
Elspeth Probyn(2005) who critique the ideal of the detached and disinterested reader. Probyn argues, for 
instance, that it is important to include the researching body in academic writing because paying attention 
to how the body feels and reacts gives the researcher important clues about how she/he relates to and 
understands what she/he researches. 
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representations seem to be inside and outside at the same time, which makes them 
interesting sites for exploring how power and resistance are entangled. 
Perezhilton.com is ‘one of the most frequently visited, profitable and well-
known celebrity gossip sites on the web’ (Meyers, 2012: 1026). Initially launched in 
2004, it was only three years later, in 2007, that Perezhilton.com ranked among the top 
five most popular celebrity news sites. Blogging over eighty blog entries per day, it 
currently has around twelve million readers (Perezhilton Media 
Kit,2013).14Perezhilton.com appears to be an individually-authored blog, even though 
numerous rumours circulating on the internet, the immense workload incurred every 
day, and the significant use of ‘we’ in the narration of blog posts on Perezhilton.com 
suggest that a team of ghost writers produces the website. 15  Officially, however, 
Perezhilton.com is owned and written by thirty-four year old blogger Perez Hilton (real 
name Mario Lavandeira), who is Cuban-American and openly gay.16 In this thesis, I 
position Perezhilton.com as a ‘homonormative’ (Duggan, 2002) online space because it 
expresses (despite its camp sensibility) quite essentialist or normative ideas about the 
‘right’ performance of femininity and sexuality. Celebrities who are openly gay and 
mimic heteronormative standards of gender identity and coupledom are deemed as more 
valuable than those who scramble these expectations. I explain this positioning in more 
detail in Chapter Three, but a number of factors have led to this placing, including 
Perezhilton.com’s affinity to identity-politics, visibility and assimilation (rather than 
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 The frequency of Perezhilton.com’s traffic varies widely. Depending on the service used to 
provide numbers it varies from 1.2 million unique users to 2.22 million unique viewers a month. I use in 
this thesis the numbers that the websites themselves make available because those numbers are used to 
sell advertising. 
15
 Perez Hilton avoids declaring the number of staff he employs (or admitting that he employs 
ghost writers at all) because it is important that the blog stays closely linked to his personality in order for 
it to be successful.  
16
 Besides Perezhilton.com, he owns spin-off websites such as Perezitos.com, a website for 
paparazzi-like photos of celebrities; Cocoperez.com, a website for fashion; Teddyperez.com named after 
his dog and dedicated to animal and baby photos; and Fitperez.com, a website for fitness. He also owns a 
record label, Perezcious Music, and is (co)author of three books: Perez Hilton's True Bloggywood 
Stories: The Glamorous Life of Beating, Cheating, and Overdosing (2009); Red Carpet Suicide: A 
Survival Guide on Keeping Up with the Hiltons (2009); and The Boy with Pink Hair (2012). 
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performativity and deconstruction) which finds expression in its online writing.17 In 
former times, Perezhilton.com used violent humour to ‘out’ celebrities that were 
rumoured to be gay. Blogger Perez Hilton repeatedly explained his motivation for this 
as follows:  
It upsets me that people think what I’m doing is a bad thing […] I know there is 
some controversy about outing people, but I also believe the only way we’re 
gonna have change is with visibility. And if I have to drag some people screaming 
out of the closet, then I will (Perez Hilton, interview with Access Hollywood, as 
cited in Grant, 2006).   
Despite the fact that Hilton has since ceased this practice after been publicly criticised 
for outing people against their will (this has been criticised as a form of bullying), he 
continues to endorse in his online writing quite normative ideas about gender and 
sexuality. It is also noteworthy that, through his success and high public visibility, Perez 
Hilton has become a celebrity himself. In contrast to bloggers from Dlisted.com or 
Jezebel.com, he actively seeks a level of closeness to celebrities and the celebrity 
industry.18 However, this closeness compromises, I argue, not only the humorous take 
on celebrities for which the website was renowned in its early beginnings, but also 
Hilton’s ties to his audience. In 2011, he explained publicly that he would stop mocking 
celebrities on his website: ‘I am trying to be nice to everyone, even the ones who 
deserve a talking to like Lindsay Lohan. I am still critical and opinionated – sassy 
                                                             
17 Homonormative spaces like Perezhilton.com promote ideas of ‘correct’ forms of sexual 
relationships and a stable sexual identity that should be made highly visible so that it can become 
politically and legally integrated into mainstream, i.e. the heteronormative system. Queer theory 
challenges such understandings of sexuality, and aims to go beyond merely lobbying for the respect and 
equal treatment of gays and lesbians: rather than assimilating to the heterosexual norm, queer theorists 
want to deconstruct the heteronormative system.  
18
 In contrast to Hilton, blogger Michael K. of Dlisted.com finds this closeness to celebrities 
problematic: ‘I used to get invited to parties and I don’t go anymore because I don’t want to meet 
someone and then feel like I can’t write about them. If I meet a celebrity that I’ve said shit about and they 
want to be friends with me, then that’s weird. They can sit on their side of the cafeteria and I’ll sit on 
mine’ (cited in Thompson, 2011). 
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without being nasty’ (cited in Plunkett, 2011: n.p.).19 While this alteration in attitude is 
officially explained by Hilton as motivated by personal reasons, media critics argue that 
‘Hilton’s makeover coincided with a shift towards the mainstream, which included the 
publication of a children’s book, The Boy With Pink Hair, and a four-part television 
series, Perez Hilton: Superfan’ (Plunkett, 2011: n.p.). Perezhilton.com can still be seen 
as a humorous celebrity gossip blog that can move readers in critical directions, but the 
social location of the main author means that it seems more compliant with dominant 
classed, raced and gendered discourses than Dlisted.com and Jezebel.com. 
Jezebel.com is a multi-authored blog that is part of the Gawker Media group, 
which also runs thirteen other blogs. Gawker launched Jezebel.com in May 2007 to 
better target its female readership.20 Labelled as a ‘women’s interest blog’ that takes a 
purportedly feminist lens on celebrity culture, it is produced by a six-woman editorial 
board (Jessica Coen, Dodai Stewart, Tracie Egan Morrissey, Katie J.M. Baker, Lindy 
West, and Madeleine Davies), regular contributors (Jenna Sauers, Tracy Moore, Laura 
Beck, Doug Barry, and Anna Breslaw) and guest bloggers like Lux Alptraum, each of 
whom take turns writing posts on this frequently updated site. Most members of the 
editorial board have prior experience in the media, working for magazines such as 
Glamour, In Style and Star. Officially, it is this level of expertise that makes 
Jezebel.com an explicit alternative to traditional women's magazines. Anna Holmes, the 
former chief editor and founder of Jezebel.com explains: ‘I felt disillusioned by 
[women’s] magazines to a certain degree because they perpetuate this insecurity factory 
and present solutions to the insecurities they just created’ (cited in Mascia, 2010: n.p.). 
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 Hilton links his change to a rhetoric of health and purity. He said he stopped drinking alcohol 
and began seeing a therapist. He took up daily yoga, in part to build muscle under skin that lost elasticity 
after he lost nearly eighty pounds. Now he tweets what he calls ‘Perezisms,’ or feel-good musings (‘I 
choose to be happy!!!’) to inspire, and claims that ‘[w]hat’s important for me is not being liked, but it is 
that people think I am no longer toxic to the world’ (Holson, 2012: n.p.). 
20
 According to Jennifer Mascia (2010), Jezebel.com’s readership is 97 per cent female. My own 
research on Google Adplanner shows that the readership is 40 per cent male and 60 percent female, a 
result which is surprising considering the female-orientated content of the website. This suggests that the 
gendered lines between media for feminine audience groups or masculine groups are more blurred than 
production companies and marketers admit. 
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Jezebel.com positions itself expressively in opposition to such traditional forms of 
entertainment for women, and its tagline ‘Celebrity, Sex, Fashion For Women Without 
Airbrushing’ provides an immediate clue to its apparently industry-critical perspective it 
takes on celebrity culture. Even though Jezebel.com covers not only celebrity gossip but 
also a range of other political and popular culture issues, ‘celebrity content is among the 
most popular in terms of page views and number of reader comments, indicating there is 
an audience that wants an outlet for feminist approaches to celebrity culture’ (Meyers, 
2012: 1035). Jezebel.com describes itself on its advertising webpage as follows:  
Jezebel is dedicated to what contemporary women want to talk about. It brings 
you what the superficial glossies won’t: savvy pop culture, fashion truths, 
progressive advice, female heroes, entertainment realities, cultural criticism, and a 
healthier take on female aspiration. Unhesitatingly honest, Jezebel is changing 
women’s conversation. (Gawker Media Kit 2013)21 
As this description shows, Jezebel.com can be located between a post-feminist 
celebration of consumerism and self-improvement on the one hand, and a commitment 
to so-called ‘second wave’ feminist values such as the empowerment of women through 
sisterly advice and a criticism of media images on the other.22This ambiguous position 
results in Jezebel.com often being accused of appropriating feminism for the sake for 
profit. Emily Gould argues, for example, that Jezebel’s criticism of pop culture and 
‘righteously indignant rage’ is merely ‘petty jealousy, cleverly marketed as feminism’ 
(2010: n.p.). She maintains that the media-experienced writers of Jezebel.com cleverly 
raise the traffic on the website by stoking readers’ insecurities – just in a different way 
(Ibid.). In an similar sense, online discussions show that Jezebel.com is often critiqued 
                                                             
21
 During my work on this Ph.D., Gawker changed the advertising text for Jezebel.com. In an 
earlier version, potential readers (and consumers) were not described as ‘women’ but as ‘modern chicks’. 
This shows clearly Jezebel.com’s post-feminist orientation, which understands young women as readers 
of ‘chick-lit’ and viewers of ‘chick-flics’. For a critical feminist discussion of ‘chick-lit’, see Ros Gill and 
Elena Herdieckerhoff (2006). 
22
 For an overview of second wave feminists critique on images of women, see Susan Bordo 
(1993), Molly Haskell (1973), Susie Orbach (1978) and Gayle Tuchman (1981). 
  
 16
for ‘buil[ding] a commentary empire based on post-feminist bullshit that tries 
(unsuccessfully) to reunite Western mass media with female empowerment’ (Sutton, 
2011: n.p.). However, I argue for a more nuanced reading of Jezebel.com because its 
witty critiques of a racist, sexist and heterosexist celebrity culture not only create an 
online product for a niche market, but also illustrate the unequal power structures that 
shape celebrity culture and our everyday life. 
As a group blog that encompasses a range of different writers, Jezebel.com is 
difficult to situate, and I am reluctant to label Jezebel.com as postfeminist because I 
understand postfeminism in Angela McRobbie’s (2009) terms. From her perspective, 
postfeminism is linked to the assumption that, in Western industrialised nations, women 
have won the battle, that gender equality has already been achieved and therefore no 
longer needs to be addressed. Jezebel.com does not subscribe to this myth regarding 
equality, but rather regularly points out how women become objectified and 
disadvantaged in a sexist, racist and homophobic Western society, which is reflected, 
they argue, in media representations. And yet Jezebel.com has an affinity to fashion, 
glamour and consumerism, while borrowing in many ways from second-wave feminist 
perspectives: there is a strong emphasis on political and social visibility, identity politics 
and a reliance on the media-effects model. 23  As such, I position Jezebel.com as 
‘critically post-feminist’ as a means to address how the blog is feminist-aware 
(especially in its intersectional thinking and feminist critique on images of women) 
while not labelling itself as feminist (neither in the title nor in its self-description). With 
fifty to sixty posts published daily, Jezebel.com attracts about five million readers per 
month worldwide (Gawker Media Kit, 2013). As this figure shows, Jezebel.com is 
significantly smaller than Perezhilton.com but, like Perezhilton.com, it takes a 
humorous stance towards celebrity culture. As with Perezhilton.com and Dlisted.com, 
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 One of Jezebel.com’s central concerns is the influence of photoshopped images on young 
women, which they discuss regularly under the rubric ‘Photoshop of Horror’. I discuss this practice and 
its implications in more detail in Chapter Two.  
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readers can follow Jezebel.com on other social media sites such as Twitter or Facebook, 
yet the blog distinguishes itself from the other two blogs as it regulates who is permitted 
to comment and how:  
This is our website, and we will moderate it as we see fit. Comments we love: 1. 
Clever and witty insights or retorts. We love your funny, so bring it. 2. Comments 
that reflect an interesting opinion that has yet to be presented. 3. Intelligent and 
thoughtful contributions to a discussion […]. Arguing with editors regarding 
‘censorship’ or the violation of ‘free speech’ is just silly, and it will almost 
certainly have some kind of consequence (Coen, 2010a).    
This can be read as an expression of Jezebel.com’s commitment to a particular feminist 
orientation and notion of social responsibility, but it also helps the website to present 
itself as an exclusive community in which only a ‘clever’ target group is allowed to 
produce content. 
Dlisted.com presents itself as a single-authored blog written by New Yorker 
blogger Michael K., who identifies himself as of Mexican, Chinese, English, and 
Danish descent and openly gay. Launched in 2005 as the D-List, the blog currently 
attracts about 190,000 unique visitors monthly within the US and is as such smaller than 
Jezebel.com or Perezhilton.com.24 The blog publishes about eight entries daily, and, 
while Michael K. has admitted to receiving help with web design and programming, it 
seems that all the posts are written by him. In order to produce his blog, Michael K. 
consumes celebrity content that is available online or through mainstream media, but he 
also receives tip-offs from other bloggers and/or his readers, which he acknowledges in 
the respective blog entries. As in Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com, the website entries 
contain embedded videos from platforms such as YouTube, self-produced GIFs, and 
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 I retrieved this number from compete.com in July 
2012(https://siteanalytics.compete.com/dlisted.com/). Unlike Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com, 
Dlisted.com does not host a media kit site with data. This suggests that Dlisted.com is less professionally 
orientated than the other two blogs. 
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hyperlinks to other webpages.25 Like Perezhilton.com, Dlisted.com uses images that fall 
under the U.S. Copyright Fair Use Act (Title 17, U.S. Code.). This means that it 
publishes photographs and images that ‘are readily available in various places on the 
Internet and believed to be in public domain’(Dlisted.com, 2002: n.p.). However, 
considering the quality and quantity of celebrity images on these websites, it is likely 
that they also each purchase images from photo agencies such as WENN or Getty 
Images.26 This illustrates that Dlisted.com works through similar means as the other 
websites I discuss, though on a smaller scale. 
Dlisted.com’s tagline is ‘Be Very Afraid’, a warning that prepares the audience 
for the offensive and sometimes vulgar humour through which celebrities are mocked. 
Dlisted.com rejects normative journalistic regulations like objectivity, fact checking or 
even spell checking, and often celebrates notorious celebrities who are critiqued and 
ridiculed within mainstream media. Dlisted.com aggressively flaunts its ‘bad taste’ and 
its difference by celebrating the culturally low, and proudly describes itself as trash: 
‘Having Tina Fey say she liked Dlisted in an interview was bizarre. Why would she be 
reading me? I’m trash. Sometimes I’m still like, “I don't know if she really reads this, 
because this is kind of disgusting”’ (Michael K. in Thompson, 2011). Dlisted.com uses 
self-deprecating humour and biting irony in order to create a counterintuitive reading of 
celebrities that challenges the conventional morality and taste of the middle classes. Its 
comments on celebrity news are laden with sexual remarks, and its excessive use of 
sexual connotations not only violates existing standards about sexuality, but it also 
expresses Dlisted.com’s unapologetic politics that resist being fixed, and which seem to 
play with normative cultural values and judgements. With its focus on perversity, 
fantasy and irrationality, Dlisted.com challenges what Michael Warner has termed ‘the 
                                                             
25GIF refers to ‘Graphics Interchange Format’. This is a bitmap image format that supports 
animations and allows images to move. 
26
 Perez Hilton in particular has, in the past, appeared repeatedly in the news for being sued by 
photo agencies and photographers, who claim that the blogger uses their work without compensation.  
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regimes of the normal’ (1991: 16) and goes ‘gaga’ (Halberstam, 2012) with our ideas 
about gender and sexuality. As such, I locate Dlisted.com as a queer online space that is 
not concerned with assimilation or integration, but rather aims to scramble the social 
absolutes that shape our everyday lives. 
My positioning of these gossip blogs as homonormative, critically post-feminist 
and queer is not to suggest that they are homogenous and as such always already 
subverting or reinforcing dominant discourses. Rather, it should be seen as strategic, 
enabling me to clarify the ways in which particular categories and norms are employed 
in different ways within these blogs. Overall, the blogs I examine in this thesis inhabit 
an ambiguous position within the current neoliberal consumer culture: on the one hand, 
they can be read as operating at the margins of dominant norms.27 They do not carry 
many signs of commercial collaboration with the celebrity industry, a fact which is 
highly valued by an audience that is become increasingly media literate and sceptical 
towards idealised representations of celebrities.28 On the other hand, these blogs are still 
very much part of celebrity culture, and therefore part of a global economy which 
makes profit out of modulating affects, and of multiplying and distributing differences.29 
Throughout this thesis I aim to flesh out moments in which these blogs participate in 
innovative deployments of femininity, queerness and the deconstruction of whiteness 
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 Neoliberal consumer culture refers in this thesis to our current socio-cultural and political 
climate in which the capitalist logics of the market infiltrate not only the domain of politics, but nearly all 
social and personal relations. According to Foucault (2010) and later Nikolas Rose (2012) neoliberalism 
engenders a specific form of government – a so-called governmentality – where subjects govern 
themselves seemingly without pressure from outside. In the current neoliberal consumer culture the 
neoliberal subject controls and improves itself constantly, mostly through the ‘right’ kind of consumption. 
Since the forms of governmentality change over time, our contemporary neoliberal form of 
governmentality in the Western context can be seen as an expression of a ‘society of control’ (Deleuze 
1992) where subjects govern themselves increasingly through affect and emotion. 
28
 As I have suggested, Perezhilton.com represents an exception in this respect, as blogger Mario 
Lavandeira befriended many celebrities and became a celebrity himself. Furthermore, some blog posts 
serve solely to promote industry productions, such as TV shows, without any further comment from 
Perezhiton.com. Perez Hilton is, owing to his commercial success and the different brands and media 
outlets that he owns, an influential actor in the celebrity industry. 
29
 In the Conclusion I discuss in more detail how the political economy of celebrity gossip blogs 
compromises their potential to create meaningful critical difference. 
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and through their humour render strange what usually passes unquestioned as right and 
normal.  
 
The Affective Quality of Celebrity Gossip Blogs 
As I have argued, I understand blogs such as Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and 
Perezhilton.com as affect-producing technologies that are invested in shaping our ideas 
about what it means to be a ‘proper’ social individual in the current society of control. 
Without doubt, affect and emotion have always been part of how we make meaning out 
of media: talk shows, soap operas, and dramas are all emotional products, but so too is 
serious programming such as news. 30  Celebrity gossip blogs, however, invite us to 
explore their affective content (the humorous online representations that aim to entertain 
the reader) as well as enabling us to investigate how affect (and as such the humour) can 
be transformed and modulated through virtual interaction and circulation. As such, these 
online formations not only raise question about the ways in which the visual content 
engenders feelings and emotions in the reader, but they ask also how their texture and 
materiality, or the movement of these online celebrity representations, shape and 
reshape our affective reactions towards them. I argue that these celebrity gossip blogs 
are affective because of their humorous quality. Through humour, online celebrity 
representation come alive and become palpable and experiential for the reader. It can be 
argued that humour animates these online celebrity representations, and I suggest that 
this is where their potential for creating critical difference lies: now they are alive, they 
have agency, thereby actively producing rather than merely re-presenting what already 
exists somewhere else.  However, humour is often marginalised as that which cannot be 
                                                             
30
 Sean Redmond (2008) argues that talk-shows get their affective quality from practices like 
confession in which the celebrity body has to perform in carnal ways and according to discourses of 
therapy. Jessica Ringrose and Valerie Walkerdine (2008) explore the affective quality of make-over 
television shows through analysing the workings of abjection and desire through which the feminine 
subject becomes rehabilitated or dismissed. Lilli Chouliaraki (2006) demonstrates how news shape 
through editing and representational patterns the ways in which viewers can feel empathy with 
representations of suffering on the screen. 
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taken seriously, as light-hearted entertainment that is unable to effectively challenge 
socio-political structures (Davies, 2011), or, perhaps worse, as a discursive practice that 
reiterates and patrols social and symbolic boundaries, keeping deviant people in their 
place and causing feelings of shame, anger and pain.31In the form of ridicule, humour 
can produce and display group identity and loyalty thereby upholding social and 
cultural conventions and cement social relations. This is particularly effective in the 
context of ‘control societies’ where borders seem extremely permeable and fragile, 
disseminating feelings of anxiety and insecurity. In her analysis of the television 
programme Little Britain, Deborah Finding (2010) argues that the performed humour, 
rather than being self-deprecating or apolitical, instead targets stereotyped Others. She 
maintains that, through this process of othering, the programme returns to sexist, 
homophobic, classed and racist sentiments, and argues that it is through irony that this 
return is made acceptable. Many scholars are aware of this dangerous potential of irony, 
and argue that the context for this kind of humour is one which is post-feminist, post-
racial, postmodern, and in which the subject both knows and intentionally plays with the 
borders of good taste.32Much of this critical work has helped to show that humour is not 
universally ‘good’ or ‘innocent’, but rather that aggression, belligerence and pain are an 
integral part of it. 
Despite these negative associations, humour has also been understood as taboo 
breaking and transformative. For Jerry Palmer, humour can perform a temporary release 
from society’s rules, and can provide a space of rebellion: ‘[H]umour can be used to 
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 Imogen Tyler (2008) argues that the social derision of figures like ‘the chav’ (embodied in the 
character of Vicky Pollard in the television show Little Britain) sustains classed hierarchies affectively. 
Michael Billig (2001) explores the links between humour and hatred and argues that racist jokes animate 
xenophobia and racism. Deborah Chambers (2009) illustrates, using the examples of Roseanne and 
Designing Women, how humour functions to perpetuate prejudice against working class and single 
women. 
32Ros Gill argues that irony can function in advertising to undermine feminist gains and argues 
that it allows advertisers to ‘present titillating and sexist images of women while suggesting that it was all 
a deliberate and knowing post-modern joke’ (2007: 110). Simon Weaver illustrates through his work on 
racist jokes how post-modernity enables a form of ‘liquid racism’, that is racism that is elusive because it 
is marked as irony (Weaver, 2011). 
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directly subvert well-established rules of behaviour by raising taboo topics that can 
remain on the agenda’ (1994: 61). This subversive strategy functions only if the 
aesthetics and ethics of humour are recognised and the joke is understood and deemed 
as appropriate. Another way to theorise the transgressive potential of humour is through 
notions of the carnivalesque, which is a particular special type of communication that 
occurs across a variety of cultural sites, most notably in carnival itself. For Mikhail 
Bakhtin (1984), the popular tradition of carnival has the potential to suspend social 
hierarchies through mostly bodily and bawdy humour which finds expression in the 
celebration of bodily grotesqueness and excessiveness, fooling around and profanities. 
These markers of indecorum are strictly policed during ‘normal’ times, but during 
carnival they can be animated and enable comic reversals: For instance, when a jester 
might be crowned in place of a king and, as a result the authoritative voice of the 
dominant discourse momentarily loses its privilege. Even though this reversal of power 
is just momentary, carnivalesque humour enables here a space in which a genuine 
dialogue can emerge, which in turn creates the chance for a new perspective and a new 
order of things: ‘Carnival is not a spectacle seen by people; they live in it, and everyone 
participates because its very idea embraces all the people […] It has a universal spirit; it 
is a special condition of the entire world, of the world’s revival and renewal, in which 
all take part’ (1984: 7). Hence, for Bakthin, the subversive potential of the carnivalesque 
lies in the fact that its humour can break down social hierarchies and distances and 
enable as such an anti-discriminatory dialogue between all people for a better new 
world. It is easy to critique Bakthin’s account as universalist, utopian, and maybe even 
supportive of the system, but his account invites us also to think through what humour 
(and the laughter that it might provoke) can do if it is theorised as creating intimacy and 
belonging rather than distance and boundaries. Bakthin writes for instance that 
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[l]aughter has the remarkable power of making an object come up close, of 
drawing it into a zone of crude contact where one can finger it familiarly on all 
sides, turn it upside down, inside out, peer at it from above and below, break it 
open its external shell, look into its centre, doubt it, take it apart, dismember it. 
Lay it bare and expose it, examine it freely and experiment with it. (1981: 23) 
Here, laughter (and the humour that provokes it) collapses distance. Laughter enables an 
‘object [to] come up close’, where ‘one can finger it’, touch it and thereby, according to 
Bakthin, modulate it. Bakthin’s account might seem overly cheerful and positive in 
terms of the transgressive powers of laughter, but I find this notion useful nevertheless: 
it illustrates that laughter is not just a bodily reaction, but that it is tactile and can re-
modulate that with which it comes into contact.  
For Giselinde Kuipers, humour is also crucial in the building of communities, 
because, she argues,  
Sharing humor marks similarity – and similarity breeds closeness. The sharing of 
humor also unites people: the drawing of boundaries includes and connects, too. 
Especially in literature, humor may unite readers across boundaries of time, 
language, and culture in rather unexpected ways. (2009: 219)  
Like Bakthin, though through a different approach, Kuipers’s analysis highlights the 
communal that can emerge through humour, and which in turn can create affective 
change in how we feel and relate to each other. Furthermore, feminist critics have 
argued that laughter – one possible reaction to humour – can confront gendered taboos, 
and produce spaces of outrageous pleasure and disruption within culture and language.33 
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 Luce Irigaray understands feminine laughter as excess and asks: ‘Isn’t laughter the first form 
of liberation from a secular oppression? Isn’t the phallic tantamount to the seriousness of meaning? 
Perhaps woman, and the sexual relation, transcend it “first” in laughter?’ (1985b: 163; emphasis in 
original). Kathleen Rowe argues that women’s laughter shatters the symbolic authority of patriarchy. 
Women’s laughter, she writes, is both ‘terrible and wonderful’ (1995: 2). It expresses anger for the 
injustice of the law, and turns women into spectacles that are both illogical and threatening to men’s law. 
Also, Mary Russo (1988)understands unruly laughter as a feminist weapon. Unruly laughter makes a 
spectacle of women, andthereby challenges the century-old convention that women are supposed to be 
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Similarly, Elliot Oring (2008) argues that humour expressed in disaster jokes can be 
seen as rebellion against the discourses of mass-media. In this way, many have 
highlighted the affective connections and reactions humour can invoke, and how these 
can challenge dominant discourses and expectations.  
I understand humour as an affective practice that can animate the readers of 
these celebrity gossip blogs in many different and contradictory ways. Humour can 
engender feelings of happiness, joy and amusement as well as shame, anger or 
frustration. Our encounter with a humorous online celebrity representation can make us 
laugh, make us feel pity with the ridiculed celebrity figure, or even bore us. Scholars 
like Suzanne Lockyer and Michael Pickering argue that questions such as ‘who has 
been chosen as the comic targets of ridicule and mockery and what lies behind these 
choices’ deserve our attention because they can tell us a great deal about the lines of 
division and social stratifications that run through a society or culture (2008: 813). I 
argue that our reactions to humour are not only descriptive in that they let us know 
where divisions lie, but that they are also performative: they can exacerbate or muffle 
stereotypes and practices of othering. Celebrity gossip blogs enable this affective and 
performative function of humour through their visual content and through their texture 
and materiality, or the movement of these online celebrity representations. The online 
celebrity representations on Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com make 
readers laugh not only through their satirical or ironic textual commenting, but also 
through their materiality and texture, i.e. the media format in which they materialise.  
When considering the affective quality of these blogs and the online 
representations they mediate, it is thus necessary to think through how different media 
formats such as images, videos, GIFs, and texts have been put together, and how this 
criss-crossing shapes the affective quality of particular online representations. Jodi Dean 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
silent and unspectacular. It destroys with force the old structure to create the potential for something new 
to emerge.  
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argues that ‘[d]igitization erases the distinctions between visual, written, and acoustic 
media. It turns all data into numbers that can be stored, transmitted, copied, computed, 
and rearranged’ (2010: 94). While she maintains that in cyberspace the material 
difference between these different media vanish, I suggest that even though all these 
media formats can be reduced to codes, they have different material qualities which 
touch the reader in different ways: a video touches the viewer differently than a still 
image because it appeals to different senses, draws on different somatic archives, and 
enables different experiences and activities. GIFs can have a particular comical quality 
because their materiality is determined through jerky movements and repetition. We 
perceive this differently than if we would read a repetitious text, for instance, because 
the GIF amends different bodily senses than reading written letters. I argue that online 
media like gossip blogs require us to take into account how different media formats 
intersect and meet on a blog thereby shaping the affective (humorous) quality of online 
representations. As I will show in Chapters Two, Three, and Four, this affective quality 
influences how we experience and make meaning out of the online celebrity 
representations before us.  
The affective quality of an online celebrity representation is not only shaped by 
discourse (the blogger’s text) or materiality (of a specific media format), but is also 
made and re-made through its circulation. I seek to show at various points throughout 
this thesis how the interaction of users with blogs changes the affective charge that the 
‘original’ online celebrity representation had. Users can dispute or challenge the 
blogger’s interpretation of a particular celebrity image, event or narrative through 
commenting or adding further images and GIFs to the original blog post. This process 
of commenting is not only mechanical (pressing keys), or economically productive, it is 
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also highly affective:34 The user feels something when encountering the ‘original’ online 
celebrity representation, and this affective jolt motivates her/him to vent and/or express 
her feelings in a comment. Dean argues that every moment of interaction ‘accrues a tiny 
affective nugget’ (2010: 95) to the online representation, thereby changing not only how 
it materialises on the screen, but also how we feel about it and how we read it. I suggest 
that paying close attention to this touching and re-touching of online representations 
enabled through their circulation can give us useful insights regarding the ways in 
which celebrity gossip blogs can interrogate, scramble or shift our ideas about 
femininity, queerness and whiteness. In this section, I have discussed how the 
technological specificities of blogs shape the affective quality of their online celebrity 
representations. These blogs combine different media formats, which have different 
material properties, and which, in turn, affect readers in different (embodied) ways. An 
analysis of how their online celebrity representations make and re-make our ideas about 
gender, sexuality and race needs to pay close attention to the ways in which these 
different media formats intersect, and with what possible effects and affects. 
Furthermore, I argue that the interactive and dynamic nature of blogs needs to be 
accounted for because online representations are moved and re-shaped through our 
interactions with them. In this sense, celebrity gossip blogs are a form of affective 
entertainment, by which intensities flow not only between the screen and the reader, but 
also between the different elements and media formats on the screen.35 
 
Reading through Skin 
Reading online representations presents some methodological and theoretical 
challenges, because ‘the academic metaphor “to read” points towards the word, printed 
                                                             
34
 As many have argued, and as I will discuss in more depth in the last chapter of this thesis, the 
affective investment in celebrity culture and gossip keeps these blogs alive and economically productive. 
35
 For a slightly different conceptualisation of affects that pass between bodies on the screen and 
between the viewer and the screen, see Skeggs and Wood (2012: 222). 
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page, book, and political economy of text-based modes of production and distribution,’ 
and ‘subsumes the unruly images under the rational sign of the text’ (Hillis, 2009: 27). 
In this sense, using the term ‘reading’ to describe the analytical work done in 
interpreting online websites carries the danger of ‘bypassing the differences between 
text and still and moving images, and threatens to gloss over the unstable and indiscrete 
nature of digital media that arises as a result of interactivity, manipulation and 
immediacy’ (Paasonen, 2011: 13-14). Nevertheless, I refer to the practice of reading, 
because reading not only involves thought and evaluation, but, as many feminist 
scholars have shown, it is also a practice felt in and by the body.36 As such, the term 
‘reading’ allows me to avoid making ‘analytical distinctions between bodily sensation, 
emotion and thought as if they could be “experienced” as distinct realms of human 
“experiences”’ (Ahmed, 2004a: 6). Determining whether something feels good or bad 
already ‘involves a process of reading, in the very attribution of significance’ (Ibid.). 
Hence any evaluation of whether a representation affects us in a pleasurable or 
disturbing manner involves a reading of this encounter. But what does it mean to ‘read 
through skin’? Methodologically, it means a thinking through the skin. Thus skin is not 
only my object of analysis (the celebrity skin), it is also ‘the site from which thinking 
takes place’ (Ahmed and Stacey, 2001: 3). One cannot think outside of one’s own skin, 
because it is through the skin that one has a position in and relation to the world – it 
structures our perception and our knowledge through feeling (Connor, 2004: Howes, 
2005: 27-28). As such, a reading through skin can be seen to offer a critique of models 
that claim to examine representations through objectivity. 37  I use my own reading 
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 Ahmed argues that emotions cannot be separated from the body and that texts move the body 
through their emotionality (2004a: 12-13). In a similar vein, Isobel Armstrong maintains that affect 
emerges between text and reader and is inspired by the symbolic but cannot be determined by it. She 
argues that making sense and sensing in your body (the mental and the corporeal) cannot be separated 
when we interpret cultural texts that we encounter (2000: 117, 121). Lynne Pearce understands reading as 
an interactive and implicated process (1997: 11-15). Rather than situating text and reader in opposition, 
Pearce explores their interaction, which is shaped by a wide range of emotions.  
37
 Carolyn Pedwell and Anne Whitehead point out that ‘[f]eminist theorists have played a crucial 
role in highlighting the significance of affect and emotion to critiques of positivism and the presumed role 
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experiences of these blogs to ground the analysis in a concrete skin – my own – as an 
intersection of the cultural and personal.38 From my own located, trained, experienced 
embodiment, my affective reactions are enmeshed within ethical and socio-political 
concerns.  
Furthermore, it is safe to say that skin lends itself, at least in the first moment, to 
a visual analysis. As the visible bodily surface, skin is often defined as a cover of the 
self, a fleshly envelope, or a canvas that passively waits to be made sense of through a 
distant gaze. In this understanding, skin acts as the visible signifier for a gendered, aged 
and raced identity, or as the bodily witness of our way of life and our past contact with 
the world (one might think here of scars, wrinkles or sun exposure). In psychoanalytical 
discourse, the quality of our skin is often seen as representing our ‘inner self’ – skin 
diseases can be read as material expressions of a troubled psyche, which finds 
expression on the bodily surface.39 Furthermore, cultural practices such as tattooing, 
dieting, exercising, tanning or bleaching are seen as forms of self-expression that are 
then celebrated or pathologised, depending on the particular context. Skin is here the 
fleshly and passive canvas that can be remoulded and reshaped at will, thereby 
containing the truth about the subject that wears it. Skin is, in this understanding, the 
surface that can be decoded to reveal inner depth because it is understood as being 
meaningful rather than becoming meaningful through the particular gaze and through 
the particular discourses that encounter it.40 From this perspective, the metaphor of skin 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
of objectivity in knowledge production. Through fleshing out the critical imbrications of location, 
embodiment and knowledge, these thinkers illustrate not only the impossibility of objective knowledge 
detached from embodied location, but also explore the potential for affect to provide different, and 
potentially transformative, ways of knowing’ (2012: 119). Reading through the skin follows this feminist 
tradition and is also concerned to point out possible ways of contesting and shifting traditional ideas of 
gender, sexuality and race. 
38
 I am borrowing here directly from Katariina Kyrölä, who grounds her reading of Fat Actress 
‘in a concrete body […] as an intersection of the cultural and the personal’ (2010: 75).  
39
 See, for instance, Helmut Beltraminelli and Peter Itin’s work on psychologically induced skin 
diseases (2007). 
40
 For more on this, see Nikki Sullivan (2009), who argues that the construction of skin as a 
given truth that can be decoded through the expert’s eye is merely the effect of certain discursive 
practices. 
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enables us to analyse the celebrity online representations in these blogs from a number 
of different points of view. Skin transforms every visible surface into an object of 
investigation, and this is why I focus in this thesis on the skin of the celebrity body as 
represented in digital photographs, text, and videos – as well as how they all interact – 
on the screen. 
In general, the concept of skin draws attention to three separate but overlapping 
aspects that remain largely unaddressed in more traditional semiotic and textual 
analyses. The first of these emerges from the commonplace observation that skin is not 
only a visible bodily surface that purportedly contains and represents our raced, 
gendered and aged identities, but also that it is a fleshy material that can be touched and 
felt. Translated into the realm of online media, skin invites us to explore how digital 
representations produce meaning not simply through texts and images, but also via their 
materiality and texture. Whereas in the context of linguistics and classic semiotics, 
texture is understood to mean ‘textuality’, that is, the property by which successive 
pieces of communication form a coherent text, texture here is used ‘to refer to the 
material qualities of surfaces and substances, experienced by touch and recognised by 
sight’ (Iqani, 2012: 329). In other words, the concept of skin invites us to ask how it 
would feel to touch the online celebrity representations that we encounter. The glossy 
and shiny, or grainy and blurry texture of an online image is created through various 
mechanical processes and procedures, and it influences how we understand the image. 
Mehita Iqani argues therefore that our meaning making processes are simultaneously 
visual and tactile:  
Each text has been constructed from materials considered by a certain culture 
useful for making meaning. […] Texture is tactile, but it also operates on the 
visual level. […] By looking at a certain surface we can imagine how it will 
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probably feel to touch it, and the description of a surface by its phenomenological 
qualities becomes a simultaneously visual and tactile experience.(2012: 312-316) 
From this perspective, texture is an important semiotic and sensory resource that 
significantly shapes the meaning of a representation. Reading through skin entails 
attending to the texture of an online representation. Secondly, employing skin as a 
heuristic device reminds us that it matters how online representations make us feel; the 
kind of emotions and affects that we might experience in our body when we encounter 
them. Sometimes skin seems to give away how we feel, for instance, when certain 
emotions find their expression on and in our skin, such as when we smile, blush or get 
goose bumps. Clearly, not all emotions are visible on the skin, but rather may be felt 
within the body. Yet, as Ahmed argues, emotions do not reside within objects or bodies, 
but instead circulate between them. For Ahmed, skin is central in any consideration of 
emotions, because skin as the in-between space – between the self and the world, 
between inside and outside – demonstrates how such apparently separate entities as 
social discourse and private feeling relate to and create each other through these 
relations. Furthermore, she argues that emotions shape the surface of bodies, 
maintaining that ‘it is through emotions, or how we respond to objects and others, that 
surfaces or boundaries are made: the “I” and “we” are shaped by, and even take the 
shape of, contact with others’ (2004a: 10). Dominant discourses, and the norms they 
produce, are saturated with particular emotions that make them appear morally right and 
natural, thereby concealing their constructed nature. These norms, and the particular 
emotions attached to them, function like pressure points that leave an impression on the 
bodily surface. Through repeated imprinting on the skin, the skin becomes shaped and 
the body contorted, orientating itself (seemingly naturally) towards certain objects and 
away from others. Hence a reading through skin draws attention to how online 
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representations make us feel while acknowledging that these feelings are, at least partly, 
the result of social norms that are repeatedly imprinted upon the bodily surface.41 
As the porous and affective interface through which we stay in contact with the 
world, skin also allows me to theorise the role of connection in our meaning-making 
processes. Skin, as a permeable border, changes according to that with which it comes 
into contact: we tan when we are exposed to the sun, we sweat when exposed to heat, 
we get goose bumps when exposed to cold. Skin is, as such, mutable and shaped by 
what it connects with, as well as that with which it has previously been in contact. 
Within the context of online environments, this means that online celebrity 
representations only become meaningful through contact. Such processes include their 
contact with other blog elements such as other images or texts, as well as their contact 
with the viewing body in front of the screen. As I have discussed, online representations 
in celebrity gossip blogs create links amongst different texts, images and bodies. These 
links transform the online representation: Each new comment, tag or ‘sharing’ becomes 
a material part of this online representation, and subsequent readers take this new 
material into account as part of their experience of the online representation. Hence, 
applying the concept of skin to explore the dynamics of celebrity culture enables us to 
conceive of these online representations as material, sensuous and dynamic surfaces that 
become through their connection with other animate and inanimate bodies. These three 
aspects, texture (touch), emotion (feeling) and connection (contact) draw attention to 
questions concerning the tactility of digital representations (how would this image feel 
if I could touch it?) and their emotive productivity (how do they make me feel), while 
exploring how different media formats and elements (texts, images, videos, GIFs) touch 
in a particular blog post, as well as how this touching, and this cutting across, affects 
and is affected by the reading body. Furthermore, reading through skin conceptualises 
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 This resonates in some respects with Kristeva’s notion of abjection, (bodily) boundaries are 
here explained as both private (in that we feel them in and through our skin) and public (in that they 
emerge as a result of the repetition of certain socio-cultural practices and behaviours) (1982). 
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reading as an embodied and sensuous act of exchange: the reading body is touched by 
the material and dynamic online representations while touching these representations 
back by engaging with them, thereby shaping the meaning of representations, of that 
which apparently exists apart from us. The assumption of either a passive reader or a 
passive text that simply waits to be decoded by the gaze is thus replaced by a model of 
an affective and embodied interaction between the two. These three aspects also 
demonstrate the ways in which a reading through skin is an affective reading that allows 
us to think through creatively about possible intersections between two schools of 
thought: those who see affect as linked and overlapping with feeling and emotion, and 
as such as embedded within cultural discourse and ideology, and new media scholars 
who understand affect as a ‘force prior to and in excess of social and cultural 
inscription’ (Tyler et al., 2008: 87).42 The concept of skin is not a turn away from 
ideological critique, or a renunciation of the long history of feminist work on the 
politics of emotions.43 Rather, it places these ideas in dialogue with the work of new 
materialists and phenomenologists, a body of scholarship which pays attention to the 
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 I draw in this thesis mainly on Ahmed (2004a, 2010), Hemmings (2005) and Berlant (2011) as 
feminist scholars who, as discussed earlier, see affect as culturally and ideologically embedded. New 
media scholars who theorise affect as in excess of the social, subjective and political include, for instance, 
Laura U. Marks, Luciana Parisi and TizianaTerranova and Steven Shaviro. They enable me to account for 
the technological and affective specificities of gossip blogs. Marks argues that different media, such as 
film or online websites, enable emotional or visceral responses that are not limited to sight, and maintains 
that ‘often meaning escapes the audiovisual registers altogether’ (2000: 129). The agency of new media to 
move the body beyond the realms of seeing and hearing (i.e. beyond traditional forms of representation) 
deserves our attention, according to Marks, because it is constitutive of our meaning-making. Parisi and 
Terranova theorise the affective quality of digital cultures through discourses of materialism and 
technoscience. They understand affect as a pre-individual force and intensity that changes the relationship 
between body and technology. Body and technology are, in their approach, not conceptualised as binary 
oppositions, but as interwoven with each other. Through the material-affective quality of technology, 
bodily capacities become increased and changed. In their understanding, new media has the capacity to 
open up alternative ways of being and feeling (2001). Shaviro theorises affect in the context of new 
cinema as a pre-subjective force or sensibility that cannot be represented (only emotion can be 
represented) and affects our current society. For him,‘[f]ilms and music videos, like other media works, 
are machines for generating affect, and for capitalising upon, or extracting value from, this affect’ (2010: 
2).  
43
 The long history of feminist work on the politics of emotions is outlined by Megan Boler, who 
illustrates how, ‘in patriarchal culture, we learn emotional rules that help to maintain society’s particular 
hierarchies of gender, race and class’ (1999: xxi). Ten years earlier, Arlie Hochschild (1989) traced how 
the performance of emotions and ‘good’ feelings is used within the work life of stewardesses, and as such 
is part of an affective economy. In 1987, bell hook argued that racist discourses and politics are always 
already saturated with – and reinforced through – emotions such as fear, disgust and hate (1987).  
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material specificities of online environments, and understands digital culture as material 
and sensuous, with the ability to enable particular sensory, synaesthetic, and visceral 
experiences and knowledges through our encounter with technologies. As a material and 
affective interface that touches and is touched in ways that are (most of the time) 
beyond our control, skin draws attention to the sensory and the visceral. As such, a 
reading through skin accounts for affective intensities that sometimes escape discursive 
mastery, and opens representations up for productive misreadings, which depart from 
the ‘preferred’ reading. 
Furthermore, rather than forcing all examples of humorous online 
representations into the same analytical framework, the heuristic device of skin allows 
me to move between different theoretical perspectives and modes of interpretation to 
produce a multifaceted understanding of the developments and directions taking place. 
In some parts, my approach resembles traditional semiotics or discourse analysis, 
because these methods are very suitable to fleshing out how structures of inequality 
translate into online media content. In other parts, however, I move closer to the 
representations, skin-tight, to tackle the affective appeal they engender, to explore their 
tensions, loose threads and little openings – the pores through which they breathe and 
change. My ‘skin-tight’ reading pays close attention to the ways in which my moving 
through and touching of the blog influences what I encounter and how I feel. It shows 
that reading a blog is a physical, multisensorial and affective experience in which my 
body and the blog interact and influence each other, thereby opening new ways of 
relating to each other and meaning-making. This shifting between perspectives is useful 
and strategic because it enables me to account for the dynamic, multimedial and 
interactive nature of gossip blogs. Online celebrity representations cannot be analysed 
like representations in magazines or on television only because this would gloss over 
their technological and material specificities. We can draw comparisons to some extent 
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(and this is why I use semiotics and discourses analysis), but we also need to develop 
approaches that account for their particularities and the specific visceral and affective 
experience that they can engender.  
My shift in perspective is guided by my subjective encounter with the online 
representation (how I perceive it), but also by the ways in which it offers itself up to 
analysis. Reading through skin recognises that it matters how images lend themselves to 
our investigation. Depending on the materiality and texture of the image, we might use 
different ways of reading them – at times more distant (discourse or semiotic analysis) 
and at other times closer, skin-tight. This strategic shift between different ways of 
reading is evident within, as well as between, the individual chapters of this thesis. In 
this sense, a reading through skin aims to extend traditional textual approaches by 
inviting us to ask how the complex relations between affect, embodiment and 
technology can enable new ways of thinking and feeling. 
Outline of Thesis 
Chapter One provides an overview of the existing literatures on affect, new media and 
celebrity culture in cultural and media studies, in order to flesh out a theoretical 
framework for my reading through skin. I examine how feminist scholars have theorised 
the role of active audiences in processes of meaning-making, and highlight some of the 
problems encountered by recent approaches that promise to go beyond representation, 
but also what we can learn from them. This chapter locates my thesis within current 
critical conversations regarding emotion and new media, and sketches out my 
understanding of affective and sensuous meaning-making which is key to the analysis 
of my empirical material that I develop in the following chapters. In each of my core 
chapters, online celebrity representations are seen as dynamic, material and affective 
interfaces, which have relations with their immediate online surroundings as well as the 
viewing body. In subsequent chapters, I elaborate on the ways in which online celebrity 
  
 35
representations produce, circulate and transform affectively ideas concerning 
femininity, queerness and whiteness.  
In Chapter Two, I explore how femininity is affectively produced and mediated 
through online representations of female celebrities. Without suggesting that the female 
sexed body and femininity are interchangeable, these examples illustrate most clearly 
how the border between proper and improper or respectable and non-respectable 
femininity is affectively negotiated and communicated within the blogs considered. In 
this chapter, I introduce, through empirical examples, my key argument that how we 
make meaning of online celebrity representations is it not only a matter of vision but is 
also shaped by touching and feeling. By focusing on beauty practices and technologies 
like cosmetic surgery and Photoshop which ‘improve’ the appearance of real or 
represented skin, I illustrate that skin can function as a site of normalisation; however, 
what normalisation means changes when the background shifts against which the 
celebrity skin is read. I illustrate this through blog posts about Dolly Parton and Jessica 
Lange on Dlisted.com, both of whom have undergone excessive cosmetic surgery. I 
argue in this chapter that the ways in which we read re-touched or re-done celebrity skin 
are more complex than feminist readings, which draw on the Foucauldian concept of the 
docile body, account for. I suggest, for instance, that through these practices and 
technologies the potential of skin to betray the gaze is exposed; thus how we read 
celebrity skin is not only based on what we see but also on what we expect to lie under 
the skin. I illustrate this through the example of contrasting representations of Heidi 
Montag and Alexa Ray Joel on Perezhilton.com. The heuristic device of skin enables 
me to explore how Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com aim to evoke 
particular feelings through their online writing and use of different media formats, 
thereby celebrating or othering certain femininities. Jezebel.com, for instance, uses 
videos and before/after images in order to make the affective force of their blog posts 
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even more palpable. As argued earlier, the concept of skin draws also attention to 
question about texture and touch. Using the example of a blog post about Lady Gaga’s 
excessively Photoshopped skin, I illustrate how the texture of celebrity representations 
is a resource for meaning, and that blog reading is an embodied and affective practice. 
Overall, this chapter begins to trace the complex ways in which celebrity gossip blogs 
move their readers in affective and embodied ways through the use of technology, but 
also by reiterating discourses online which are already saturated with particular feelings.  
In Chapter Three I continue to question the privileged position of vision by 
illustrating that it cannot be separated from other senses. Considering online discussions 
about television series such as Vampires Diaries and Glee, I illustrate how meaning-
making is always already shaped through our prior experiences. Reading through the 
skin, in this respect, involves recognising that how we are affected by certain celebrity 
representations is dependent on our situated and located knowledge, which we gain not 
only through cognitive processes such as reason and intellect, but also through feeling 
and how these process are imbricated. In other words, through inhabiting our own skin 
we create knowledge (Howes, 2005). Focusing on affective tactics such as ‘gay 
sensibility’ and ‘camp humour’ in Dlisted.com, I explore some of the complex ways in 
which humour can function as an affective-discursive tool to move the reader, thereby 
altering what we see and how this is valued. Drawing on critiques of homonormativity, 
I read Perezhilton.com’s online representations of queer or gay celebrities counter-
intuitive, thereby revealing the ways in which their affective compliance with dominant 
discourses of heterosexuality can become intensified or muffled within these online 
spaces. Reading through skin here allows me not only to map cultural norms of 
sexuality literally on the skin (considering, for example, which parts of the skin count as 
sexual, or what kind of touch is sexual), but also to shed light on the artificial boundary 
that sets up heteronormativity and queerness as opposites. I discuss, for instance, 
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through the humorous online representations of Keira Knightley and Richard Simmons 
on Dlisted.com, how sartorial practices carried out on the skin shape our ideas about 
straight and queer identities, and how they can be challenged through online practices. 
Skin reveals how these imagined categories are both interwoven and shifting, and 
allows us to consider key questions such as why we feel closer to and more comfortable 
with some queer celebrity bodies than others, and how this can become contested.  
Chapter Four explores the affective force of humorous online representations 
further through the critical lens of race. I explore the ways in which feelings such as 
anxiety, anger, shame, resentment, happiness, affection and enjoyment can be 
understood as part of the affective landscape upon which whiteness is built. Further, I 
consider how humour, as an affective-discursive tool, can move the body in front of the 
screen, thereby re-orientating us towards dominant ideas of whiteness. Analysing 
representations of celebrities such as Gwyneth Paltrow, Kate Middleton and Prince 
William, I explore the affects that surround figures of ‘idealised’ whiteness. I also 
attend also to the feelings often associated with marginalised or demonised figures of 
whiteness such as ‘white trash’, and the ‘chav’, and how these affects animate the online 
representations of Lindsay Lohan and Zac Efron. Throughout this chapter, I pay 
particular attention to the technological possibilities that blogs provide, such as the 
opportunity dispute or resignify online representations through user comments. The 
contradictory and diverse comments I identify in some of these posts allow me trace the 
struggles that readers have with particular representations of whiteness, how they try to 
undermine this dominant system and where the limits of this endeavour lie. Exploring 
user comments also helps me to flesh out another key argument of this thesis: These 
comments show that affect is intertwined with cultural discourses and practices, and that 
it thus often reinforces pre-existing knowledges as it glosses over the constructed and 
relational nature of celebrity representations, and presents them as being either simply 
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good or bad. Yet affect also offers possible exit points – ways of reading and feeling 
that differ from dominant or preferred meanings. In this vein, reading through skin also 
demands that we account for emotional responses that do not conform to white, middle-
class expectations, as my concluding discussion about the user comments on 
Perezhilton.com about the cast members of Jersey Shore demonstrates. 
In my Conclusion, I consider the wider implications of my analysis in the 
context of contemporary political dynamics. If my reading of online celebrity 
representations through skin has aimed to illustrate how humorous online celebrity 
representations can – owing to their affective force – shift our ideas about femininity, 
queerness and whiteness, then this claim should also be valid when considering the 
complex workings of power in a society of control that manages difference through 
economic integration. After summarising the key points made in my core chapters, I 
explore how we might understand these online celebrity representations in the context 
of Deleuze’s society of control and associated practices of affective labour. Drawing on 
the work of Julie Wilson and Emily Chivers Yochim (2013), as well as Dean (2010), I 
flesh out how online media exploits the affective work of (blog) readers. With reference 
to J. Jack Halberstam (2012) and José Esteban Muñoz (2009) I then illustrate how my 
reading through skin has been productive in showing how the humorous online 
representations on Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com can provide new 
ways of feeling and thinking in a time in which the affect and feeling have become fully 
integrated into the economic circuits of neoliberal consumer culture.  
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Chapter One 
Celebrity Studies, Affect Theory  
and Digital Cultures  
 
Through the concept of skin, this thesis investigates the ways in which our engagement 
with celebrity representations in humorous gossip blogs affectively produces ideas 
regarding femininity, queerness and whiteness. As such, it contributes to an established 
body of scholarly work concerned with the social function of celebrities, and to the 
analyses of media and cultural studies theorists who see the relationship between reader 
and text as unstable, dynamic and productive.44 In order to develop my argument, I first 
provide an overview of audience research in media and cultural studies that understands 
audiences and readers as active producers of meaning, whereby producing meaning is a 
process shaped by cultural and historical location, experiences and emotions.45 I then 
explore the ways in which scholars of celebrity studies have theorised the affective 
qualities of celebrity and their representations. While many authors focus on the role of 
discourse and ideology in the construction of celebrities, some also highlight the ways 
in which celebrities are affective figures that move us, grab our attention, hold our 
interest and evoke feelings of intimacy, desire and/or aversion. Scholars such as Anita 
Biressi and Heather Nunn (2010), Jo Littler (2004) and Sean Redmond (2008) argue 
that celebrities are deeply embedded within the cultural practices and processes of our 
increasingly ‘emotionalized society’ (Swan, 2008). New media formations such as 
reality television shows and therapy talk shows have their own affective qualities, and 
are used to establish an affective economy of intimacy and immediacy between 
audience and celebrity. Following this, I provide an overview of how affect has been 
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 The social function of celebrities is discussed in Dyer’s (1979) work, where he examines what 
type of role model or social type celebrities embody. Scholars like Marshall (1997) or Redmond and Su 
Holmes (2007) illustrate how celebrities exercise power in the sense that they represent the struggle over 
cultural ideas and values.  
45
 I draw here mainly on feminist research such as Bobo’s (1988), Radway’s (1991) and Skeggs’ 
and Wood’s (2012), as feminists were long concerned with alternative ways of meaning-making. These 
works show the historical trajectory of feminist audience research.  
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theorised in media and cultural studies. My aim here is to highlight some key points that 
flesh out my understanding of affect as an alternating force: as embodied feelings and 
emotions that are culturally embedded, as well as disruptive intensities and forces that 
cannot be foreseen. In the subsequent section, I map out how digital culture has been 
reconceptualised through theories of affect as sensuous and material. Here I focus 
especially on aspects of new materialist theory, as well as on the work of Susanna 
Paasonen (2011), who brings into dialogue scholarship on new media and digital 
cultures, new materialisms, immaterial labour and social and cultural theoretical 
writings on the politics of emotion. My discussion about affect is organised in this way 
because it illustrates my understanding of affect – in this thesis I put the work on affect, 
feelings and emotions in social and cultural studies into dialogue with scholarship on 
digital culture and new media, and think creatively through their possible intersections. 
 
Representation, Meaning-Making and the Active Audience 
In this section, I examine how audience research moved historically from the passive 
over the active audience member/reader, to the audience-in-the-text. Cinema studies in 
the 1970s and 1980s was often informed by psychoanalytic approaches which 
seamlessly integrated the viewer into a certain audio-visual order.46This rigid model was 
subsequently challenged by audience research on the so-called empirical spectator 
carried out by scholars in sociology and cultural studies.47These scholars undertook 
ethnographic research, conducted through interviews and participant observations, in 
order to analyse the ways in which individuals or groups interpret and experience 
certain media events, and concluded that representations construct viewing positions as 
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 This psychoanalytically informed work has been well accounted for – see, for instance, Jackie 
Stacey (1994) and Suzanne Danuta Walters (1995). It is as such not my intention to dwell upon it 
extensively here. The core arguments of these approaches can be found in Laura Mulvey’s seminal work, 
‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ (1975), in which she argues that Hollywood cinema fixes women 
as objects to be looked at thereby enabling visual pleasure for men through voyeurism and fetishism.  
47
 I refer here to specifically to Charlotte Brunsdon’s and David Morley’s (1978) seminal 
ethnographic studies of television viewers in Britain. 
  
 41
well as subjectivities and identities. Hence, work in audience studies extended the focus 
from the text itself to the ways in which that text is consumed, how the audience are 
active participants in the production of meaning, and how this process is placed within a 
set of power relations. The spectator or reader is here a social subject that is inscribed 
by various competing discursive formations (such as gender, class, race and sexuality) 
which shape and re-shape the meanings of the encountered text. In this sense, this work 
on the consumption of television challenged the deterministic model of the textual 
spectator employed in film studies. Feminist scholars have been particularly eager to 
challenge assumptions of the passive audience owing to a widespread tendency in 
scholarship to regard women as a particularly passive and helpless audience. Often 
regarded as ‘women’s genres’, soap operas and romance narratives have been regarded 
as ‘mindless nonsense’ ‘escapist rubbish’ and ‘the trashiest trash’ (Stacey, 1994). A 
significant re-evaluation of popular pleasure and feminine reading is Janice Radway’s 
work on women romance readers (1991). Challenging feminist readings which, inspired 
by the Frankfurter Schule, reduced popular culture to that which merely reproduces a 
dominant ideology, Radway shows– through analysing the perceptions of female 
readers– that these readers are not simply duped consumers of cultural commodities, 
and nor are they merely enjoying themselves ‘innocently’. Readers of these novels saw 
themselves as involved in a social process with other women that often allowed them 
respite from domestic requirements. Reading was not only a way to escape, but also 
allowed them to glimpse ways of life unlike their own, and to question their 
assumptions and options. In their attempts to move beyond the limits of textual analysis 
and imputed spectator positions, feminist scholars such as Radway (1991), IenAng 
(1985), and later Joke Hermes (2006), were able to understand how women actually 
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engage with representations, and to thereby demonstrate how reading ‘against the grain’ 
can be enacted productively.48 
 Dorothy Hobson’s work on Crossroads (1982) was one of the first feminist 
works in television studies to challenge cultural notions of the feminine viewer as 
passive and helplessly positioned to be filled with dominant meaning. Hobson 
highlights the active participation of Crossroads audiences, and argues that women do 
not enter into any viewing situation as neutral, empty vessels, waiting to be filled by the 
particular message emanating from the screen. Rather, women are enabled by complex 
histories, knowledges and interpretative skills that are all brought into play as they 
engage with particular kinds of images or texts. Hence, these readings of the programme 
extend far beyond the text itself, and depend upon knowledge and experiences that exist 
outside of the viewing situation. In Hobson’s study, this knowledge comes from their 
experiences of being women, mostly working class, whose lives are often divided by the 
entanglement of family and work, and who are constrained by economic pressures. 
Hence, meaning cannot merely be produced from the signifying practices within the text 
alone, or from an analysis of the spectator position constructed by it. Rather, meaning 
depends on a model of the audience that takes into account its shared cultural 
knowledges and historical contexts, which are shaped by class and gender (among other 
factors), and which produce diverse readings.  
Jacqueline Bobo’s (1988) ethnographic study of the reception and interpretation 
of the film The Color Purple extends the critical work of  feminist cultural critics by 
highlighting the importance of race and gender in the meaning-making process. She 
challenges the assumption of a white, male spectator in order to address the multiple 
identities that subjects might hold. Her study showed that the movie has a specific set of 
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 Ien Ang (1985) shows how soap operas like Dallas are consumed and enjoyed by women in a 
particular context. Over ten years later, Joke Hermes explores how the consumptions of glossies provide 
pleasure through forming a sense of community, and momentarily suspend social hierarchies by 
engendering an ‘imaginary sense of power over the rich and powerful’ (Hermes, 2006: 295). 
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meanings for African-American women. This is encapsulated by one of Bobo’s 
interviewees:  
When I went to the movie, I thought, here I am. I grew up looking at Elvis Presley 
kissing on all these white girls […] And it wasn’t that I had anything projected 
before me on the screen to really give me something that I could grow up to be 
like. Or even wanted to be […] So when I got to the movie, the first thing I said 
was ‘God, this is good acting’. And I liked that. I felt a lot of pride in my Black 
brother and sisters (1988: 102).  
For the interviewee, the delight in the film arises out of her position as a black woman, 
long denied positive role models on the screen. Her social, cultural and historical 
position enables a positive reading of the film. Bobo’s research illustrates as such that 
while mainstream ideology in The Color Purple attempted to portray black characters in 
a stereotypical racist way (as ‘exotic’ and ‘uncivilised’), black female viewers ‘re-
wrote’ the text and were able to take something worthwhile and progressive from the 
film. 
Other feminists have problematised the devaluation of popular texts by taking 
the workings of emotion and fantasy seriously, and attempting to understand audience 
attachments to particular dramatic forms. In an influential study, Ang demonstrates the 
diversity and contradictions inherent in women’s readings of the television series Dallas 
(1985). Ang considers what female audiences recognise in Dallas, and how and why it 
is pleasurable for them, and concludes that attachments to the soap opera fiction are 
generated through ‘emotional realism’ – the characters seem real through their 
emotional structure, and viewers can recognise in them the interpersonal dramas of 
everyday life. She argues that the pleasure of popular culture for women lies in the 
‘flight’ into a fictional fantasy world. This ‘is not so much a denial of reality as playing 
with it. A game that enables one to place the limits of the fictional and the real under 
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discussion and make them fluid’ (Ang, 1985: 49). This game, with its borders between 
the real and the virtual or the imaginative, becomes more pertinent when we consider 
the blurred boundaries between ordinary people and celebrities, and those new media 
formations that place the audience in the text.    
With the development of new television formats such as reality television, make-
over and talk-shows, and their emphasis on participation, proximity and interactivity, 
novel approaches to audience studies have become necessary. The once seemingly 
discrete categories of ‘text’ and ‘audience’ are now blurred and interwoven: the 
audience is not held at a distance, but rather is motivated to vote, to tweet, or to phone 
in. These levels of emotionality and interactivity have led a number of critics to argue 
that the audience is now ‘in-the-text’ (Holmes and Jermyn, 2003), that ‘we are audience 
and performer at the same time’ (Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998: 57). Elements of 
indeterminacy and unpredictability are central to these formats, and it is these same 
elements that produce their affective texture: we are close, we watch, we judge, we vote, 
we are involved, we cringe away, we celebrate. Reality television is about immediacy, 
closeness and proximity, and it can be argued that the frame of mediation has 
transformed as a result of these changes, enabling a move from representation to 
presentation (Marshall, 2006), or from representation to intervention (Skeggs and 
Wood, 2012). As these considerations illustrate, new approaches to audience studies 
and the ways in which we make meaning need to attend to both the material and 
technological qualities, as well as their affective intensities. 
As Beverly Skeggs and Helen Wood highlight, many scholars have theorised 
these new emotional media formats through the lens of neoliberal governmentality. 
These readings illustrate how media formations such as make-over shows and reality 
television, for example, interpellate and generate the subject that takes up the work of 
producing the self in the subject’s own interest. In these readings the affective quality of 
  
 45
reality and make-over television inserts viewers into a system of neoliberal governance 
with an imperative to monitor, improve, motivate, transform and protect themselves in 
the name of freedom, enterprise and social responsibility. With its emphasis on 
surveillance and pedagogy, reality television operates here as the ultimate cultural 
technology in neoliberal self-governance (Andrejevic, 2003; Becker, 2006; McRobbie, 
2009; Quellette, 2008). While neoliberal discourses and technological changes 
undoubtedly influence how we make meaning and might as well inform the production 
of such media, I nevertheless agree with Skeggs and Wood, who contest the smoothness 
of the governmentality approach that inserts the viewer unproblematically in one 
position. They argue that a governmentality approach cannot explain the contradictory 
feelings and reactions that such texts raise in some viewers and maintaining that 
theories of governmentality do not wholly account for what has been seen as most 
radically suggestive of reality television – its emphasis upon immediacy, intimacy 
and indeterminacy. Reality television has been described as a genre involved more 
in ‘intervention’ than ‘representation’ […], because of its emphasis upon affect 
and reaction over any determined meaning. (2012: 11) 
Even though Skeggs and Wood are writing about reality television and not online 
media, their audience research is important for this project because they show, by using 
a multi-method approach composed of interviews, focus groups and ‘text-in-action’ 
viewing sessions, that viewers develop complex readings. Rather than inserting viewers 
into a specific position in which they are ‘taught’ neoliberal logics, Skeggs and Wood 
found that viewers frequently rejected the intended meaning. Instead, they took pleasure 
in questioning the position of ‘experts’, or sometimes enjoyed the ‘happiness’ that 
participants gave off despite their problems. Skeggs and Wood illustrate how affect 
complicates our ideas about what a text can do. Through text-in-action viewing 
sessions, they aimed to find the exact points at which participants engaged affectively 
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with the shown series: ‘they gasped, laughed, tutted, sighed, ‘ooh’ed and/or ‘aah’ed’ 
(Skeggs, Thumim & Wood, 2008: 17). These affective reactions were then channelled 
through the social position of the viewer, and reformulated so that the viewer could 
produce herself as a person of value in a way that resisted neoliberal logics. For 
instance, in their study about reality television programme Wife Swap, Skeggs and 
Wood show that, rather than following the neoliberal imperative to work as a mother, 
reality television enabled working-class mothers to enact a level of moral authority as 
stay at home mums. In their refusal to assume a position of aspiration and mobility in 
favour of giving time to children through more traditional modes of femininity, these 
working-class women actually resist this contemporary neoliberal pressure on women. 
Hence, owing to its affective qualities, Skeggs and Wood conceptualise reality 
television as an intervention rather than representation.  
Affect as a ‘new’ research dimension has shifted the focus from meaning and 
representation to the body and on materiality. Scholars like Steve Shaviro (2010), 
Marco Abel (2009) and Richard Grusin (2010) use the work of Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari ([1980] 1987, [1991] 1994, [1972] 2004) and Brian Massumi (2002) to rethink 
the visceral and sensuous aspects of the media they have studied. 49 Despite their 
differences, all three scholars argue that media can produce meanings that cannot be 
grasped through the traditional concept of representation. Through their technological 
make-up, new media engender experiences that communicate meaning immediately 
(without mediation) through sensing rather than conscious interpreting. Grusing argues, 
for instance, that the images of Abu Ghraib evoke disgust and sickness in us, not 
because of their content but because the media practices through which they were 
produced are identical to our habitual use of media. Taking a picture is part of our 
                                                             
49Shaviro argues that cinema’s images confront the viewer directly, without mediation, meaning 
that one is impressed and moved by the images unfolding and responds to them viscerally before 
interpreting them as symbols of any kind. Abel is also interested in the force of images to ‘produce effects 
prior to their inevitable narrativization, their eventual territorialization onto the plane of representation’ 
(2007: 10).  
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everyday life and we do it when something affects us in such a positive way that we 
want to remember it and share it later with friends and family in order to spread or 
reanimate the good feeling. The fact that this common media practice, which we 
connect with ‘good’ feelings, is now used to depict torture and horror provokes an 
affective contrast, which makes us feel sick. Grusin writes: ‘what affected us even 
before we were cognizant of what we were seeing or how horrible it was […] was our 
(perhaps unconscious) recognition that we use digital photos in the same way, to 
distribute our affective responses’ (2010: 89). This example shows some of the ways in 
which affect can encourage us to theorise representations beyond the visible content and 
traditional understandings of representation. Scholars like Grusin, Shaviro and Abel 
investigate media with a focus on materiality, intensity and sensorial qualities, and 
advocate a shift away from approaches concerned primarily with ideology, meaning, 
and signification that reduce every image or object to texts. The problem with 
approaches ‘after representation’ (Thrift, 2007) that glorify the immediacy of affect 
while abandoning language, representation, discourse and ideology, is not only that they 
ignore generations of feminist scholarship that has articulated the significance of 
subjective and social experiences and feelings for processes of meaning making, but 
also that they try to establish a new ontology that stands outside of power.50Paasonen 
argues convincingly that it is impossible to separate ‘questions concerning the 
immediacy of affect and the visceral impact of images [from] the depicted, the 
symbolic, the mediated, and the representational’ (2011: 10). This is because 
considerations about what a film or artwork does are necessarily shaped by that which it 
signifies: the representational practice that composes what is before us. However 
immediately and affectively cultural texts and images may touch us, we inevitably 
engage in acts of interpretation, especially when we make them our objects of study. 
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 For critiques of this situating of affect outside of culture, see Hemmings (2005) and Imogen 
Tyler et al. (2008). 
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Since online media such as gossip blogs do a lot of things, it would be misleading to 
reduce their online celebrity representations merely to the visual interface; but it is 
equally wrong (and impossible) to focus exclusively on their technical protocols and 
affordances, and the circuits of communication, affect and gut reactions they enable. 
Thus, I bring critique ‘after representation’ into dialogue with studies of representations. 
In this section, I have explored how the study of representations and meaning-
making has evolved in film and cultural studies along with the development of new 
media formats – from early psychoanalytical work on cinema, to ethnographic studies 
on film and television series, up to considerations of affect in new media formats like 
reality television and make-over shows. Even though my project is preoccupied with 
online media rather than television or film, the work considered above is valuable and 
salient because it highlights the importance of theorising active audiences that shape and 
reshape the meaning of representations. Blogs make active audiences highly visible and 
viable, and a reading through skin attunes us to the affective quality of online celebrity 
representations. In this sense, my project builds upon the above literature: it enables me 
to challenge the idea that humorous online celebrity representations only communicate 
one dominant meaning, and helps me to theorise how the active reader and the affects 
that these blogs produce might enable new ways of understanding femininity, queerness 
and whiteness.  
 
Celebrities as Animating Figurations 
In this section, I explore how celebrity studies has long been concerned with the ways in 
which celebrities touch us emotionally, grab our attention or hold our interest. Initial 
work on the social function of stars and celebrities took the form of structural readings, 
founded in psychoanalysis and sociology. Approaches informed by psychoanalysis 
focused on the feelings of desire and visual pleasure that the star evoked in the audience 
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through its positioning within a particular visual order. Sociological approaches, on the 
other hand, tended to understand stars as marketing devices or social role models – as a 
means for creating and organising audiences and disseminating stereotypes. Richard 
Dyer’s Stars (1979) and Heavenly Bodies (1986) laid the ground work for post-
structuralist star analysis within film studies. His approach combined semiotics and 
sociological aspects, and introduced the notion of the star text – the idea of the celebrity 
as text – that still shapes large parts of celebrity studies today. For Dyer, film stars 
perform ideological functions in the sense that their representations (or images) shape 
what kinds of identities and behaviours are intelligible for people at a particular moment 
in history: ‘Stars represent typical ways of behaving, feeling and thinking in 
contemporary society’(1986: 17).51 From his perspective, stars work like signs, or as 
ideological symbols that must be examined in relation to historical, cultural and socio-
economic contexts. They do not simply reflect a set of coherent meanings – rather, they 
embody multiple and sometimes even competing discourses of what it means to be a 
subject at a certain time. This contradiction ‘within and between ideologies’ (1979: 34) 
is crucial for the star image, because it invites the active audience to manage those gaps, 
or to read the star as embodying a ‘subversive’ or alternative ideological position. The 
premise that such star images are intertextual and contradictory opens up the possibility 
for divergent or oppositional readings by different audiences, but which are nevertheless 
still structured or limited by ideology:  
From the perspective of ideology, analyses of stars […] stress their structured 
polysemy, that is, the finite multiplicity of meanings and affects they embody and 
the attempt so to structure them that some meanings and affects are foregrounded 
and others are masked or displaced. The concern of such textual analysis is then 
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 By ‘ideology’, Dyer means here ‘the set of ideas and representations in which people 
collectively make sense of the world and the society in which they live. […]Ideology is specific to a 
particular culture at a particular moment in history’ (1979: 2). 
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not to determine the correct meaning and affect, but rather to determine what 
meanings and affects can legitimately be read in them.(Dyer, 1979: 3) 
As this suggests, stars can be read in different ways, and can engender different 
meanings and affects. However, Dyer also makes it clear that this ‘polysemy’ is not 
unlimited; rather ideology makes certain meanings or affects more likely than others. 
His analysis of the star as a cultural text is a useful starting point for this project, as it 
explores how stars can articulate ideas about personhood. Dyer highlights the economic 
and ideological structures that produce the star within particular historical conditions, 
while also allowing for the contingency and specificity of the meanings generated by a 
particular star in relation to their active audiences.52 He recognises stars as ‘significant 
nodal points of articulation between the social and the personal’ (Rojek, 2001: 16), and 
this makes Dyer ’s work extremely relevant for  a study of celebrity representations. 
Readings of stars or celebrities as cultural texts offer crucial insights regarding 
the production and consumption of celebrities, and how celebrities can function as 
productive sites for the analysis of cultural shifts around gender, sexuality, class and 
race. 53  Many feminist readings of celebrities interrogate the ways in which their 
representations reinforce or disrupt gendered norms.54 However, according to Graeme 
Turner, there is a tendency within celebrity studies to focus too much on celebrity as 
representation and celebrity as the effect of discourse, ignoring ‘the larger, more 
structural, political or theoretical issues’ (2010: 14). I agree with Turner in the sense that 
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 Dyer makes this re-appropriation visible using the examples of Judy Garland by gay men 
(1986: 137-192), and Greta Garbo and Bette Davis by queer communities (1979: 58-59). He argues that 
these actresses expressed in their acting a kind of queer sensibility, which allowed queer audiences to read 
their performance as camp, as making the constructed nature of social roles visible. A deeper discussion 
about queer sensibility can be found in Chapter Four. 
53
 For an analysis of the shifts in gender roles, see, for instance, Diane Negra and Su Holmes 
(2008), who explore the emergence of the female ‘trainwreck’ celebrity. Stephen Knadler (2005) 
examines the shifts around categories of race in his discussion of Jennifer Lopez. Kim Allen and Heather 
Mendick (2012) illustrate how young people draw upon class and gender distinctions that circulate within 
celebrity discourses in order to construct their own identities.  
54
 See, for instance, Milly William’s (2010) discussion of the ways in which discourses of class 
and gender become reinforced through the public derision of celebrities like Britney Spears and Kerry 
Katona. Deborah Ferreday (2008) explores how over the top performance of femininity in Burlesque 
dancing can be read as subversive, and Helen Shugart et al. (2005) argue that celebrities like Macy Gray 
or Gwen Stefani subvert with their spectacular performance of gendered norms.    
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questions of political economy and political forces must be integrated, and I address 
these in more detail in the last chapter of this thesis, but I do contest his argument that 
these approaches exclude each other. Careful readings of celebrity representations do 
not regard them as immaterial and separate from institutionalised structures of power, 
but rather as interwoven and conditioned by political, social and economic contexts and 
production processes. My affective reading of online celebrity representations through 
skin aims to contribute to this nuanced and critical study of representations.  
Scholars such as Dyer (1979, 1986) and Stacey (1994) highlight the significance 
of feelings in our understandings of celebrities and what representations of them can do. 
For instance, in Star Gazing, Stacey analyses the intense emotional investment felt by 
female spectators towards Hollywood stars of the 1940s. Considering their emotions 
and feelings of adoration and worship, as well as the multiple pleasures they experience 
from watching these stars, or consuming their associated lifestyle goods, Stacey 
challenges the psychoanalytically informed work of early feminist film theorists, which 
traps the female spectator/consumer within a position of passivity and subordination. 
Pleasure, for the female spectator, is mostly absent in these approaches, or can only be 
conceptualised as the desire to be the passive object of masculine desire. Stacey 
summarises this as follows: ‘[w]ithin a Lacanian framework, […] women’s pleasure in 
Hollywood cinema, either through identification with the female protagonist, or 
otherwise, can only be conceived of as a sign of their complicity with their oppression 
under patriarch’ (1994: 133). By drawing attention to feeling, and therefore moving 
away from a strictly textual analysis, Stacey demonstrates that, rather than limiting the 
female spectator to one particular form of femininity, the affective connections between 
star and audience enable multiple ways of creating and negotiating femininity, thereby 
showing how a focus on emotions can enrich our understanding of celebrities, and how 
their representations work. Chris Rojek is also concerned with the affective connections 
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between celebrity and audience, highlighting the paradox that celebrities arouse feelings 
of belonging, intimacy, joy and affection, despite the fact that they are physically 
absent: ‘One peculiar tension in celebrity culture is that the arousal of strong emotion is 
attained despite the absence of direct, personal reciprocity’ (2001: 12). He argues that, 
through the decline of religion, along with family and kinship systems, celebrities 
replace through ‘para-social interaction’ the ‘real’ intimacy formerly provided by these 
institutions. ‘The term “para-social interaction”’, as Rojek explains, ‘is used to refer to 
relations of intimacy through the mass-media rather than direct experience and face-to-
face meetings’ (2001: 52). There are clear limitations in his work such as the 
problematic separation between ‘real’ intimacy and so called ‘second-order’ intimacy – 
that is intimacy felt through representations rather than real people – and the fact that 
his reading of devoted fans is often overly structural. Still, I argue that his work is 
valuable to this project because it highlights the centrality of affect and emotions to the 
production and consumption of celebrity culture. His work also invites us to think 
through how feelings become even more diverse through online media formations such 
as humorous gossip blogs. If, as Rojek argues, celebrity adoration is affectively similar 
to religious acts like praying, then how can we make sense of the kinds of online 
trolling and celebrity bashing which we find on Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and 
Perezhilton.com? 
Whereas Rojek investigates the affective relationship between celebrity and 
audience from the fan-perspective, others have examined this relationship by analysing 
the emotional ways in which celebrities now have to act. Anita Biressi and Heather 
Nunn (2010), for example, explore how audiences can feel ‘betrayed’ by celebrities that 
are unknown to them. They suggest that, in a culture where people are literate in reading 
emotions and therapeutic discourses – as these practices are key for a (economically) 
successful identity – new forms of subjectivity and self-presentation are required (see 
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also: Swan, 2008). Celebrities have to meet the expectations of a media-savvy and 
emotionally literate audience in order to maintain their affective appeal and (economic) 
success. This means, for instance, that they have to be both intimate and ‘real’. The 
idealised and remote cinema goddess that Dyer and Stacey analysed has therefore 
transformed into a celebrity that invites the audience to feel with him/her, a subject that 
is apparently accessible, open and confessional. As Jo Littler notes, 
[t]here have always been gossip and scandals, interviews and confessions around 
celebrities. But unlike the ‘heavenly bodies’, perhaps, about whom nuggets of 
information are revealed through interviews, and who are subject to the usual 
barrage of scandalous gossip, we now have many stars who appear only too keen 
to tell us very early on in their careers about how they are unheavenly and how 
they have dirty emotional closets to clean out. (2004: 20) 
Biressi and Nunn argue that, in order to successfully perform the emotional chain of 
suffering, regret and apology, and to overcome a perceived ‘betrayal of public trust’, the 
celebrity figure has to perform the right feelings at the right time. Drawing on the work 
of Arlie Hochschild (1983) and Berlant (2008), they illustrate that feelings or emotions 
are not a private, spontaneous matter, but rather that they shape a horizon of social 
expectations concerning how the morally and ethically respectful subject should feel, 
i.e. should communicate their feelings.55 They maintain: 
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 Hochschild uses the example of stewardesses to discuss how feelings and emotions have to be 
controlled as part of an economy that thrives on ‘good’ feeling. Through this, she demonstrates how 
private feeling and public feeling interlink, and how both have to be managed (1983). Berlant examines 
the ways intimate publics such as ‘women’s culture’ are constituted through and by affective connections. 
She illustrates, using the example of U.S. popular twentieth-century literature directed towards women, 
how these goods create through their sentimental messages an affective community that structures 
women’s feeling and acting in similar ways. Through the consumption of this literature, women are hailed 
into feeling commonality – despite differently classed and raced positions – because they are apparently 
all looking for love and surviving the disappointments of failed love. The political implications of this are 
that women are made to believe that their primary mode of subjectivity is affective, which in turn directs 
them away from any feeling of political agency. Berlant thus reveals the ways in which sisterhood is 
constituted through a commodity culture that relies not on abstract ideas of womanhood, but instead upon 
shared feelings and fantasies (2008). 
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[T]he ready expression of emotion (properly moderated and directed) has become 
a yardstick for measuring the healthy (read ‘successful’) performance of the 
achieving subject in both public and private life. Hence, the celebrity figure 
performing emotion is at the high (visible) end of a spectrum of emotional 
conduct; conduct by which many of us are now expected to manage our public 
lives in order to demonstrate integrity, authenticity and personal commitment to 
our public role. (Nunn & Biressi, 2010: 54) 
Biressi and Nunn’s work is very relevant to my affective reading of celebrity online 
representations, as it illustrates the entanglement of celebrity culture with the current 
socio-economic framework, in which a turn to emotion is imperative for the distinction 
between ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ subjects. 
In a similar vein, Redmond (2008) shows how new media formats – for example 
‘therapy talk shows’ such as Oprah and one-to-one interviews – stage the celebrity as a 
highly emotional figure, allowing intimate confession, introspection and the 
representation of a better or improved self in front of the audience. Focusing on a 
neoliberal consumer culture, Littler (2004) explores how celebrity figures are today 
constructed according to tropes of intimacy, reflexivity and ‘keeping it real’ in order to 
maintain the paradoxes of ‘contemporary “meritocratic” culture, in which new 
possibilities of social and cultural transition are produced alongside sharp inequalities of 
wealth and status’ (2004: 8). To be recognised and felt as ‘real’, the celebrity has to 
create an intimacy with the audience. This is often secured when the celebrity 
demonstrates a kind of reflexivity about her/his current privileged position while 
making clear that she/he remembers how it was to be not famous: ‘Cinderella now has 
to show that she can still remember that she started out in the kitchen’ (Littler, 2004: 
14). Rather than serving to challenge the rules of the neoliberal meritocracy, this 
emotional attachment and memory instead keeps them alive. By constructing fame as 
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both, desirable and attainable for ordinary people, everyone is thus placed in the 
‘celebrity race’ (Rojek, 2001: 147), continuing the long history of the rags-to riches 
narrative. Furthermore, the grounded and self-reflexive celebrity that remembers the 
hard and economically deprived life before fame (i.e. the life on the block) produces, 
according to Littler, 
a structure of feeling that uses its ‘appreciation’ for the block for entirely 
individualistic purposes, in order to justify enormous wealth and divest itself of 
any guilt, rather than to enter into a reciprocal relationship [with the block]. As 
such it sustains, furthers and deepens inequality rather than tackles it […]. What 
more perfect image could there be for a company to use to sell, what more potent 
dream to buy than glamour which pretends to be democratic through-and-
through? (2004: 14)  
Littler thus illustrates how celebrity figures like Eminem or J-Lo (Jennifer Lopez), who 
claim to have lived on the block before they became famous, maintain the unequal 
power structures of neoliberal meritocracy by playing on such stories and the feelings 
that accompany them. 
Another key point in discussions regarding celebrity culture and affect concerns 
the more recent ironic consumption of celebrities. Irony engenders a range of emotions 
like amusement, schadenfreude and pleasure, as well as feelings of distance, superiority 
and affection.56 The celebrity gossip blogs that I read in this thesis can be seen as part of 
this new approach to celebrity culture. Here, celebrities are marketed to an audience that 
is extremely ‘wised-up’ to the rules of the celebrity game (Littler, 2004: 21). Joshua 
Gamson (2007) argues that, with the increasing visibility of the publicity machine 
behind celebrities in the later twentieth century, the celebrity industry posed a threat to 
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 Drawing on Joppe Boodt (1992) in her discussion of gossip magazines, Hermes writes that 
irony is used by subjects who feel sure about their cultural capital and want to distance themselves from 
low culture. It is therefore often accompanied by feelings of distinction and arrogance (Hermes, 2006: 
304-305). Holdcroft, however, claims that irony does not necessarily involve a negative attitude and can 
be ‘playful and affectionate’ (1983: 496). 
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its own myth. He suggests that one way to oppose this risk was to invite the audience to 
increase their knowledge about celebrity production and to find the ‘real’ behind the 
‘image’. Gamson argues that, 
[b]y embracing the notion that celebrity images were artificial products and 
inviting readers to visit the real self behind those images, popular magazines 
partly defused the notion that celebrity was really derived from nothing but 
images. […] The public discovers and makes famous certain people because it 
(with the help of the magazines) sees through the publicity-generated, artificial 
self to the real, deserving, special self. (2001: 270 cited in Holmes 2005: 25) 
Gamson explains how the two separate but overlapping processes function to keep the 
celebrity myth alive. In the first, the industry itself makes publicity processes and 
celebrity production processes highly visible, the second establishes an ironic and 
mocking perspective on celebrity culture, and both processes offer the audience a 
flattering position of power. He explains that, ‘[t]hrough irony, these celebrity texts 
reposition their readers, enlightened about the falseness of celebrity, to “see the joke” 
and avoid the disruptive notion that there is nothing behind a fabricated, performed 
image but layers of other fabricated, performed images’ (2007: 153). This means that, 
even when articulated through ironic distance, such practices enable an audience to feel 
closer to the secret lives of celebrities. It is what might be called, following Michel 
Foucault, an ‘incitement to discourse’ (1998: 17) around celebrity intimacy. It is a 
discourse of critical and cynical distance about the celebrity-machine, and one that is 
predominantly channelled straight back into feeding this machine – to the reforming and 
the reselling of celebrity, rather than the dissolution of it (Littler, 2004: 22).57 Irony is a 
defining element in the gossip blogs that I am reading in this thesis. Scholars such as 
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  A similar argument is made by Ros Gill (2007) and Angela McRobbie (2009) concerning 
irony and postfeminism. They argue that within a post-feminist media landscape, irony can function as a 
tool to invoke sexist and anti-feminist attitudes (disguised as a joke), thereby undermining the gains and 
continuance of feminism. Hence irony functions here not to deconstruct sexist ideas and notions, but 
rather to repackage and resell them to the audience. 
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Gamson and Littler put the ironic treatment of celebrities into an historical context and 
enable me to further explore its workings within our current neoliberal consumer 
culture. 
As I have shown in this section, various approaches to celebrity culture explore 
the current affective production of celebrity representations through notions of intimacy, 
accessibility and irony, and provide useful insights into how subjects become 
interpellated and aligned through the emotional performance of celebrities. The constant 
call for more closeness and intimacy, and the effect that such emotionality has, is often 
explained through concepts of governmentality and neoliberalism. Whereas early work 
on the affective quality of stars understood affect as something that helps us to make 
different meanings (Stacey, 1994), later approaches, such as those of Rojek (2001), 
Biressi and Nunn (2010) and Littler (2004), recognise the role of affect as determined 
through ever-changing structures of power. While I do not object to the suggestion that 
affect travels along these lines of power and discourse, this thesis is also interested in 
the moments when affect surprises us and allows us to re-orientate ourselves towards 
traditional ideas of gender, sexuality and race. As Lawrence Grossberg notes, ‘affect is 
organized; it operates within and, at the same time, produces maps which direct our 
investments in and into the world’ (2006: 585). Affect can therefore create new ways of 
thinking, imagining and relating to realities that might not be visible through the lens of 
neoliberal governmentality. As I will demonstrate in the next section, the capacity of 
affect to do both – to reiterate oppressive structures while also disrupting old patterns – 
has been long theorised by scholars in cultural studies.  
 
Theorising Feeling, Emotion and Affect 
The precise meaning of affect is difficult to grasp. It originates from the Latin word 
affectus, meaning affect, passion, desire and emotion, words which were used 
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synonymously until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Berlant, 2004: 3-4). 
Through the ‘turn to affect’ within the last decade, affect, feelings and emotions have 
increasingly become ‘objects of scholarly inquiry’, and affect has taken on different 
meanings within this critical school of thought (Cvetkovich, 2012b: 133).58Since ‘the 
turn to affect’ often involved either a turn away from ideological critique (with its 
emphasis on discourse, representation and language) or an extension thereof, Tyler 
suggests that affect theory can be divided into two main schools of thought: one that 
refuses ideological critique and views affect as an a-political force and another strand 
that sees affect a political and socially embedded (Tyler et al., 2008: 87). As I will 
show, my use of affect does not signify a turn away from ideological critique but rather 
extends these approaches. Furthermore, affect is sometimes either used as ‘basically 
synonymous’ with emotion (Brennan 2004: 5-6), or alternatively as strictly separated 
from emotions. In the latter approach, emotions refer ‘to cultural and social expressions, 
whereas affects are of biological and physiological nature’ (Probyn, 2005:11).59Kristyn 
Gorton summarises:  
‘[t]he nature and degree of difference between emotion and affect is often 
contested. Some argue that emotion refers to a sociological expression of feelings 
whereas affect is more firmly rooted in biology and in our physical response to 
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 Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley (2007), Anna Gibbs (2010) and Anu Koivunen 
(2010) provide extensive accounts for ‘the turn to affect’. Scholars such as Cvetkovich (2012b) and 
Hemmings (2005) critique the rhetoric of an ‘affective turn’ because it presents affect as a novel category 
in feminist research when feelings and emotions have in fact long been centre stage in feminist critical 
enquiry. For Cvetkovich, the turn to affect is not new because movements like the ‘Public Feelings 
Project’ emerge out of the feminist mantra that ‘the personal is the political’ (2012b: 133). Feminist work 
on ‘emotional labour’, the role of affect in the maintenance of political and social structures of exclusion, 
as well as on media, such as film and television, and genres such as melodrama, have long been 
concerned with affective registers. For example, as argued earlier, Ang (1985) illustrates the affective 
quality of television on the series Dallas, Linda Williams (2001) shows that melodrama like Uncle Tom 
Cabin or Gone with the Wind shapes affectively the race relations in the U.S., and Christine Gledhill 
(1987) argues that melodrama shapes trough emotions gender and heterosexual power structures. 
59In her writing on shame, Probyn (2005) resists a clear split between biological affect and 
biographical emotion. Drawing on Silvan Tomkin’s notion of the unpredictability of affect and the fact 
that contradictory affects can stick together, Probyn argues that shame always also includes interest. She 
maintains further that feelings are not just registered consciously and can therefore be controlled, but they 
too are felt and enacted by our bodies that escape our control. Starting from a personal narrative she 
explores the social and political ramifications of shame arguing that shame has the capacity to disturb 
both personal and political norms. 
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feelings; others attempt to differentiate on the basis that emotion requires a subject 
while affect does not; and some ignore these distinctions altogether’. (2007: 334) 
As Gorton shows, dividing lines between affect, emotion and feeling are difficult to 
draw. Taking into account these challenges and complexities, the aim of this section is 
to provide an overview of the ways in which key theorists in cultural studies have 
conceptualised affect, feeling and emotion (and their differences) in order to clarify my 
understanding of these terms and to explain how affect is used in my reading of 
celebrity gossip blogs.  
Studies that understand affect as a pre-discursive intensity (Massumi, 2002; 
Sedgwick, 2003), and as such strictly distinct from personal feeling and social emotions, 
are often motivated by a certain fatigue and dissatisfaction with structuralist and post-
structuralist approaches that purportedly overstate the significance of language. From 
this perspective, (post)-structuralist approaches leave out considerations of materiality 
in their theorisation about the subject while putting it also in a position of ‘social 
determinism’ (Hemmings, 2005: 551). Scholars that understand affect as a-political and 
biological often draw on the work of psychologist Silvan Tomkins in order to account 
for the unconscious (i.e. gut reactions) and the unexpected (i.e. that which seems to 
escape discourse) experiences that influence our life.60 Tomkins understands affect as an 
automatic biological response to a stimulus, and that emotion comes into being through 
a process of interpreting these responses by applying ‘scripts’ based on past experiences 
and cultural knowledges. Elisabeth Wissinger explains:  
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 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003) is a good example for a theorist who draws on Tomkins in 
order to develop a new reading of social life. She draws on Tomkins distinction between ‘strong’ and 
‘weak’ theory in order to show how reparative reading (which I explained earlier) emerges out of weak 
theory. Tomkins calls the ways in which we organise our affective experiences ‘theory’. Seemingly 
paradoxical, ‘strong theory’ is not as effective as ‘weak theory’ because the former is overtly general and 
tautological (it always finds what it was paranoid about). ‘Weak theory’, however, means that we have 
developed affective mini-strategies that help us to survive even when we experience negative affects. In 
this sense, for Segdwick, affect can provide alternatives to strong theory because it has the capacity to 
link us creatively to others, and because affect is innate to everyone it can be produced by everyone – not 
just dominant actors.  
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Tomkins understood affect in terms of specific physiological responses that then 
give rise to various effects, which may or may not translate into emotions. Affect 
therefore precedes emotions; affect is not conscious, but it has a dynamism, a 
sociality or social productivity. The effects of affect, however, are not predictable: 
affective change from passivity to activity, from inertia to motivation, for 
example, is not reducible to a single stimulus. (2007: 232) 
Tomkins considered shame, interest, surprise, joy, anger, fear, distress, and disgust as 
the basic set of affects (Sedgwick and Frank, 1995: 5) which then become translated 
into emotion. Affect is unpredictable with regard to time (anger can evaporate within 
minutes or remain for a long time) and aim, as well as in what it can do: ‘the pleasure in 
hearing a piece of music can make me want it hear it repeatedly, listen to other music, 
or study to become a composer myself’ (Sedgwick, 2003: 19). Furthermore, an object is 
not fixed with one particular affect but can be associated with different affects: ‘There is 
literally no kind of object which has not historically been linked to one or another of the 
affects. Positive affects has been invested in pain and every kind of human misery, and 
negative affect has been experienced as a consequence of pleasure and every kind of 
triumph of the human spirit’ (Tomkins cited in Sedgwick 2003: 19). In other words, 
there is no necessary logic in affect: what we experience as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ might 
change over time.  
Furthermore, it can be said that positive affects such as joy suggest a movement 
towards the object, and negative affects such as disgust might suggest a moving away. 
However, paradoxically, this ‘negative affect may also entail desire to move towards the 
[disgusting] object’ (Ferreday, 2009: 31-32). Tomkins’s conceptualisation of affect is 
relevant to my own understanding of affect because it formulates it as dynamic and 
shifting. Particular affects might make certain movements or orientations more likely 
than others but they do not determine them. For instance, the ‘chav’ celebrity, which I 
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discuss in Chapter Four, might provoke disgust in the middle-class reader and motivate 
as such a moving away – paradoxically, though, readers are often drawn to these 
figures. I do, however, diverge from Tomkins in the sense that I do not separate strictly 
between affect, emotion and feeling in my thesis. Owing to the methods and objectives 
of my research, i.e. me reading online representations, it is not possible for me to clearly 
separate when a reaction is conscious or unconscious. I have to be conscious about my 
affective reactions, feelings and emotions, otherwise I cannot write about them. Other 
scholars that distinguish between affect and emotion draw on Deleuze’s 
conceptualisation of affect:  
Deleuze proposes affect as distinct from emotion, as bodily meaning that pierces 
social interpretation, confounding its logic, and scrambling its expectations. 
Deleuze understands affect as describing the passage from one state to another, as 
an intensity characterized by an increase or decrease in power (Hemmings, 2005: 
552).  
As Clare Hemmings’ explanation suggests, Deleuze conceives affect as a pre-personal 
intensity that cuts across different human and non-human bodies (see also Deleuze, 
1978). Key theorists that follow Deleuze’s conception of affect are Massumi (2002) and 
Grossberg (2006). Massumi understands affect as an intensity which is different from 
emotion because they ‘follow different logics and pertain to different orders’ (2002: 27). 
From his perspective, affect is a force prior to and in excess of social and cultural 
inscription (Tyler et al., 2008: 87). Affect here is a vital materiality, it is an asocial, pre-
discursive and therefore pre-subjective intensity, whereas emotion is captured or tamed 
affect. For Massumi, emotion is the subjective expression and the sociolinguistic 
manifestations of an experience, i.e. affect (2002: 28). Emotions are ‘semantic fixations 
of the affective and the immediate, those social and cultural conventions that transform 
corporeal intensity to linguistic categories and meanings’ (Sundén, 2010a: 49). 
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Importantly, the transition from unconscious intensity to conscious symbolically 
embedded emotion leaves always an excess that cannot be grasped in language. Affect 
escapes not only language but also the confinement of the singular body whose vitality 
or potential for interaction it is.61 Such an understanding of affect makes clear why 
affect is so attractive to scholars like Abel, Grusin or Shaviro: it provides a tool and 
critical vocabulary to theorise feelings and meanings that we, at least in the first 
moment, cannot make sense of. My understanding of affect is not informed by 
Massumi, but it encompasses traces of Deleuze. This becomes apparent in, for instance, 
my discussions of Lady Gaga or Gwyneth Paltrow on Dlisted.com. In these moments, I 
tease out how humour – as an affective-discursive force – can grab us and re-orientate 
us away from traditional ideas and values. 
Scholars that see affect and emotion as overlapping include Sianne Ngai, who 
argues that,  
[a]t the end of the day, the difference between emotion and affect is still intended 
to solve the same basic and fundamentally descriptive problem it was coined in 
psychoanalytic practice to solve: that of distinguishing first-person from third-
person feeling, and, by extension, feeling that is contained by an identity from 
feeling that is not (2005: 27).  
Therefore Ngai uses emotion and affect interchangeably. Berlant challenges the strict 
distinction between bodily affect, personal feelings and social emotion by arguing that 
feeling compassion with someone who suffers might find resonance in our ‘hearts and 
tears,’ and might as such feel pre-social and bodily, but that feeling of compassion is 
deeply embedded in social hierarchies and social process of othering (2004: 4). She 
writes: ‘[i]n operation, compassion is a term denoting privilege: the sufferer is over 
                                                             
61Massumi has been widely criticised for discharging an entire history of feminist, queer and 
critical race critique that was (and is) sensitive to the political, social and economic structures of 
exclusion, and has developed counter-hegemonic strategies (Hemmings, 2005: 557-558; Tyler et al., 
2008). His dualistic model of ‘liberating and mobilising’ affect versus ‘rigidifying’ meaning has also been 
criticised as ‘moralistic’ (Koivunen 2010: 24) 
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there’ (Ibid.). However, she nevertheless still draws some distinction, as emotional 
attachments like optimism can cause a wide range of contrasting affects such as joy, 
outrage and anger, which may be felt as hurtful. She phrases this as the distinction 
between the structure of an emotion and its (variable) affective qualities. For her, affect 
is a relation, an attachment that shapes public feeling and, as a consequence, personal 
feeling. Cvetkovich uses affect in a general sense that encompasses feeling, emotion, 
impulses and desires and their historical social construction. Yet she prefers the term 
feeling ‘because it is intentionally imprecise, retaining the ambiguity between feelings 
as a bodily sensations and feelings and psychic and cognitive experiences’ (2012: 4). 
Her description highlights the vernacular function of feeling as a concept that brings 
body and mind together, thereby disrupting the Cartesian body/mind split. Like scholars 
such as Isobel Armstrong (2000), who argue that sensing and making sense (body and 
mind) play together in the act of reading, Cvetkovich reads ‘archives of feeling’ to 
explore ‘cultural texts as repositories of feelings and emotions, which are encoded not 
only in their content of the texts themselves but in the practices that surround their 
production and reception’ (2003: 7). Cvetkovich’s work is valuable for this project 
because she theorises our engagement with cultural texts as affective, as something we 
feel, and she explores ‘how affective experiences can provide the basis for new cultures’ 
(Ibid.). Humour, for instance, is in her understanding an affect that can ‘make room for 
another kind of story’ (2003: 23) besides traumatic experiences. Her aim is to tease out 
how affect, which is for her always the foundation of public cultures, can be productive 
and enable new ways of thinking, even if it is associated with negative experiences such 
as trauma or depression.  
Throughout this thesis, I draw on the work of Ahmed who also understands 
affect, emotion and feelings also as overlapping. Ahmed renders Massumi’s strict 
distinction between affect and emotion problematic because she argues that they can be 
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separated analytically, but not as lived experience. No matter how immediate sensation 
appears, how unconscious it may be or how it might escape language, for Ahmed it is 
always mediated through our body and our skin, both of which have a cultural history. 
Hence, everything ‘we feel is tight to what we already know’ (Sundén, 2010: 51). Her 
critique of the conceptualisation of affect as something other than emotion leads her to 
primarily speak of emotion, but in a more elastic and composite way. From Ahmed’s 
perspective, feelings are not innate, but neither do they come from the outside. Rather, 
she understands them as coming into being through exchange, through circulation 
between bodies and signs. They are produced as ‘effects of circulation and interaction’ 
(2004a: 8). In her concept of ‘affective economies’, Ahmed draws on Marx’s theory of 
capital to develop a framework that illustrates the way in which affect ‘travels’ and 
accumulates value through circulation.62 She writes:  
Affect does not reside in an object or sign, but is an effect of the circulation 
between objects and signs (= the accumulation of affective value). Signs increase 
in affective value as an effect of the movement between signs: the more signs 
circulate, the more affective they become. (Ahmed, 2004a: 45) 
Yet this circulation of affect can also fix the objects of emotions. For instance, some 
figures have been associated with particular discourses and practices so often that 
certain meanings and affects have begun to stick to them. The particular figure or 
representation is then seen as having certain characteristics, as being good or bad, rather 
than seeming good or bad, owing both to the particular way in which we come into 
contact with the figure, and its own history of sticky associations (Ahmed, 2004b: 127-
128; 2011). Affect sticks people, values and ideas together, sometimes so tightly that 
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 The idea that emotions are innate – and as such by-products of evolutionary necessity, 
protecting humans from danger – is widespread within the fields of biology and anthropology. For 
instance, Paul Ekman (1993) argues, based on his study in Papua New Guinea, that there are six universal 
facial expressions that communicate our feelings: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise and disgust. 
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the object becomes what sticks to it: the stranger is not someone who elicits fear in me, 
the stranger is danger. Ahmed explains: 
I have suggested that emotions, which respond to the proximity of others, do not 
respond the way that they do because of the inherent characteristics of others: we 
do not respond with love or hate because others are loveable or hateful. It is 
through affective encounters that objects and others are perceived as having 
attributes, which ‘gives’ the subject an identity that is apart from others. (2004a: 
52-53) 
Here, Ahmed demonstrates how feelings are socially and culturally constructed, how 
they travel, accumulate or ‘stick’ to certain bodies, but also how they conceal their 
constructed nature and appear natural, and authentic. 
If we take seriously the notion that affect travels along normative discourses and 
practices, it becomes clear that emotions are linked to power relations and social 
hierarchies that endow others with meanings or value (Ahmed, 2004a: 4), and which 
can reify power inequalities. A number of feminist theorists explore the ways in which 
affect keeps systems of unequal power relations alive: Tyler asserts for instance that 
‘our disgust reactions [towards particular figures and media representations] are often 
revealing of wider social power relations (2008: 19). Similarly, Berlant explores how an 
optimistic attachment to the fantasy of a ‘good life’ is actually an obstacle to one’s 
flourishing because it cannot be lived in times of ‘ordinary crisis’ and keeps our current 
precarious economic, social and political situation in place (2011). For Ahmed, a 
‘politics of emotion’ involves an analysis of how ‘emotions can attach us to the very 
conditions of our subordination’ (2004a: 12), how others become objects of our 
feelings, and how emotions stick to certain bodies more than others. In The Promise of 
Happiness, Ahmed explores how ideas which are culturally deemed as good, such as 
happiness, function to establish a shared horizon of social expectations that link bodies 
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together – I am only happy if you are happy – aligning them and directing them towards 
certain life choices and away from others. Through the figures of the feminist killjoy, 
the unhappy queer, the angry black woman, and the melancholic migrant, she critiques 
the notion that happiness is inherently a good thing by illustrating how happiness is 
used to justify social oppression, and the affective and moral work that subjects take on 
in order to fulfil the ‘happiness duty’: 
Your unhappiness would threaten my happiness. If my happiness is dependent 
upon your happiness, then you have the power to determine my happiness. You 
might thus feel obliged to conceal your unhappiness in order to protect my 
happiness. You have a duty to be happy for me. (Ahmed, 2010: 91; emphasis in 
original) 
Ahmed also demonstrates how objects, signs and bodies stick together through the 
promise of happiness, how ‘things become good, or acquire their value as good, insofar 
as they point towards happiness’ (2010: 26). Her work illustrates how humour can be 
seen as a shared orientation that defines – as I show in Chapter Four – what is good and 
tasteful and what is not. 
Drawing on these various critical literatures, I understand affect as an ambiguous 
force. I do not strictly follow the intersection between pre-conscious affect, personal 
feeling and social emotion, but rather I see these categories as entangled and 
overlapping. I understand affect as an intensity or a force that shapes the relations 
between different animate and inanimate bodies but this intensity is not outside of 
cultural discourses and practices but rather part of it. In my understanding, following 
Ahmed, affect orientates bodies and objects in a certain way, towards – or away from – 
each other. It is the force that literally moves us in our bodies in ways that (sometimes) 
cannot be articulated in language by naming it or making sense of it. One might think 
here of the shiver down the spine or the gut feeling that we experience when 
  
 67
encountering an online representation. In this sense, affect points to the experience of 
intensities, to the way in which media images are felt through bodies, a feeling that 
seems inexplicable, even paradoxical, and might not be translatable into words. As this 
description already illustrates, for me, as for other feminist cultural theorists, affect and 
feeling are difficult to distinguish. I use emotion when I refer to specific emotive states 
such as anger, happiness or disgust. However, as Ahmed has shown, emotions are never 
simply in bodies but become through circulation and relation with our surrounding. 
Furthermore emotions are often accompanied by bodily feelings: disgust, for instance, is 
often linked to nausea. Hence emotion cannot be understood without the body and 
bodily feeling. Thus, although I am aware of the different connotations and dimensions 
affect, feeling and emotion have, I, like Cvetkovich, tend to use affect in a generic 
sense, rather than in the more specific Deleuzian sense in which affect is strictly 
different from emotion. In my analysis, affect is a category that can encompass feelings 
and emotions as well as gut reactions, impulses and sensory experiences. As such, my 
understanding of affect is not only informed by feminist scholars and the politics of 
emotions, but also draws on Deleuzian understandings of affect as ‘an ability to affect 
and be affected, […] as a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one 
experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in 
that body’s capacity to act’ (Massumi, 1987: xvii). Throughout my core chapters, I 
explore how my encounters with humorous online representations affect me and are 
affected by me in sometimes surprising and contradictory ways. But a Deleuzian 
understanding of affect is especially productive for my considerations in the 
Conclusion: here I consider if online representations which emerge through different 
contacts of animate and in-animate bodies are merely products of a society of control, or 
if they can enable new ways of thinking and connecting with our surrounding. On the 
whole, my use of affect is mainly informed by feminist scholars who theorise affect as a 
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relation that shapes and is shaped through social contact. This relation can be felt in the 
individual body as a feeling or an emotion but it also shapes communities, societies and 
political structures by aligning bodies in the same way. And yet it also contains ideas 
about affect as a disruptive force and intensity that cannot be foreseen, and opens these 
online celebrity representations up for a new reading and understanding. In the next 
section, I explore this potential of affect in more detail when I elaborate how scholars in 
digital cultures have theorised affect.  
 
Digital Culture and Affect 
Digital culture has often been understood as ‘the virtual’: separate from, and opposed, to 
material reality, and to senses like touch and smell. This lack of physicality and 
geographical proximity is either celebrated, and seen as opening up new spaces of 
interaction and subversion, or regarded with scepticism and anxiety. Early cybertopian 
feminist writers such as Sherry Turkle, for instance, celebrate the absence of bodily 
markers in online spaces. Leaving the possibly flawed body with impeding physical 
markers such as gender and race behind, the individual online is a process considered to 
be ‘free floating’, and therefore full of creative agency (Turkle, 1995). As Vivian 
Sobchack suggests, according to these theorists, ‘man’s lived body […] in all its 
material facticity, its situatedness, its finitude, and its limitations, seemed to have been 
transubstantiated through textualization into the infinite possibility, receptivity, 
literality, and irresponsibility of the “pure” sign’ (2004: 167). Dis-embodied 
cybertopian ideas have been critiqued by other feminist scholars who consider the 
privileged position of the mind online to be merely a reiteration of the violent 
mind/body dualism that has for so long excluded women from public life. Jenny Sundén 
writes for instance that ‘where “the meat” is left behind and disembodied consciousness 
released from its earthly groundings, the Cartesian separation of mind from body is no 
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longer a contradiction, a divide under threat, but re-articulated and fortified’ (2001: 
216). This argument has also been expressed earlier by Nancy Paterson, who argues that 
‘[a]ccess to machinery and technology has been culturally sex-typed as masculine. In 
maintaining control over new technologies and by promoting and adhering to a 
technological world view, men have attempted to silence [women]’ (1998: n.p.) A 
number of theorists challenge the radical separation between the imaginary and the 
‘real’ through a post-structuralist lens. Through this approach, they illustrate how the 
body in front of the screen shapes the performance of the body on the screen. Rather 
than the body being left behind, they argue that the body instead gets ‘translated’ into 
cyberspace.63 This happens either through the visual representation of the ‘real’ life 
body through images, webcams or video material, or through the discursive 
performance of users. Written texts seem to construct a gendered, sexualised and race 
body even if no visual cues are given, because users employ gendered, sexed and raced 
scripts and norms from the ‘offline’ world in order to create authenticity online, which 
needs to be recognised by other users and can then enable meaningful interaction. In 
other words, the body and the experience that we have made in this body shape our 
online performances.  
The intermeshing of online performance and lived embodiment is also 
demonstrated by Kristin Langellier and Eric Peterson in their study of weblog users:  
[A] person can read or write a weblog only to the extent that she or he is bodily 
capable of doing so […] reading and writing weblogs requires bodily discipline 
(the ability to orient, reach for, and grasp or accomplish a task) and a disciplined 
                                                             
63
 Kate O’Riordan and David J. Phillips (2007) challenge the notion that cyberspaces would 
create unproblematic spaces of belonging for queer identities by pointing out how oppressive online and 
offline practices are interwoven. Lisa Nakamura (2002) critiques cybertopian ideas about the unmarked 
body online in her investigation into how race becomes translated online. Furthermore, Niels van Doorn, 
Sally Wyatt and Liesbet van Zoonen (2008) argue that gender becomes translated through the textual 
performance online. 
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body (a body trained to read and write, to manipulate a keyboard, to use 
computers and access the Internet). (2004:166) 
Thus, the rhetoric of cyberspace might be one of immateriality, but online practices are 
deeply influenced by the material conditions of the offline world. This becomes 
apparent when we think about the digital divide, which makes obvious that only some 
bodies have the material resources and equipment to go online and participate. But, as 
Langellier and Peterson illustrate, the materiality of cyberspace is also highlighted when 
we consider what kind of body sits in front of the screen. This body shapes the 
materiality of its online representation through his/her textual performance (or the 
modes of representations he/she chooses), thereby giving the online representation a 
texture, a particular feel. As this shows, cyberspace is shaped by our ‘offline’ lives and 
the experiences that we have gained there. Nevertheless, discussions about digital 
culture have historically been framed within a language of lack and loss. Rather than 
making ‘real’ sensuous experiences (i.e. those made in the ‘offline’ world), cyberspace 
is understood to simulate these experiences through means that can only be inadequate. 
Online environments thereby deprive us of the richness and synaesthesia of real feeling, 
replacing it with a bad copy. An example of these early accounts of cyberspace is shown 
in Clifford Stoll’s assertion that 
[much] of what happens over the networks is a metaphor – we chat without 
speaking, smile without grinning, and hug without touching […]. How sad – to 
dwell in a metaphor without living experience. The only sensations are a glowing 
screen, the touch of a keyboard, and the sound of an occasional bleep. All 
synthetic. (1995: 43-44) 
As this quotation shows, cyberspace was often conceived not only as dis-embodied, but 
in consequence also as dis-affected. 
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This idea of digital culture as void of sensuous experiences has been challenged 
by media and technology scholars who draw on the work of Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987) to rethink the connections between body and technology. Affect is not 
conceptualised here as personal, but rather as a force that cuts across and connects 
different bodies. Through notions of rhizomes, networks, assemblages and the virtual, 
‘affect is in these approaches first and foremost devised as potentiality, as a positively 
charged category of futurity, change and (at least possible) freedom’ (Koivunen, 2010: 
16). Even though such an understanding of affect might seem overtly celebratory of the 
possibilities of digital cultures, it is very productive because it allows us to understand 
digital culture as tactile and palpable, with the ability to enable experiences and 
knowledges that might escape traditional forms of representation. This Deleuzian-
influenced school of thought in digital cultures is important for my project as I theorise 
digital culture as material and sensuous through the concept of skin. My claim is that 
online celebrity representations have a certain texture or feel which is produced not only 
through the body in front of the screen but also through particular technologies. This 
materiality might not be something that is accounted for in more traditional textual 
analysis or semiotics, but it is still important for our reading and understanding of online 
representations. Texture gives us an idea of how online celebrity representations might 
feel. This shapes our understanding of such representations not only through cognitive 
processes and conscious decoding, but also through the immediate cues and feelings we 
get through our encounter with them. Hence, cyberspace is sensuous even if online 
touching and feeling might be different from our offline touching and feeling. 
Scholars that inspire my reading of online representations include Luciana Parisi 
and Tiziana Terranova (2001) and Laura U. Marks (2002). Informed by new materialist 
critique and phenomenology, they draw attention to the affective intensities produced 
by encounters with digital images, as well as to the importance of the technological base 
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and make-up of media technologies, their material properties, programmability, 
operations, and logics of action that ‘generate text and images rather than merely 
represent or reproduce what exists elsewhere’ (Chun, 2004: 27; see also: Marks, 2002: 
163). Parisi and Terranova draw on Massumi’s conceptualisation of affect as pre-
personal intensity to argue that digital images, in opposition to celluloid film, work 
through an affective immediacy that does not allow any distance that would be 
necessary for a controlling gaze: 
Films that use digital effects overwhelm the spectator with their demand for a 
participation that is not so much about controlling as about being inundated by 
liquid images. Far from determining a relation between inside and outside, subject 
and object, digital effects tackle the mediatic interface between the body and the 
image (Parisi & Terranova, 2001: 122).  
They argue that digital images ‘convey the power of affect’ rather than enabling 
distance through which affect can be filtered down to emotions, and as such become 
organised and limited. The possibility of digital media to affect the body directly 
illustrates for them the agency of materiality. Marks is more influenced by 
phenomenological approaches than new materialism, but she also argues for the 
immediacy that certain images, produced through particular technologies and camera 
angles, can enable. For her, images can have ‘haptic’ and ‘optic’ qualities. Even though 
the boundaries are often blurry, optic visuality privileges the representational power of 
the image, giving a sense of distance and mastery; haptic visuality tends to escape 
mediation and blurs the boundary between perceiver and object. Haptic images are 
encountered by the skin as well as the eyes, and thus encourage a ‘bodily relation 
between the viewer and the image’ (Marks, 2000: 164). For Marks, haptic visuality is 
concerned with the texture of an image. The haptic  
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invites a look that moves on the surface plane of the screen for some time before 
the viewer realizes what she or he is beholding. […] While optical perception 
privileges the representational power of the image, haptic perception privileges 
the material presence of the image. (Marks, 2000: 163)  
As such, haptic images are experienced in a different way to optic images, and give rise 
to different resonances and feelings of intimacy. For haptic images, the viewer must 
bring his or her resources of memory and imagination to complete them. The haptic 
image forces the viewer to contemplate the image critically and affectively instead of 
being pulled into a predictable narrative. These images are full of tactile qualities, and 
blur the boundary between perceiver and object.  
A number of scholars in media and digital culture have drawn on the large body 
of feminist and queer scholarship on politics of emotion – these include, for example, 
Joanne Garde-Hansen and Kristyn Gorton in their work on online emotions (2013), and 
Adi Kuntsman and Athina Karatzogianni (2012a) in their collection on the ‘affective 
fabric’ of the digital, which illustrates how affective structures mediate between the 
actual and the digital virtual. Furthermore, in Online Belongings (2009), Debora 
Ferreday investigates the dynamics of fantasy, gender and affect in online settings, and 
analyses how feelings of belonging and affective attachment are produced and 
circulated in online communities and e-commerce websites. She draws on Tomkins’s 
understanding of affect and makes clear that the affective registers involved are not only 
‘positive’, but that they also entail the circulation of hate, acts of mourning and 
sensations of disgust. In her work she follows Cvetkovich and charts the role of affect 
on websites. These scholars illustrate, even though through different conceptualisations 
of affect, the affective quality of cyberspace, and have helped me to develop my own 
affective reading of cyberspace. My affective reading through skin, however, is mostly 
inspired by the work of Paasonen (2007, 2010). Paasonen rethinks the relationship 
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between online pornography and the viewer’s body as a sensuous and affective process, 
a reading that challenges notions of visual mastery without glossing over the structural 
power inequalities that shape online surroundings. Through the concept of ‘affective 
resonance’, she theorises affect as personal, human and social, but also as the sensory, 
synaesthetic, and visceral aspect of encountering images. Paasonen explores ideas of 
affective labour, as well as considerations of how ‘experiences and articulations of 
affect attach people, objects, texts and values together and pull them apart’ (2011: 22; 
see also: Ahmed, 2004a; 2010). Her multilayered use of affect is suitable for an 
investigation of online representations because online media might enable through 
technology new experiences and feelings, yet it is also shaped through offline power 
relations which influence the representational patterns online. From Passonen’s 
perspective, ‘the internet is about mediation and representation but equally about 
communication and exchange, technical protocols and affordances, and affective, 
visceral gut reaction. It is not one thing or the other but an assemblage of factors and 
actors that cut through and build onto one another’ (2011: 12). Importantly, Paasonen’s 
affective reading of online pornography is open to the transformative and surprising 
elements enabled by new media technology, while also taking into account the history 
and genre of media: 
New media can be made familiar (or domesticated) through analogies to previous 
media, and familiar forms of representation and interaction help to bridge 
differences in technological makeup (no matter how radical these may be). At the 
same time, these analogies have shortcomings in not allowing for differences in 
materiality and technological horizons of possibility. (2011: 102-103) 
This illustrates how online formations like celebrity gossip blogs often invite us to draw 
comparisons to more traditional media formats. The digital photos of celebrities that the 
blogs I examine entail can be compared to photographs in print magazines, and the 
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videos that they have embedded can be compared to film or television. I agree with 
Paasonen that this can be helpful, because literature on more traditional media forms 
can inform online research, but that an overreliance on these comparisons masks the 
specificities of online media.  
Paasonen’s work is important for this thesis because it is specifically about 
online media, and allows for an analysis in which ‘the material and the textual’, the 
sensuous and sense, ‘matter and meaning’ flow into each other (2011: 25). Her notion 
of an ‘discomforting commute’, which travels between a distant, more structural reading 
and a close affective reading, allows me to understand online representations as 
affective formations with both material and semiotic qualities. Her work shows how 
circuits of money, patterns of representation and questions of genre structure online 
representations, without closing up the transformative and surprising experiences online 
porn can engender. It links the process of making sense to the level of being moved, and 
transformed, by whatever one interacts with. Paasonen’s theorisations of online 
pornography influence my affective reading of humorous online representations of 
celebrities in many ways: not only do I draw on her definition of affect as feelings, 
emotions, sensations, gut reactions and intensities that might be at times more or less 
defined by cultural discourses, I also share with her the conviction that everyday genres 
that might be commonly categorised as low and of less cultural value are not as 
straightforward and uncomplicated as we might first presume. A close attention to 
surprising affects and reactions, as well as takings seriously the material and 
technological affordances of online media, takes us beyond repetitive readings of them 
and allows us to understand their potentialities better: What can they do besides 
reiterating and exacerbating norms that are already there? 
In this section, I have shown how theorists have made use of affect to rethink the 
entanglement of embodiment, materiality and digital technology. These scholars inform 
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my analysis in which I use skin as a heuristic device to rethink the connections between 
affect, embodiment and technology in celebrity gossip blogs. Their focus on 
immediacy, gut reactions and fantasy, which are provoked through the encounter of 
technology and body, inspire my reading of these blogs, and give me a critical 
vocabulary to grasp these ‘ethereal’ experiences.     
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated how literatures about audience studies, celebrity culture, 
affect theory and digital culture inform my critical framework. I have shown that these 
different archives contain theorisations of affect which help to re-visit and re-think the 
methodologies and concepts in their particular field. I began by demonstrating how 
different media formats encourage different ways of theorising the meaning-making 
processes of audiences. By tracing how theorists in media and cultural studies have 
conceptualised meaning-making in film, television and new forms of television (e.g. 
reality television and make-over shows), I have illustrated how affect and emotion 
became an increasingly important aspect in the ways in which we theorise 
representations. I then explored how scholars have long investigated the affective 
quality of celebrities. By mapping affect in early psychoanalytically informed 
approaches, as well as in post-structuralist readings and in more recent discussions 
about the emotional performances of celebrities, I have highlighted that the affective 
relationship between celebrity and audience cannot be examined without the wider 
socio-political context in which they are embedded, or without the context of new 
media and technology through which their representations are produced. Reading this 
literature with a focus on affect brings to the fore how my project is not only informed 
by this trajectory, but also how it contributes to it. The contribution of my analysis lies 
in the way in which I read those humorous online celebrity representations through a 
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specific lens (skin) which brings two schools of thought into dialogue: theories of the 
politics of emotions and scholarship on digital cultures. In order to flesh out my use of 
affect, I delineated the different discussions in which feelings, emotions and affect have 
been framed in media and cultural studies. As I have shown, my use of affect is mainly 
informed by feminist work on the politics of emotion, but it also contains traces of a 
Deleuzian understanding of affect. The productivity of the later was highlighted through 
my examination of the affective quality of cyberspace. As I have illustrated, many 
scholars in digital culture understand affect as an intensity that shapes and re-shapes 
differently the human and non-human bodies that it encounters. Such a Deleuzian 
conceptualisation of affect as a precognitive sensory experience and relation to 
surroundings enables us to tease out the sensuous and material quality of online 
environments. Hence, I have demonstrated in this chapter that I understand affect, 
emotions and feelings as overlapping rather than distinct from each other. As such, I 
conceive affect as embodied, lived, and social, yet also as intensities and forces that in-
animate objects like digital photographs or GIFs can perform, and which can push the 
body in unforeseen directions. Overall, this chapter has fleshed out a critical framework 
through which I develop my reading through the skin. In the next chapter, I begin with 
my empirical analysis. I illustrate how these theoretical considerations allow me to trace 
the complex ways in which celebrity gossip blogs move their readers in affective and 
embodied ways, thereby producing ideas about femininity.  
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Chapter Two 
Not only Seeing but Feeling:  
The Affective Production of Femininity  
in Celebrity Gossip Blogs 
 
 
Feminist scholars have often argued that skin, as the fleshly envelope of the ‘docile 
body’, has a special function in the communication and construction of femininity. Jane 
Kenway and Elizabeth Bullen (2011) explore, for instance, how current narratives of the 
beauty industry concerning the ‘right’ skin colour (tanning/whitening) and the ‘proper’ 
skin shape (cosmetic surgery) for women normalise and control femininities. 64This 
highlights that skin is not mere matter, but also a doing that comes to signify gender 
through different practices and discourses ranging from the medical and scientific to the 
aesthetic. In a similar vein, Ahmed and Stacey (2001) illustrate the ways in which 
femininity and skin become intertwined through cultural ideas not only about what 
feminine skin should look like, but also, and perhaps more importantly, what it should 
feel like. They argue that in our Western neoliberal consumer culture, feminine skin 
must be smooth, soft and tight without any markers of otherness such as wrinkles, 
cellulite or scars. Clearly, smooth and tight skin is often read as the external evidence of 
an inner self that constantly self-monitors and self-improves through the ‘right’ 
consumption of beauty products. What is noteworthy for my argument is that this kind 
of skin makes cultural ideals about femininity as young and tender not only visible but 
also palpable. To put another way: proper femininity is not only a matter of seeing, but 
                                                             
64
 Normalisation refers to a number of social discourses and practices through which ideas, 
behaviours and subjects come to be seen as normal or natural in everyday life. In Discipline and Punish 
(1991[1975]), Foucault develops the concept of normalisation in the context of disciplinary power, and 
argues that normalisation produces an idealised norms of conduct – for example, the way a soldier should 
stand, march, present arms, and so on, as defined in minute detail – according to which the subject is then 
rewarded or punished for conforming to or deviating from this ideal. The crucial point about 
normalisation is that these disciplinary regimes operate seemingly without external pressure and force. 
The ideal disciplinary individual has internalised the rules and conforms to them. Feminist theorists such 
as Bordo (1993) and Cressida Heyes  (2007) use Foucault’s account of normalisation to reveal the forces 
through which the female subject is produced within a purportedly free, neoliberal consumer culture. 
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also a matter of feeling. Online celebrity representations of ‘proper’ femininity would 
have a particular feel if we could touch them. The capability of skin to highlight the 
importance of touch and feeling for our meaning-making is central to this chapter. 
I begin by exploring how we read celebrity online representations not only 
through our gaze but through our skin. I draw attention to the complex ways in which 
representations on Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com touch us in embodied 
ways, thereby mediating ideas about femininity not only through seeing, but also 
through feeling. I investigate online representations of female celebrities whose skin is 
either cosmetically re-done through surgery or digitally re-touched through technologies 
like Photoshop.65 More specifically, I elaborate how celebrities that have altered their 
skins through such technologies are understood in these gossip blogs. I focus on 
cosmetic surgery and Photoshop for two reasons: firstly, cosmetic surgery and 
Photoshop might be different technologies that work on different skins (cosmetic 
surgery works on the ‘real’ skin whereas Photoshop alters the represented skin), but 
they are both practices through which celebrity skin is commonly manipulated, and both 
practices therefore raise questions about authenticity and artificiality. Depending on 
whether these skin manipulations can pass in the public opinion as ‘natural looking’ and 
therefore authentic, or as ‘too excessive’ and therefore fake, the celebrity becomes 
positioned accordingly as either immaculate or monstrous. The second reason is that 
both beauty practices remind us that skin cannot be fully grasped through the gaze, but 
that it also has the potential to betray us or to be misread. They are therefore suitable 
starting points for rethinking and challenging the privileged position that visibility 
commonly holds in discussions about meaning-making.66 
                                                             
65I use Photoshop (Adobe Photoshop Software) here as an umbrella term to signify digital image 
manipulation, and to refer to a range of software such as MS Paint, GIMP or Cine Paint. 
66
 The privileged position of the sense of visibility is justified in the Western world through 
power binaries which align seeing with objectivity, distance and reason, whereas other senses, especially 
touching, are associated with closeness, intimacy, the blurring of borders and emotion. This binary 
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In my discussion of the production of femininity in celebrity gossip blogs, I 
argue that female celebrities are interpellated to inhabit what I call ‘iconic’ skin. In 
semiotics, iconic signs are visual signs that bear a certain resemblance or likeness to the 
object, person or event to which they refer (Peirce, 1991: 181-183). However, iconic 
skin does not resemble an original immaculate skin that we find in real life, because this 
immaculate skin is unachievable and, crucially, unsustainable. A celebrity might 
embody iconic skin momentarily, in a particular photograph or scene, through the help 
of make-up, or Photoshop and lighting techniques, but when the light changes or the 
body moves, this immaculate bodily surface can become wrinkled and imperfect. 
Nevertheless, I suggest that celebrity skin can be seen as iconic when it resembles 
shared cultural ideas about an ideal feminine skin, where this ideal is taken to mean skin 
that is immaculate, glowing, light and evenly toned. The qualities of iconic skin have 
mainly two functions: firstly, they make the celebrity highly marketable owing to the 
ability to effortlessly change from one role into the next, with no markers of otherness 
like scars, skin conditions or uneven skin tone to hinder this smooth transition. Iconic 
skin also increases the celebrity’s selling power. As Stacey (1994) demonstrates in her 
work on beauty products such as ‘Lux Toilet Soap’, and Kathy Peiss(1998) shows in her 
work on ‘Max Factor’, celebrities are often understood as influencing the consumer 
habits of women who desire to inhabit a skin like that of a celebrity. Ordinary women 
try to even out skin tone and correct other visible flaws on the skin with foundation and 
concealers, and in doing so they imitate celebrity skin presented to them ubiquitously 
through advertising, films, magazines and online media. Secondly, iconic skin 
reinforces hegemonic and therefore highly desirable ideals of femininity. It is 
understood as the external, highly visible signifier of inner qualities such as morality, 
purity and spirituality. As I show in Chapter Four, these positive connotations, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
between seeing and touching is also gendered, with seeing associated with masculinity and touching with 
femininity. 
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feelings that are associated with them, are deeply connected to questions of race because 
iconic skin is often understood to be white skin. Yet, it is not only raced but also classed 
because iconic skin is the visible sign of privilege (Iqani, 2012: 322). Hence, when 
female celebrities carry iconic skin, they embody cultural fantasies of goodness, of 
whiteness and wealth.  
In this chapter, I am not only concerned with celebrities that inhabit iconic skin, 
I also explore how celebrities that fail to carry this skin (through the ‘wrong’ use of 
cosmetic surgery and Photoshop) are affectively represented on Dlisted.com, 
Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com. I aim to extend a semiotic or visual analysis of these 
re-done and re-touched skins, by drawing attention to the multiple ways in which their 
skins are policed and ridiculed but also how they can become resignified and 
rehabilitated online. This means paying close attention to the technological tools and 
possibilities that both bloggers and users have and which can re-touch these online 
representations. I explore, for instance, how commenting, hyperlinks and image 
manipulation can re-signify celebrity skin by moving the blog reader in embodied and 
affective ways. Furthermore, I elaborate on questions about the texture and materiality 
of online celebrity representations: how would it feel to touch the represented celebrity 
skin? I argue that these are important questions that shape how ideas of femininity are 
affectively produced in celebrity gossip blogs. In the first part of the chapter, I focus on 
technologies of cosmetic surgery, and explore, by moving from surgery on publicly 
visible skin to surgery on hidden skin, how the three blogs read female celebrities that 
have made use of surgery in different ways. On Dlisted.com, for example, celebrities 
that try to embody the heteronormative norms of feminine skin too excessively are 
ridiculed, while grotesque skin can be celebrated for its potential to denaturalise gender. 
On Perezhilton.com, cosmetically altered skin needs to be publicly acknowledged or 
confessed to in order to flag respectable femininity, while on Jezebel.com proper 
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femininity inhabits natural and uncut skin. I discuss the assumptions upon which these 
ideas of proper and improper femininities are based, with a particular focus on the 
problematic nature/culture binary. In the second part of this chapter, I draw attention to 
the ways in which Photoshop is discussed in those blogs. Moving from subtly to 
extremely manipulated digital photographs, I examine how Photoshop is used to redraw 
the lines between proper and improper femininities. I discuss how questions of texture, 
materiality and affect influence our reading of these celebrity online representations. 
Overall, this chapter introduces my key argument that how we make meaning of online 
celebrity representations is it not only a matter of vision, of what we see in front of us 
on the screen, but it is also shaped by touching and feeling. 
 
Shifting Gazes, Feelings and Cosmetic Surgery 
Cosmetic surgery has a prominent place in the world of celebrities, as many owe their 
fame to their carefully staged and managed appearance.67Celebrities that have gone too 
far in their use of cosmetic surgery might be the target of social derision, but going too 
far can also be a way to become a celebrity. People such as Jocelyn Wildenstein, for 
instance, owe their celebrity status purely to their grotesque and monstrous appearance, 
caused by an excessive use of cosmetic surgery. Wildenstein was a low-profile New 
York socialite before she became infamous for her excessive use of cosmetic surgery, 
which left her face too artificial for reality. 68 Meredith Jones (2008) argues that 
celebrities who have made excessive use of cosmetic surgery have two functions: on the 
one hand, they represent a monstrous and abject femininity in their violation of the 
                                                             
67Anne Anlin Cheng (2011) argues that skin, as the visible surface that we see in front of us, and 
the means by which we read gendered and racialised differences, is crucial for the formation of a celebrity 
figure. Virginia Blum argues that cosmetic surgery holds such a prominent place in celebrity culture 
because celebrities try to imitate through this practice their own screen image which has been altered by 
cameras and lighting (2003: 154). 
68 According to Meredith Jones, ‘[n]one of [Wildenstein’s] features are overly strange in 
themselves […]. But together they form an aesthetic that is distanced from the mainstream’ and make her 
appear monstrous (2008: 123). Furthermore, it needs to be highlighted that Wildenstein represents a 
different form of celebrity than, for instance, Dolly Parton. Yet, as I have argued in the Introduction I use 
celebrity as an umbrella term in this thesis to refer to very different kinds of public personas as celebrities.  
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borders of good taste, modesty and notions of naturalness through which Western ideas 
of idealised femininity are constructed. These women are perceived to have taken things 
‘too far’, and are consequently now forced to inhabit deformed and grotesque skin, 
which is read as the external evidence of their inner turmoil. On the other hand, 
celebrities who have undergone excessive amounts of surgery function to rehabilitate 
other skins – for instance, those skins that have been altered through cosmetic surgery, 
but upon which the traces of this intervention are less obvious, and which appear more 
natural. In this sense, celebrities that inhabit abject skin enable other surgically 
enhanced celebrities to pass as natural, and thereby contribute to the progressive 
normalisation of cosmetic surgery.69 
I want to expand on Jones’s argument by suggesting that what makes certain 
femininities abject is not only a matter of the quality and quantity of cosmetic surgery, 
but rather that this is dependent on the background against which this skin is read. I use 
the term ‘background’ to connote the knowledge an audience already has about a 
celebrity figure (the star image) and the context within which the viewer of the celebrity 
representation speaks (in the example I am about to discuss, this is Dlisted.com). The 
tension created by the intersection of these two realms inevitably influences how, and 
with what affects, we view the representation. In the following example of singer Dolly 
Parton and actress Jessica Lange, two celebrities that have made excessive use of 
cosmetic surgery, I illustrate how their skins become read against different backgrounds 
– Dlisted.com uses a queer, celebratory gaze to read Parton’s skin, but then 
subsequently uses a heteronormative, disciplining gaze to read Lange’s. The difference 
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 Jones explains this process of normalisation in terms of weight loss practices: ‘Weight-loss 
dieting might at first seem like a forceful intervention into “normal” eating habits. Dieting can be seen as 
an expression of self-hatred and a hurtful subordination to patriarchal beauty standards. Yet, when 
measured against more radical intervention such as anorexia then dieting appears like a reasonable and 
self-responsible practice’ (2008: 112). She argues that the process of normalisation always requires a 
monstrous other against which it can be measured and judged as less radical. 
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between these readings highlights the way in which the gaze of a located and embodied 
subject or online space shifts depending on what it encounters. 
 
 
Figure 1: ‘It’s Dolly Time’ (Michael K., 2011a) 
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Parton has had numerous cosmetic surgeries, including facelifts, upper and 
lower blepharoplasty, rhinoplasty, fat transfer, Botox and Restylane injections, breast 
implants, and chemical peelings.70 She is very open about these procedures and talks 
about them in interviews in a humorous and self-ironic way, which invites an ironic or 
queer reading of them. Yet, owing to the extent of her surgery, Parton’s skin can also be 
read as excessive, and as a failed attempt to embody conventional feminine beauty. Her 
skin shows ‘inappropriate extremes,’ and thereby violates the border of good taste, class 
and graceful aging, all of which are of high importance for the successful performance 
of proper femininity in a neoliberal consumer culture (Jones, 2008: 116-119). Yet 
despite her grotesque skin, Parton is celebrated on Dlisted.com: 
These pictures of Dolly spreading natural talent and sheer beauty to her fans at the 
Hard Rock Hotel in Hollywood, FL is for all you hating whores out there who are 
constantly spewing shit like ‘But Michael, Helen Mirren and Meryl Streep are 
women of a certain age who are organically beautiful and aging with dignity.’ To 
which I say, aging with dignity is overrated! (Michael, 2011a; emphasis in 
original) 
The ironic tone of this post is foregrounded through the way in which it highlights 
Parton’s ‘sheer beauty’ whilst simultaneously contrasting this description with a less 
than charming photograph that depicts her as monstrous, with a wide open mouth and 
stretched-out arms (Figure 1). Nevertheless, the post can still be read as an homage to 
Parton, and as one which empowers aging femininities because ‘aging with dignity is 
overrated’. The narrow boundaries of proper aging are now momentarily confounded by 
ironically installing a different aesthetic perception – Parton’s ‘sheer beauty’. Michael 
K.’s irony is not cynical, sarcastic or expressing a critical and negative attitude towards 
Parton and thereby limiting possible performances of femininity. Rather, it can be 
                                                             
70
 Blepharoplasty is cosmetic surgery on the eyelids, and rhinoplasty is cosmetic surgery on the 
nose. 
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understood as a form of irony which Pierre Fontanier (1977) describes as praising or 
flattering someone under the pretence of blaming or criticising. It can be seen as an 
asset of ‘camp humour’ (Babuscio, 1993), a kind of humour that grows out of a gay 
sensibility and will be discussed in more depth in the following chapter. In this sense, 
irony is here playful and affectionate, pointing towards the idea that Parton’s overly 
altered skin merely represents a different understanding of feminine beauty, but one that 
is nevertheless also legitimate.   
However, the negative tone of a 2009 Dlisted.com post about Jessica Lange 
illustrates that this alternative manner of aging is only deemed acceptable for certain 
celebrity figures: 
Unless Jessica Lange is starring in an Oxygen movie based on the life of Jocelyn 
Wildenstein, she has no business wearing that face. […] Humans don’t ripen like 
that. […] Jessica needs to gaze at Jane Fonda some more. That’s what her face 
should look like! […] And that plastic surgery comment doesn’t apply to Dolly. 
She’s a completely organic beauty. The Tennessee mountain air keeps her looking 
as fresh as baby’s breath. (Michael K., 2009) 
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Figure 2: ‘A Do And A Don’t’ (Michael K., 2009) 
 
In this instance, the ironic comment that ‘[Dolly] is a completely organic beauty’ can 
again be read in an affectionate way. Dlisted.com allows Parton to inhabit grotesque 
skin, but Lange, as a femininity that cannot pass as a queer icon and which merely 
seems to follow through her beauty practices heteronormative ideas about feminine 
appearance, is compared to women who ‘ripen’ properly and according to cultural 
standards, such as Jane Fonda. For Dlisted.com, Lange has ‘no business wearing that 
face,’ and her misuse of cosmetic surgery is policed while Parton’s excessive use is 
affectionately mocked and allowed. How might this different reading of overly altered 
skin be understood? Why does surgically altered feminine skin evoke such different 
affective responses? I now explore the two different backgrounds against which 
Parton’s and Lange’s skins are read, and demonstrate how these backgrounds enable 
two different femininities to emerge: one a subversive and, therefore, in the Dlisted.com 
context, proper femininity, and one an overly compliant and therefore failed femininity. 
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Dlisted.com understands subversive femininities as proper and compliant femininities 
as failed because, as I have argued in the Introduction to this thesis, it is a queer space 
which aims to scramble (hetero)normative notions. As such, it pursues a politics of the 
‘counterintuitive’ (Halberstam, 2012: xiv) that finds pleasure and potential in 
subjectivities that disturb the often violent workings of the normative rather than finding 
them upsetting or annoying. 
In this sense, Parton’s skin is celebrated on Dlisted.com because it is conceived 
as that which does not simply follow traditional forms of femininity. Rather, it is 
understood as a subversive act that disturbs traditional norms of femininity through 
over-performing them. I turn to Irigaray’s concept of mimesis in order to understand 
how the imitation of gendered norms can become a subversive act.71 Mimesis, from her 
perspective, is a form of resistance, in which women imperfectly imitate stereotypes of 
femininity in order to reveal such stereotypes and undermine them (1985b: 76).72 This 
resistance is necessary because, according to Irigaray, in the western phallocentric 
system, the feminine (‘the mother’ or ‘the woman’, but especially her eroticism and her 
sexual organs) is made invisible (1985a; 1985b). The feminine exists only to support the 
one, masculine sex, but is itself never allowed to exist in its own right. The one sex, 
which is metonymically related with the one ‘of the (male) sexual organ, of the proper 
                                                             
71
 Butler’s theory of performativity as repetitive acts that reinforce and create gender is similar to 
mimesis. Parodic performative acts such as drag are similar to Irigaray’s notion of mimesis because both 
strategies work through excessiveness and vision. Both strategies overdo the visual signifiers for 
femininity (for example big breasts, big lips and wrinkle-free skin) with such vicious, sarcastic excess so 
that the absurdity and constructed nature of these norms becomes visible, thereby blowing 
heteronormative structures and ideas about femininity apart (Shimizu, 2008). Both Butler and Irigaray 
view parodic repetition as a repetition with a difference and therefore potentially subversive. Yet 
Irigaray’s concept of mimesis differs from performativity because, for Butler, repetition is not aimed at 
creating ‘real’ femininity but rather to dismantle the fictional character of gender (1990: 137-138, 148). 
For Irigaray, mimesis is a strategic tool to carve a new language through which ‘real’ femininity can exist. 
Hence, whereas for Irigaray mimesis functions on a strategic level, for Butler it is constitutive of 
femininity (or gender). 
72
 Many are sceptical about the subversive potential of mimicry. Carol Anne Tyler argues, for 
instance, that it merely reinscribes white, middle-class femininity because the mimicked femininity is 
only a parody when measured against a normative style: ‘It is only from a middle-class point of view that 
Dolly Parton looks like a female impersonator’ (1991: 57). Kaja Silverman argues that mimicry entails 
the danger of a subject’s possible compliance with the assigned cultural image, thereby conflating the ‘I’ 
and the body image (1996: 205). I suggest, however, that the subversive potential of mimicry arises not 
from what is actually seen, but from its power to create suspicion that the image might be deceptive.   
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name, of the proper meaning’, installs a visual economy in which only forms that are 
solid and unified can be recognised; by contrast, forms that are multiple and fluid (i.e. 
feminine) remain invisible (Irigaray, 1985b: 26). Because, according to Irigaray, the 
feminine cannot be represented in this phallocentric visual economy, it therefore has no 
choice but to assume the feminine role that had been historically assigned: the role of 
the mirror, the imitator/mimic. However, by taking this role on deliberately and 
unfaithfully, the feminine can then unmask, through excess and overdoing, the inner 
workings of a system that construct subjectivity in this way. 
Why does Dlisted.com read Parton’s skin not as one which has gone too far, but 
rather as an expression of resistance through mimesis which, in turn, shifts her from the 
position of abject femininity to that of the empowered and celebrated female performer? 
I argue that this is because her skin is read against a queer background. Parton’s ‘star 
image’, together with Dlisted.com’s own background (its overt queer politics) invites a 
queer gaze, and she is constructed as a gay icon. Hence, even though Parton’s private 
reasons for cosmetic surgeries may indicate a serious attempt to enhance her feminine 
beauty, her skin is already placed in a camp context, with particular affects attached to 
it. This camp context associates her skin with parody, subversion, and the 
deconstruction of gendered and sexualised norms, all of which can cause anxiety, anger 
and frustration when perceived from a conservative background. Yet reading her skin as 
subversive can also give rise to such emotions as joy, delight and pleasure when 
approached from a position that is more critical towards gendered and sexualised norms. 
Hence, which emotions are produced depends entirely on the type of space in which 
Parton’s skin is read. Dlisted.com can be regarded as a queer online space in the sense 
that it celebrates, through often quite vulgar humour, the non-normative appearances, 
qualities, behaviours and practices of celebrities, non-celebrities, animals or even 
inanimate objects. This does not mean that the label ‘queer’ confines Dlisted.com to 
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certain readings, but it does mean that it is more likely to offer some readings than 
others. It is likely that Dlisted.com associates women that disturb traditional notions of 
femininity with positive affects such as pleasure and enjoyment. Parton arrives on the 
blog with her status as a gay icon already in place. This combination makes it more 
likely that Dlisted.com will foreground Parton’s subversive element rather than her 
compliance with stereotypical feminine beauty standards (after all, Parton enhances her 
breasts and not her stomach). Dlisted.com reads Parton’s skin as mocking traditional 
notions of femininity and traditional aesthetic norms, and therefore celebrates it.  
By contrast, Lange’s surgically altered skin is not read by Dlisted.com as 
subversive mimesis. Rather, it is ridiculed as monstrous, as that which can be compared 
to ‘others’, such as Joycelyn Wildenstein. Lange’s skin is not read through the queer 
gaze that would allow her appearance to be understood as a parody of the norms that 
society holds for aging women: rather, her excessive attempt to rejuvenate her skin is 
policed through a heteronormative disciplining gaze that presents her as an example of 
failed femininity. The queer gaze shifts to the heteronormative gaze because of the 
tension between Lange’s background and Dlisted.com’s background. Unlike Parton, 
Lange is not a gay icon, but rather represents heteronormative femininity, and is as such 
understood as desiring the straight male gaze. Dlisted.com adopts this lens when 
reading her skin, and compares her appearance with normative gendered aesthetics. 
Through this comparison, her skin is understood as ugly and other, a reading which 
saturates her performance of femininity with feelings of contempt and makes her the 
target of derision. As such, Lange represents a version of improper femininity that fails 
to successfully perform gendered beauty aesthetics. Even though Dlisted.com can be 
understood as a queer online space, different ways of looking are invoked to make sense 
of different celebrity skins. This illustrates, in turn, that even though Dlisted.com is 
written by a gay New Yorker of Asian, Mexican and Danish descent whose blog can be 
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positioned as queer because his online entries are often marked by an explicit rejection 
of ‘the mandates of cultural logics such as late capitalism, heteronormativity, and […] 
white supremacy’ (Muñoz, 2009: 111), this online space is far from homogenous or 
unified. This queer blog is as such not always already subversive to dominant 
discourses about femininity, but has the potential to reinforce them as well.  
My aim so far has been to demonstrate that overly cosmetically altered skin is 
not automatically the visible signifier of a negative femininity. I have illustrated how 
skin changes its meaning when the gaze is shifted through which celebrity skin is read. 
Parton’s skin is read through the queer gaze that sees her skin a performance of 
mimicry, while Lange’s skin is read through the heteronormative gaze that perceives her 
skin as a failed performance of femininity. Different gazes, in these examples, emerge 
through the affective relationships between the celebrity and the online space. This is 
not to say that these celebrities do not have specific affects and ways of reading them 
attached to them, but a reading of the skin asks from which position they are read and 
how dynamic and flexible this position is. Owing to its technological, interactive make-
up, the blog is often understood as a dynamic background, and I have shown that this is 
also ideologically flexible depending on which celebrity figure it encounters. This has 
critical implications for my subsequent readings of how online celebrity representations 
affectively produce ideas about femininity, queerness and whiteness because it 
illustrates that blogs are not structured by a fixed political and cultural orientation, but 
that they reform and adjust depending on which celebrity figure they encounter. In the 
next section, I argue that meaning-making is not only influenced by the context and the 
background against a celebrity skin is read, but that it is also shaped by the discursive 
affective act of confession, i.e. giving the inner reasons for this alteration. 
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Confession, Empathy and Respectable Femininity 
It might make sense that celebrities who have overdone cosmetic surgery are mocked, 
as it is assumed that they have the expertise and the financial resources to achieve 
superior surgical results. Yet what remains to be understood is why celebrities who have 
apparently been successful in their use of cosmetic surgery – in that their altered skin 
embodies current Western standards of beauty according to race and class – are 
nevertheless ridiculed. In this section, I explore how Perezhilton.com produces 
affectively proper and improper forms of femininity through the cosmetically altered 
skin of singer/songwriter Alexa Ray Joel and reality TV star Heidi Montag. As the 
daughter of singer Billy Joel and supermodel Christie Brinkley, Joel has an ‘ascribed’ 
celebrity status (Rojek, 2001: 17).73 Mainstream media portrays her as well educated, 
talented and as an expert on style and fashion. Montag, on the other hand, has no 
inherited celebrity status, but became famous in 2004 through her appearance in Laguna 
Beach: The Real Orange County, a former MTV reality television series. Rather than 
being famous for her talent, she is known for her radical publicity stunts, such as her 
extreme make-over in 2010 when Montag (then aged twenty-three) had ten cosmetic 
surgery procedures in one sitting. Despite the fact that both celebrities have undergone 
cosmetic surgery ‘successfully’, the results of which represent iconic ideals of feminine 
beauty, as both are slim, white, young, and even-featured, their skins are read 
differently: Perezhilton.com posits Joel as a representation of respectable femininity, 
while locating Montag as symbolic of that abject femininity that is the target of violent 
humour and endless ridicule.  
Thus far, I have demonstrated that understandings of what constitutes proper and 
improper femininity are not only based on the binary between monstrous and iconic 
skin, or between a ‘good’ surgical result and a ‘bad’ one. Rather, how we read skin 
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 An ascribed celebrity is someone who has, owing to lineage, biological descent or birthright, a 
pre-determined celebrity status. 
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depends upon the different backgrounds a blog provides and against which the celebrity 
figure is read. I develop this argument further by interrogating how confession works as 
an affective-discursive tool to install an intimate relationship between celebrity figure 
and reader. In this sense, a reading through skin suggests here that the different 
treatment of these celebrities is not necessarily based on what is visible on the skin, or 
what lies under the skin (their motives which they share with the public through the act 
of confession), but rather on the relation between skins. In other words, how we make 
meaning out of cosmetically-altered celebrity skin is not only shaped through the 
relations between blogger and celebrity figure or the skins of Montag and Joel, but also 
through the relation between the blog reader and the celebrity. 
In the Perezhilton.com post ‘Alexa Ray Joel Gets A Nose Job’ (Hilton, 2010a), 
Joel is complimented for her openness about her nose job: 
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Figure 3: ‘Alexa Ray Joel Gets A Nose Job’ (Hilton, 2010a) 
Alexa Ray Joel opted for a nose job earlier this month and she’s pretty pleased 
with the outcome. She explains: ‘I was thinking about getting this for years. [My 
nose] always bothered me a little bit. I was self-conscious of pictures taken from 
the side. To some people that’s vain, but at the end of the day, we all want to feel 
pretty.’ […] It looks pretty good — and at least she was honest and upfront about 
it unlike SOME people! (Hilton, 2010a) 
This passage implies that it is not her use of cosmetic surgery that distinguishes Joel 
from ‘SOME people,’ but rather her confession and the ‘honest’ reasons she gives for 
her surgery. Her confessional act highlights the emotions experienced within her old 
skin, such as insecurity, self-consciousness and distress, and openly acknowledges the 
pleasure and delight experienced within her new skin. Through the rhetorical pattern of 
confession, Joel’s cosmetically altered skin is now positively valued, as through the 
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techniques of cosmetic surgery, inner beauty and outer surface are brought into 
harmony.74 
Foucault reminds us that confession is a technology of modern governmentality, 
and as such one of the ‘numerous and diverse techniques for archiving the subjugations 
of bodies and the control of populations’ (1998: 140). Even though Foucault speaks 
here in the context of sexuality, his points are useful to my discussion because they 
demonstrate precisely how, through the act of confession, through this ‘incitement into 
discourse’ (1998: 19), subjectivities with different levels of access to power become 
produced. Through the act of confession, one celebrity becomes rehabilitated and 
reintegrated as a proper subject of femininity, while another femininity becomes 
expelled, and the reader is placed in the authoritative position of judging whether or not 
the confession is real and honest, and therefore whether or not it can pass. I suggest, 
however, that confession is not only a matter of discourse but also of affect. From this 
perspective, confession is an affective-discursive tool that invites the audience to feel 
with the celebrity, to relate to her/him in an empathetic way. Through the performance 
of confession, the audience member is able to learn about the celebrity’s inner motives 
for undergoing cosmetic surgery, and can then compare these with those reasons given 
by other celebrities, but also with his/her own feelings. If the reasons the celebrity gives 
are felt as authentic and resonate with the reader’s own understandings, then confession 
can rehabilitate cosmetically-altered skin from associations with falsity, cheapness, and 
unrespectable femininity. A successful confession shifts the celebrity in question from 
the position of the vain subject – or that of the victim of patriarchal ideology who has 
undergone surgery for purely aesthetic reasons – to the status of a self-determined agent 
who has exercised the neoliberal right of self-improvement. Confession can also tame 
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 For further analysis of the rhetoric of expressing inner beauty through cosmetic surgery, see 
Virginia Blum (2003) and Jones (2008). Both authors argue that this is a convincing rhetoric, because it 
resonates with the rules of a neoliberal society in which the subject is interpellated to improve constantly. 
It is as such often used to excuse the use of cosmetic surgery. 
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cosmetic surgery’s dangerous potential of going too far by presenting the celebrity as 
psychologically ‘in control’. As feminist theorists have pointed out, cosmetic surgery 
can be seen as a tool for normalisation, but it also invokes normative anxieties about 
femininity owing to its potential to make the allegedly unruly, uncontrollable and 
disruptive nature of femininity highly visible.75 Through medical, psychological and 
biological discourses, femininity has, been traditionally associated with the irrational 
mind and leaky bodies (Shildrick, 2002: 30). According to this understanding, the 
danger of exceeding the borders of the proper, and disrupting the controlled 
environment where everything is in its place, is apparently inherent to the female body, 
and this potential is enhanced through cosmetic surgery. Yet a successful confession can 
domesticate cosmetic surgery’s uncanny potential because it presents the celebrity as 
the psychic unity of the clean and proper self.76 
In order to confirm this status of a controlled self, the act of confession must be 
convincing, meaning that the motives for the surgical procedure should be understood 
and felt as reasonable by the audience. Joel achieves this by directly referring to the 
differences between her and Montag: ‘Would I do anything else to my body? No. It’s 
not ten procedures like Heidi Montag. For me, that’s a little extreme’ (Hilton, 2010). 
Perezhilton.com publishes this quotation in order to enable an empathetic relationship 
between his blog readers and the celebrity: her ‘modest’ reasons are pitted against the 
out-of-control behaviour of Montag and produce her as reasonable, ensuring that the 
audience member can relate to her. Confession serves here as an affective tool of 
                                                             
75Many feminist scholars have drawn on Foucauldian concepts of the docile body, bio-power and 
micro-practices of the self to show how mainstream cosmetic surgery is situated within the disciplinary 
and normalising discursive regimes of Western culture (Balsamo, 1995; Bartky, 1991; Bordo, 1993; 
Morgan, 1991). However, they do not universally condemn cosmetic surgery as an oppressive method by 
which patriarchal culture oppresses women, a fact which is evident in their foregrounding of the 
subversive potential of cosmetic surgery in the work of artists such as Orlan. Some theorists also 
recognise the pleasure and delight that cosmetic surgery can bring to individual bodies who have suffered 
as a result of their pre-op appearance (Davis, 1995) . 
76Kristeva (1982: 71) and MargritShildrick (2002: 55) show in their work – though through 
different approaches – how a clean and intact skin that envelops the individual is essential for our 
understanding of a ‘proper’ subject. 
  
communication that creates a level of intimacy between the celebrity and the blog 
reader, not only because it makes surgically altered skin highly visible and interpellates 
the reader to judge, but also because it is seen as a route to engaging with their 
‘authentic’ feelings.  
 
Seen Much Of Heidi Montag Lately’ 
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Figure 4: ‘So THIS Is Why We Haven’t 
(Hilton, 2010b)
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 In stark contrast to these reactions to Joel’s confession is the wide spread 
derision faced by Montag when she publicly confessed her cosmetic surgeries. On 
Perezhilton.com, Hilton remarked that ‘We may have this generation’s Jocelyn 
Wildenstein on our hands if she’s not careful!’ (Hilton, 2010c). Through this 
comparison, Perezhilton.com places Montag in proximity to a celebrity who has 
achieved her fame status through the excessive use of cosmetic surgery which left her 
appearance grotesque. Even though Montag’s appearance remains outwardly controlled, 
Perezhilton.com implies in several posts that her inner self lacks in control, and hints 
repeatedly at a potential surgery junkie lurking beneath the surface. Furthermore, the 
media coverage concerning Montag’s excessive cosmetic surgery session was not only 
accompanied by reports about her apparent near death experience during the operation, 
but also coincided with the promotional tour for her new album, ultimately marking her 
as publicity-seeking.   
Despite the fact that Montag follows, in her public confession, the same 
rhetorical pattern of self-improvement as Joel in order to defend her altered skin – ‘It’s 
my body and I need to feel comfortable as a woman, as a person, and my inner beauty is 
always there and that’s what’s most important’ (Hilton, 2010c) – her confession fails to 
convince. Like Joel, she highlights the way in which surgery merely brought to the 
outer surface what lay beneath, but her skin transformations, and especially her 
significant breast augmentation, are instead read as a publicity stunt, consequently 
positioning her as vulgar, pathological and tasteless. It could be argued that a reading of 
Montag’s skin as abject, and as that which must be derided, is merely the result of the 
sheer number of operations she has undergone, and the way in which she subsequently 
sought publicity. I do not intend to deny that these factors contribute significantly to 
these negative readings of her skin. However, I suggest that the reasons for her 
production as an ‘improper’ femininity have more to do with her inability to affect the 
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audience and Perez Hilton in a way that makes them empathise with her inner motives 
and rehabilitate her skin. The reason for this failure lies, I suggest, in her apparent lack 
of respectability. Respectability as a concept that marks the morally right, tasteful and 
modest subject has become, over time, the property of white middle-class femininities 
(Skeggs, 1997: 99). These characteristics are associated with positive feelings: thus the 
distinction between respectable white middle-class femininity and the improper 
working-class subject is highly affective. Tyler (2008) and Stephanie Lawler (2005) 
argue that white working-class subjects are often framed within discourses of excess, 
lack of taste and pathology, thereby provoking disgust reactions from the white middle-
class subject. Montag might not be a working-class subject in the traditional sense, but 
her ‘white trash’ reality TV star background puts her in a lower-classed position than 
that of stars belonging to the perceived Hollywood aristocracy, or of stars with 
demonstrable skills, such as the musical talents of Joel (Cobb, 2008; Tyler & Bennett, 
2010: 379). As a celebrity, she might not lack material resources, but a lack of taste, 
knowledge, and the ‘right ways of being and doing’ (Bourdieu, cited in Lawler 2005: 
433) mark her as an example of improper white femininity. Hence feelings of contempt, 
horror and disgust that saturate the poor white working-class become associated with 
so-called ‘white trash’ celebrities like Montag. 
Montag’s surgically-altered skin is, owing to her lack of respectability, not read 
as an act of self-determination, but rather as a failed attempt to perform this white 
middle-class act of self-improvement. This inability makes her a subject worth of 
derision: ‘if working-class women can be rendered disgusting by disrespectability and 
excess, they have also been rendered comic or disgusting in their attempts to be 
respectable’ (Lawler, 2005: 434-435). Humour works here as an affective-discursive 
tool that keeps the boundary between respectable white subjects like Joel and abject 
white femininities like Montag in place. Hence the affective relationship between 
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Montag and the audience, which is established through classed, raced and gendered 
discourses, but also through the comparison with respectable celebrities like Joel, makes 
her confession fail. Her skin is not read as an act of self-expression and agency, but 
rather as pathological and fake. The reaction of Perezhilton.com to Montag’s openness 
regarding her cosmetic alterations reveals that, while the confessional act may adhere to 
certain rhetorical patterns, it fails to touch the reader affectively in the right ways so that 
she/he would rehabilitate Montag’s skin. This shows that confession is strongly 
dependent on the social position of the confessor. Celebrities who are regarded as 
respectable are able to confess successfully owing to the fact that an emotional 
proximity to them is not regarded as disturbing. We are happy to get ‘skin tight’ with 
them, relate to them, feel with them, and jump into their skin. Their motives are felt as 
true and authentic because the audience can emphasise with them. Meanwhile, 
unrespectable femininity is framed in a narrative of addiction, lying and publicity 
seeking, and as such is saturated with affects such as disgust, contempt and horror, 
which make an enduring closeness unbearable.   
In this section, I have shown that how we read represented celebrity skin is not 
only dependent on how the blogger himself reads it or the affective structure and 
cultural orientations that the blog articulates. Rather, how we make meaning out of 
cosmetically re-done celebrity skin depends on how it appears in comparison with other 
celebrity skins, and on the relationship between us and the celebrity figure. Are we 
moved empathetically by the confession? Can we relate to the celebrity’s motives and 
judge them as true and authentic? As I have shown, Perezhilton.com’s online 
representation of Montag produces her affectively as inauthentic and fake, thereby 
connoting an abject femininity. To illustrate further how questions of authenticity and 
artificiality play out for the affective production of femininities, I focus in the next 
section on discussions about ‘Labiaplasty’ on Jezebel.com.  
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Labia Skin, Disgust and Visibility 
In this chapter, I have explored the shifting, unstable nature of the boundaries between 
proper and improper femininities through a reading of surgically altered celebrity-skin 
that is publicly visible. In this section, I draw attention to a part of the skin that is 
normally invisible and hidden from the public gaze, yet which is nevertheless crucial in 
the cultural construction of femininity: labia skin. More precisely, I analyse how the 
trimming of labia skin for aesthetic reasons, through technologies such as Photoshop or 
cosmetic surgery, is mediated in Jezebel.com. In the blog post ‘The Labiaplasty You 
Never Wanted’ (Coen, 2010b) labiaplasty is represented through affects of disgust and 
nausea thereby constructing the uncut feminine subject as the proper subject, and the cut 
subject as improper.77 It may initially seem unclear why the hidden skin of the labia is 
important to this discussion of the construction of femininity, when femininity is, as 
Susan Bordo (1993), Kathy Davis (1995) and Naomi Wolf (1991) argue, constructed in 
a gendered society through visible beauty. However, an interrogation of the ways in 
which the skin of the labia is read in such online debates is crucial as it demonstrates 
how femininity is commonly conflated with a specific sexed body. Labia lips are a 
primary marker of a female sexed body. They also signify female sexuality, which 
makes this part of the skin rich with symbolic meanings and cultural and psychoanalytic 
connotations. Making visible what must, according to cultural or socio-political norms, 
be hidden is often understood as a liberating and taboo-breaking practice. Margaret 
Schwartz discusses the paradoxical nature of celebrity ‘up-skirt’ paparazzi photos that 
display, apparently accidentally, the celebrity’s vulva or labia(2008). Schwartz argues 
that while this new visibility is celebrated within a post-feminist media landscape as 
empowering female sexuality, it actually works to reintegrate the feminine into a male 
economy of visibility. Schwartz is primarily concerned with the political economy of 
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 I do not discuss female circumcision, sex-change operations, or female genital cutting in a 
cross-cultural context here, as these are complex topics that need their own focused arguments. For more 
on these issues, see: Isabel Gunning, 1991 and Simone Weil Davis, 2002. 
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the media, but I follow her in her use of Irigaray to highlight how this new visibility 
carries the danger of disrupting the subversive potential of these female sexual organs 
that work on the registers of touch. 
 
Figure 5: ‘The Labiaplasty You Never Knew You Wanted [NSFW]’ (Coen, 2010b) 
Jezebel.com’s post, ‘The Labiaplasty You Never Knew You Wanted [NSFW]’, does not 
refer explicitly to celebrity figures, but instead to representations of women in soft-porn 
magazines. These soft-porn representations seemingly work here in the same way as 
celebrity representations: as role models against which the self is measured. In this post, 
Jezebel.com refers to a report by the Australian news show The Hungry Beast, in which 
the connections between Australian decency laws, images in soft-porn magazines and 
cosmetic surgery on the labia are explored. Jezebel.com writes: 
Labiaplasty– not to be confused with vaginal rejuvenation or vaginoplasty– is an 
increasingly popular cosmetic procedure which typically involves trimming the 
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labia majora or minora (though usually minora) to give your ladybits the look of a 
neat little package. (Coen, 2010b) 
The visual aesthetics of ‘a neat little package’ are, according to the report, requested by 
the Australian Classification Board, which forces soft-porn magazines to erase 
protruding parts of the labia minora using Photoshop because the visible labia minora is 
considered to be ‘too offensive for soft porn’. Jezebel.com critiques this mutilated 
representation of sexual skin, and argues that it has damaging effects on women’s 
relationship to their bodies: ‘imagine the obvious effect this has on the women for 
whom these images are a part of their understanding of reality. […] we […] can’t 
completely discount the effects of porn when it comes to genital aesthetics’ (Coen, 
2010b). The preferred reading of this post might suggest that Jezebel.com, as a feminist-
aware celebrity gossip blog, is attempting to redefine or subvert the patriarchal norms 
that refuse to legitimate or approve any difference that visibly deviates from normative 
beauty standards.78 In its argument, Jezebel.com follows, to an extent, the media effects 
theory, which implies that images within the media have a direct effect on the viewer 
and her/his self-perception, or that such images at least work as a cultural pressure that 
allows only a limited range of acceptable body shapes. 79  Following this logic, 
Jezebel.com displays in the post’s accompanying video a number of alternative images 
of labia skin to counterbalance the mainstream representations that reduce it to a ‘neat 
little package’. It makes this un(der)represented part of skin visible, in all its natural 
variety, by showing a range of differently shaped labia lips in a video and also in the 
confessional writing of the blogger: ‘I’ve got all kinds of business down there! I don’t 
look anything like those pictures!’ (Coen, 2010b). This can be seen as an empowering 
act, a certain kind of identity politics where the marker of femininity has to be made 
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 With ‘preferred’ reading I refer to a dominant reading of an online representation. Like the 
dominant reading, the preferred reading may not be the only way to make sense of online representations, 
but it is the most likely one.  
79
 For a critique of the media effect theory that is based on the dichotomies of body/image, 
subject/object, see Coleman (2005). 
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visible (in all its variety) to gain social recognition, and to disrupt normative discourses 
and laws that harm women.  
In this post, Jezebel.com aims to evoke feelings of disgust, nausea and unease 
towards the cutting of female skin. The first lines suggest that readers with weak 
stomachs might find the embedded video unpleasant: ‘Warning: The following video is 
ridiculously NSFW and NSFWS (not safe for weak stomachs, as there are graphic 
surgery scenes)’ (Coen 2010b). The representation of cutting skin is understood as 
unsettling, as it violates the intact borders of the self. This makes cutting labia skin, I 
suggest, an abject practice. Kristeva defines the abject as that which ‘disturbs identity, 
system, order’, as that which ‘does not respect borders’ (1982: 4). 80  The abject 
transgresses borders which are deemed as necessary in our culture. The skin is, for 
instance, a necessary border for us because it gives us the impression of a clean and 
proper self that it autonomous and separate from its surrounding. Every fluid or process 
that makes us aware that this is a myth can be seen as an abject and needs to be 
expelled. Blood, vomit, urine, semen and pus are abject bodily fluids which violate 
bodily borders and provoke feelings such as nausea and disgust. I suggest that cutting, a 
practice that in no way respects bodily borders, can be seen as an abject act. Cutting 
produces also sensations of pain. Even if only represented on the screen the viewer 
associates cutting skin with pain thereby averting form it. Pain, as Ahmed argues, 
produces intensifications of feelings that are in turn perceived as boundaries of the 
surface (2004a). Pain affectively creates borders to which we do not want to get close. 
Cutting labia skin thereby becomes here the affective other, and a practice that we might 
physically turn away from (when we cover our eyes with hands or move away from the 
screen displaying the act). We also turn emotionally away from it, rejecting it as that 
which hurts, is an obstacle to well-being and therefore wrong. 
                                                             
80
 For critiques of Julia Kristeva’s account of abjection see for instance Judith Butler 1990: 125 and 
Imogen Tyler 2009, 2013: 27-35. 
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I maintain that Jezebel.com uses these affective connotations of cutting skin to 
trump the meanings and affective qualities already carried by labia lips. Labia lips may 
be hidden skin, but they are excessive and highly affective skin. The skin of the labia is 
excessive because it, quite literally, leaks out of the body and provides the orifice where 
menstrual blood and urine transgress the bodily boundaries. That it offers a testimony of 
the impossibility of the clean and proper body is precisely what marks labia skin as 
abject (Kristeva, 1982: 71). The two lips that are never completely closed or open 
confound, according to Irigaray, the phallocentric logic of the one, where singular and 
closed-up forms prevail. Besides Kristeva and Irigaray, feminist scholars such as 
Barbara Creed (1993), Elizabeth Grosz (1994) and Margrit Shildrick (2002) 
demonstrate the ways in which gendered and racialised histories of medical, scientific 
and psychoanalytic discourses have historically tied female sexual organs to notions of 
‘lack’, emptiness, danger, monstrosity, contagion and leakiness, and reveal how these 
notions in turn saturate this particular part of skin with affects of shame, guilt, disgust, 
horror and desire.81 In shifting these feelings of unease and disgust from the skin of the 
labia to the act of cutting this same skin, Jezebel.com enables a feminist reclamation of 
this skin. Yet it is important to evaluate critically how uncut labia skin, as that which 
can be seen in form of exceeding labia skin, limits the ways in which non-normative 
femininities can be understood. Shimizu Akiko explains that the politics of visibility 
cover over the fact that differences are not always visible. These politics are quite 
pervasive as they claim that through vision we can get access to the truth: if something 
looks normative then it is normative, if something looks deviant than it is deviant. This 
is, according to Akiko, a cultural consent that is flawed and makes us blind to real 
difference (2008: 3). Jezebel.com follows these cultural assumptions about visibility in 
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 The horror associated with female sexual organs is best symbolised by the vagina dentata. The 
vagina dentata is a fantasised ‘representation of the non-human status of woman as android, vampire or 
animal, the identification of female sexuality as voracious, insatiable, enigmatic, invisible and 
unknowable, cold, calculating, instrumental, castrator/decapitator of the male, dissimulatress or fake, 
predatory, engulfing mother, preying on male weakness’ (Grosz and Probyn, 1995: 293). 
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its reclamation of labia skin because it does not destabilise the one-to-one 
correspondence between visible gender performance and the ‘truth’ about the bodily 
self. Rather, it ignores the fact that subversive femininities might be outside the realm of 
visibility and yet still of matter. We might want to think here of a femme identities that 
(owing to their very feminine appearance) seem to reinforce traditional, 
heteronormative ideas about femininity while instead undermining them. 
Irigaray offers a useful way of rethinking the problematic nature of visibility. 
According to her, what is missing in our phallocentric culture – which privileges sight, 
straight lines and unity – is an alternative tradition through which to think sexual 
identity; one that prioritises notions of fluidity, flow, and feminine touch over the 
masculine aesthetics of looking. She suggests that, within Western phallocentric logic, 
the visual is predominant.82 By contrast, she maintains that ‘woman takes pleasure more 
from touching than from looking, and that entry into a dominant scopic economy 
signifies, again, her consignment to passivity’ (1985b: 26). As such, invisibility, or non-
visibility, is crucial to Irigaray’s anti-foundational, feminist politics. She uses the 
example of ‘two lips’ to explain this subversive difference, suggesting that labia lips 
‘represent the horror of nothing to see’ not because they are literally invisible, like the 
vagina, but because they are a matter of touch rather than visuality, and thereby escape 
the phallocentric logic of the one form: ‘[t]he one of form, of the individual, of the 
(male) sexual organ, of the proper name, of the proper meaning’ (1985b: 26). By 
contrast, the labia are the origin of a subjectivity whose principle logic is sensual, the 
touch, the double. The labia lips blur the cultural boundaries between activity and 
passivity, because when two lips are touching it is impossible to ‘distinguish what is 
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 In Speculum of The Other Woman (1985b [1974]), but also in The Sex Which Is Not One 
(1985a), Irigaray demonstrates the link between Western philosophy, visibility and phallocentrism, and 
reveals that the discourse of knowledge, analysis, philosophy and reason has, as its principal sense, sight, 
and that its concern is the visible or the invisible. This link between phallocentrism and ocularcentrism 
engenders a symbolism that emphasises unity, homogeneity, and a form that needs to be ‘one’ (Irigaray, 
1985b: 26). 
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touching from what is touched’ (Irigaray, 1985b: 26). Lynne Huffer (2011) argues that 
her understanding of the ‘two lips’ works as a conceptual tool to queer the binary 
thinking upon which Western understandings of unified gendered identity and sexual 
difference are based. Irigaray scrambles the ideas of linearity and dialectic through 
which we make sense of the world by showing that we need to focus on elements and 
practices that cannot be reintegrated into this system of thinking. Irigaray shows how 
visual representations cannot be truly subversive as they use the master’s tools, 
visibility and language. Visibility always reintegrates the feminine into the phallocentric 
order impeding real difference.  
Irigaray’s ideas about subversion and queering of what we perceive as natural 
and obvious in order to create real sexual difference demonstrate that, in making 
difference visible, certain oppressive ways of knowing, such as that employed by 
hierarchical binary thinking, remain untouched. For example, in the post I discuss here, 
Jezebel.com pitches uncut femininities against cut femininities, thereby tying proper 
femininity back to a specific bodily materiality. In making uncut labia lips the visible 
marker for untouched and therefore natural femininity, Jezebel.com not only reiterates 
femininity as a pre-discursive category, which inhabits a certain body, but also produces 
an abject other against which the former can be measured. Uncut labia skin becomes the 
signifier for untouched femininity, for femininity that is not limited through technology 
and patriarchal ideas concerning aesthetics, with the inevitable consequence that those 
who flaunt this visibility are either victims of these ideas, or normative identities that 
are compliant with the current cultural role of femininities. They are also transformed 
into the abject, as they make use of an abject practice that causes nausea to the viewer 
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and pain to the subject.83 In this way, Jezebel.com uses oppressive ways of knowing to 
read certain feminine bodies as good and others as abject. 
Another problem inherent in this post is that this other, the woman who 
undergoes labiaplasty, is spoken for but is cut off from speaking for herself. This 
silencing enables Jezebel.com to represent the cutting of labia skin as de-sexing proper 
and non-conformative femininity. Readers are made to feel that this activity is wrong 
through the suggestion that they may turn away in disgust from the video documenting 
the cutting. Through these techniques, Jezebel.com reinforces the understanding of a 
natural, visible body as one that is in harmony with our sense of who we are, implying 
that if we think there is something wrong with our body, it is our mind that should 
change. In the comments following the article, one user suggests ironically to another, 
who complains about the look of her labia lips and is considering labiaplasty, ‘here’s a 
much cheaper suggestion. Stop looking at it’ (TheToefTea, see: Coen 2010b). However, 
as Shimizu (2008) points out, there is no direct link between our imagined self and the 
visible bodily self. Technology and skin alterations are, on Jezebel.com, not seen as 
tools for becoming – instead, they are merely understood as ways in which femininity is 
limited. In this way, Jezebel.com limits the ways in which non-normative femininity can 
be imagined and lived.  
Readings of the cutting of sexual skin as misogynist are easy to understand, as 
this practice quite literally erases female sexuality for the sake of normative beauty 
standards. Jezebel.com uses a number of strategies and media formats to affectively 
mediate its ideas about this seemingly harmful practice, a point which I will discuss in 
more detail in the next section. Yet, as I have shown through my discussion of Irigaray, 
it is important to acknowledge the foundations on which Jezebel.com’s claims regarding 
the uncut labia skin are built. I have illustrated that the privileging of visibility as a way 
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 In her affective reading of online pornography, Paasonen highlights the contagious quality of 
abject objects and practices. Those subjects that come too close to abject objects, or indulge in abject 
practices, become abject themselves (2011). 
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of empowering women has the problematic side effect of reiterating power binaries, and 
reinforcing the idea of a pre-discursive femininity. Jezebel.com’s post hides the 
problematic ways of knowing on which these online representations are based, leading 
in turn to a situation in which non-normative femininities that are not recognised 
through vision are silenced within both hegemonic culture and feminist discourses. This 
example of how femininity is affectively produced on Jezebel.com is not based on 
celebrity figures as this kind of surgery is not (yet) publicly discussed by celebrities. Yet 
it fulfils in some respects the same function as my celebrity examples: it is part of 
popular culture and published on a celebrity gossip site where it functions as an 
affective interface through which cultural ideas and values about gender become played 
out. In the next section, I return to online celebrity representations and explore how 
ideas about a ‘natural’ femininity which should be visible to us are also key in 
discussions about Photoshop. 
 
Before/After Images, Photoshop and Anger 
Virginia Blum argues that celebrities shape our ideas about beauty to such an extent that 
we try to imitate their appearance on our own bodies. The wide circulation of celebrity 
representations has, she maintains, a powerful effect, particularly on a female audience 
that desires to inhabit celebrity-like skin. Today, Blum claims, we are no longer 
satisfied with plain skin, but rather we want to ‘wear celebrity skin’ to attract admiring 
looks (2003: 174). As I have discussed, celebrities improve their appearance through 
cosmetic surgery but their representations are usually improved through the use of 
Photoshop. Through this technology the digitally photographed skin can be transformed 
into an immaculate surface independent of what was ‘really’ in front of the lens. My 
concern here is not so much the retouched image itself, but rather the discourses 
surrounding Photoshop, and how these discourses affectively produce certain ideas 
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about femininity. A reading through the skin means here to attend to the complex ways 
in which digital images, blogger text and user comments work together to affectively 
create a rhetorical pattern which is seen as true and good. This rhetorical pattern then 
naturalises the artificial category of femininity as a visible truth. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: ‘Why You Must See Unretouched Images, 
And Why You Must See Them Repeatedly’ (Coen, 2010c) 
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A Jezebel.com post from August 2010 begins with two photographs of actress 
Jennifer Aniston from a photo shoot for madison magazine (Figure 6). In a generic 
before/after manner, the apparently untouched photograph is placed to the left of the 
after photograph, the Photoshopped cover image ‘adhering to a visual grammar where 
left-becomes-right’ (Jones, 2008: 16). Through this carefully constructed before/after 
collage, the degree of image manipulation is not an abstract concept that needs to be 
described to us, but rather it becomes concrete, something that we can experience 
immediately: we can see with our own eyes how strongly Aniston’s image has been 
manipulated. Experiencing the degree of image manipulation through our own bodily 
senses makes image manipulation a ‘truth’, and we might be compelled to follow 
Jezebel.com’s argument and scroll down to read the accompanying text: 
There’s a reason we’re fighting to keep this unretouched image of Aniston on our 
website. […] This is about the fucked-up imagery that is consistently and 
persistently gracing newsstands as the beauty standard to which we should all 
aspire. […] [E]very day, a young woman somewhere sees one of these overly 
polished pictures for the first time…and has no idea that they’re not real. […] 
What the girl does know is that the pictures show What Is Beautiful. She thinks 
they are reality. And maybe she doesn’t have someone in her life to point out that 
this is complete and utter bullshit. So we’ll do that, and we’ll do it over and over 
again just to make sure that everyone knows what’s up. (Coen, 2010c; emphasis in 
original) 
Jezebel.com polices such Photoshopped photographs because of their allegedly negative 
consequences for women. 84  Many scholars argue that the circulation of such 
manipulated images of idealised femininity has a damaging effect on women because 
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 Susan Bordo (1993) argues, for instance, that digitally manipulated images increase the 
objectification of women owing to the way in which they reinforce the cultural role of women as highly 
visible surfaces. 
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they might take for real what is actually artificially produced through Photoshop, and 
this might in turn trigger bodily dissatisfaction, frustration and self-hatred. 85In this 
sense, Jezebel.com can be seen to follow a tradition of feminist scholars who have 
analysed how images shape and discipline women’s bodies.  
The media cause-effect model upon which these arguments are often based 
provides a powerful rhetoric, resulting in the fact that these arguments have now gained 
the status of common sense. This model perceives the relationship between (women’s) 
bodies and images as one that is linear and victimising, whereby images enforce 
normative ideas of beauty on the vulnerable body of the viewer. 86  The suggested 
solution to the problem of young women feeling unhappy with their bodies as a result of 
such images is, therefore, to increase the availability of more positive and ‘realistic’ 
images. Griselda Pollock explains how this binary emerged in feminist thinking:  
While challenging social definitions of women’s roles and spheres, feminists were 
also contesting socially accepted images of women […] which were judged in a 
vocabulary of absolutes: right or wrong, good or bad, true or false, traditional or 
progressive, positive or objectifying.(1990: 203) 
Jezebel.com unmistakably positions Photoshopped pictures as bad, wrong and false, and 
this particular post can be read as an attack on a male-dominated society in which 
women are pressured into adhering to fake, and therefore unachievable, standards of 
beauty. However, at this point it is useful to question the presuppositions upon which 
                                                             
85Liz Frost (2001) analyses the pressure that women experience from such images, and how this 
results in eating disorders and self-hatred. Debra Gimlin (2002) discusses how women compare 
themselves to images and negotiate their own bodies through techniques such as dieting, work out and 
cosmetic surgery. In their empirical study, Sarah Grogan and Nicola Wainwright analyse photos in teen 
magazines, and argue that images in such magazines ‘have powerful effects on their readers, serving to 
foster and maintain a “cult of femininity”, supplying definitions of what it means to be a woman’ (1996: 
672). 
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 Many scholars have criticised the media cause-effect model by highlighting its practical and 
theoretical shortcomings: David Gauntlett (1998) has illustrated through audience research that the 
relationship between audience and image is far from linear but shaped and reshaped through the specific 
context. Rebecca Coleman has highlighted, through the Deleuzian concept of ‘becoming’, that image and 
body are not two separate entities that then influence each other, but rather that they are constituted 
through and within each other (2009). 
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this understanding of images and bodies is based. Pollock (1990) draws attention to the 
problems with feminist critiques of ‘images of women’ suggesting that the term relies 
on an unhelpful, and ultimately unsustainable separation of ‘women’ and ‘images’, 
where women are treated as ‘real’ and images as ‘representations’ (Coleman 2009: 9). 
This same logic applies to Jezebel.com’s blog post – the Photoshopped image is 
understood as the culturally produced object, while the before photograph presents the 
real skin, which becomes a metonymy for Aniston’s real gendered self. The status as 
representation is occluded in the before picture.  
The before photograph is therefore regarded as allowing access to the truth, the 
natural which re-presents what is real (or at least more real than the after photograph), 
while the other is portrayed as highly constructed and manipulated. These 
characterisations, I suggest, attach certain affects to the two different representations. In 
a different context, Pollock explains this affective charge:  
This juxtaposition [of before and after photograph] prompts the viewer to make 
simple judgements about the two images, presented as exemplars of the good and 
the bad, the ‘real’ and the glamorized, the positive and the distorted. One image is 
claimed to be closer to the truth […] as opposed to that of consumption and/or 
fantasy. The recognition that both images are densely rhetorical products of 
material, social, and aesthetic practices is suppressed. (1990: 204) 
This passage demonstrates why the before photograph is associated with good feelings 
– it is understood as true because it simply re-presents what was really in front of the 
lens. It is as such a witness, an evidence of a certain reality, and something we can trust. 
The digitally re-touched cover photograph, on the other hand, is seen as false. 
Influenced by economic motivations and beauty standards of a male-dominated society, 
it becomes, through these discourses, something we encounter with scepticism and 
caution. In juxtaposing these two images and the different affective economies that 
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surround them, Jezebel.com aims to make the contrasts unequivocal in order to trigger 
anger and resentment towards a media landscape that portrays women in these unnatural 
skins. Yet it also plays on social anxieties that these practices might pass unrecognised, 
and that they have the potential to do harm without us noticing: 
[W]hen we show you before-and-after shots of celebrities [w]e’re not pulling 
some tabloidian ‘see celebrities without makeup!’ or  ‘look who has cellulite!’ 
shtick. This is about the fucked-up imagery that is consistently and persistently 
gracing newsstands as the beauty standard to which we should all aspire. (Coen, 
2010c) 
Jezebel.com claims here not to engage in the scrutiny of images of women that creates 
feelings of schadenfreude, pleasure or enjoyment caused by sensationalism and 
voyeurism. Rather, Coen maintains that their aim is to inspire anger and dissatisfaction 
with the current situation. Scholars such as Ahmed have pointed out that anger is not 
necessarily a bad feeling per se, but that it can in fact be very productive for feminist 
politics owing to its capacity to introduce change and a re-orientations towards norms 
that have passed unnoticed (Ahmed, 2004a: 174-76). However, in the example of 
Aniston’s photograph, I suggest that anger has a limiting, rather than empowering, 
function because it covers over how Jezebel.com participates through its criticism in the 
cultural scrutiny of image of women. Hence despite the fact that Jezebel.com might be 
motivated by a desire to counter patriarchal norms and practices, it implicitly reinforces 
them through scrutinising Aniston’s photos, and reinforces cultural links between 
femininity, passivity and naturalness. Anger here limits the potential to imagine 
femininity outside of the normative frame of the natural woman. In relying on the 
media-effects-model, and on notions concerning the real that can be seen, Jezebel.com 
is unable to deconstruct femininity as a performative act that creates through repetition 
that which we perceive as natural and real. Through drawing on discourses that circulate 
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within society as true, or at least as not completely false, Jezebel.com can thereby 
invoke these negative affects towards Photoshopped images because they are already in 
place. 
So far, Jezebel.com has produced, through the photo-collage and the 
accompanying text, a convincing rhetoric against Photoshop, linking proper femininity 
to un-retouched skin. And yet through their commenting function, blogs provide the 
possibility to add to the online content thereby changing its meaning. As some user 
comments show, Jezebel.com’s reading of these photos is not accepted without some 
struggle:  
[The] first image looks pretty manipulated (at least on the face) to make her look 
worse. (spiraloflife, see: Coen, 2010b) 
How do we know that the "unretouched" images weren't altered to make her look 
worse? That's happened with countless celebs. (Rats, see: Coen, 2010b) 
I've seen Ms. Aniston several times, day and night, here in los angeles [sic] and 
think that the before image isn't right. Something about it is funky, because she 
doesn't have the forehead wrinkles in person, wearing little to no makeup, let 
alone with photo make up on. She does smoke a lot and have some freckles, but 
either that lighting is terrible or something has been enhanced to make her look 
older (AnitaLoos, see: Coen, 2010b) 
Here, users question the boundaries between real and fake that Jezebel.com presents as 
self-evident and unproblematic. Some readers are sceptical of the evidence, arguing that 
‘first image looks pretty manipulated’ (spiraloflife). However, these readers are still 
preoccupied with establishing one photograph as ‘real’ (or more real), and thus remain 
within the framework of fake or real. As this post and the accompanying user comments 
show, the borders between fake and real might be unstable and shifting, but these 
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notions persist in the construction of femininity because of the values and affects 
attached to them. 
In this section, I have shown how particular discourses and technological 
possibilities of the blog assist Jezebel.com in provoking anger against the after 
photograph, and in turn accumulate positive feelings around the un-retouched 
photograph, positing it as representative of the truth. The image comparison at the 
beginning of the blog post coveys Jezebel.com’s message affectively to the reader as 
she/he sees with her/his own eyes how strongly these photos are manipulated. The text 
underneath these images serves to reinforce a rhetorical and affective structure that 
might be already in place through cultural discourses that are by now ‘common 
knowledge’. Following this, Photoshopped images are ‘bad’ because they present what 
is fake and inauthentic as real. This scrambling of boundaries (which is also an 
intervention into the link between seeing and knowing) has can have negative 
consequence, for instance, making women feel bad about themselves. The 
Photoshopped image is as such often perceived as an obstacle for women’s happiness 
and sticky with negative affects. I have shown that this understanding is based on a 
problematic real/fake binary which dismisses femininities that cannot pass as ‘natural’. I 
argue in this thesis that celebrity online representations on gossip blogs can shift the 
affective connections which frame our ideas about good and bad femininities because 
they touch us in surprising new ways. Yet here I have shown where the limitations of 
this are: Aniston’s photograph is represented online as an example of a patriarchal 
culture that forces its women, independent of their status, into unachievable beauty 
norms. The user comments seem to challenge such a reading but eventually reinforce 
the binary of fake and real which frames our understandings of femininity. I further 
elaborate on this in the next section, in which I explore how Dlisted.com produces ideas 
of improper femininity through hyperlinks that give the reader affective jolts. This 
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underlines my argument that digital culture has the ability to enable particular sensory, 
synaesthetic, and visceral experiences and knowledges which create our ideas about 
femininity.  
 
Texture, Hyperlinks and Laughter 
Photoshop has become a common practice to improve the looks of models and 
celebrities, leaving the photographed skin sometimes overtly polished and robot-like. 
These manipulating techniques can arrest our attention if the texture of a representation 
does not fulfil cultural expectations of how the represented thing or subject should feel 
or look like. If the texture is at odds with our cultural expectations, then we categorise 
the representations as fake and artificial. In this section, I explore a blog post on 
Dlisted.com that centres around an excessively Photoshopped photograph of Lady Gaga 
from the cover of Rolling Stone magazine (Figure 7). This highly retouched image 
allows me to draw attention to the texture of digital images, and to consider it as an 
important semiotic and sensory resource that significantly shapes the meaning of a 
representation. I begin by undertaking a semiotic reading of the image, paying close 
attention to its texture.87 I then explore how my body reacts and feels when I click the 
hyperlinks in the online comment which bring the original cover photo into contact with 
images of Cartman (a character from the animated TV series South Park) and Dutch 
Boy (the logo of an American paint company). I argue that the encounter with these 
hyperlinked images causes affective jolts in me which grab me, stick with me and 
change how I read the original cover photograph: Dlisted.com shifts my reading of this 
representation from edgy femininity to failed femininity. Highlighting my affective 
involvement in and bodily reactions to the blog post enables me to illustrate that blog 
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 In effecting a semiotic reading, I follow Barthes’ classic two-step system of analysis, which 
first describes that which is seen (denotation), and then considers what ideas and values are 
communicated by this (connotation) (1972). 
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reading is an affective and embodied practice in which touching, feeling and making 
sense are intertwined. 
 
 
Figure 7: ‘Photoshop Awards: Lady GaGa’s Rolling Stone Cover’ (Michael K., 2010a) 
At first glance, the highly staged and manipulated nature of the above image 
seems clear. Its unconventional composition, which aims to grab the attention of the 
viewer through the display of extremities, mediates Lady Gaga’s reputation as edgy 
femininity. Gaga’s immaculately smooth and fair skin in the Rolling Stone cover 
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photograph evokes cultural associations of purity, radiance and divinity. Seemingly 
unaffected by aging, injuries and other lived experiences that commonly leave their 
traces on the skin, her skin is pure, untouched and heavenly, and thereby signifies not 
only idealised femininity, but also privilege and celebrity status. Gaga’s pale and 
immaculate skin clashes with darker items such as her tattoo, the black sexually alluring 
underwear, and the phallic black and shiny machine guns. In a culture in which 
whiteness functions as the dominant but silent norm, these dark elements evoke 
associations with danger, (sexual) agency and aggression, and represent notions of 
traditional heterosexual masculinity.88 Rather than the ‘good’ feelings that we associate 
with white immaculate skin, these black elements are sticky with ‘negative’ feelings, 
such as fear, giving the image a titillating quality. Nevertheless Gaga’s extremely 
Photoshopped skin fuses these contradictory elements seamlessly together to a smooth 
surface. Even the machine guns blend into her skin, replacing the nurturing breast with 
the destructive machine.89I suggest that, in line with Gaga’s contradictory celebrity 
image, this image communicates rather ambiguous meanings.90For Jack Halberstam 
(2012) the hybridity in her performances signifies a new sex and gender politics. In this 
sense, the image could be read as subverting traditional gender and sex norms. But it 
could also mean that she is reiterating them for the sake of profit. The image seems to 
hold both aspects in tension. From a scholarly perspective, I know that this image was 
carefully composed to signify edgy femininity but I do not feel this edginess. Rather the 
cover image evokes feelings of indifference and annoyance in me. 
As the headline of the blog post suggests, Dlisted.com re-published this cover 
online not because of its content but because of the texture of the image, especially 
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 I elaborate upon the racial dimensions of celebrity skin in Chapter Four. 
89
 Donna Haraway (1991: 151-153) sees the breaking down of three boundaries as significant for 
our networked and globalised postmodern world: the leaky boundaries between human and animal, 
between animal-human (organism) and machine, and between physical and non-physical. 
90
 For a discussion of the ambiguous nature of Gaga’s celebrity status, see Viktor Corona (2011) 
and Richard J. Gray (2012). 
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Gaga’s excessively smooth skin. Iqani argues that smooth surfaces are culturally 
connected with good feeling because smoothness is associated with high modernity, 
culture and beauty. In her discussion of female cover models on print magazines, she 
argues that smooth skin is not only a marker for ‘sexy’ femininity that reinforces the 
stereotype of women as soft and delicate, but it also operates to associate feminine 
bodies with commodities like new cars that can be possessed and used (2012: 323-324). 
Silky-skinned femininities are therefore often featured in magazines that have a straight 
male target group like the Rolling Stone magazine. From this perspective, Gaga’s 
smooth naked skin seems to invite the male gaze, and turns her into a sexualised 
object.91 On the other hand, as Tyler (2001) maintains, naked skin can also frustrate the 
penetrating male gaze when technologies such as Photoshop make it so shiny and tight 
that it functions as a sort of mirror that reflects the gaze rather than absorbing it. She 
suggests that an overtly tight and shiny skin is paradoxically hyper-visible and yet 
invisible. In this sense, technologies like Photoshop turn Gaga’s naked skin into an 
impermeable armour that not only connotes integrity, but also strength and 
invulnerability. Tyler’s discussion allows us to read Gaga’s cover photo and her 
exposed tight skin as signifying a new powerful femininity that is not defined by 
traditional markers such as softness and delicacy. Overall, these two models show not 
only the image content but also its texture which communicates tension: her skin can 
signify either traditional or subversive femininity.  
Dlisted.com refuses to maintain the tension that the print image provides, and 
uses different technological and affective strategies to pin down its meaning to signify 
improper femininity. According to the blogger, the (mis)use of Photoshop turned 
Gaga’s skin into an excessively tight, shiny and polished surface that surpassed cultural 
ideals of feminine skin, thereby transforming it into a marker of failed femininity. This 
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 Moreover, Gaga ‘wears’ materials that are smooth and shiny – such as the machine guns and 
her red lipstick – which resonate with the sexualised symbolism of smooth skin. 
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is expressed in the headline in which the creator of this image is honoured ironically 
with the Photoshop Award. Furthermore the humorous comment beneath the image tries 
to move the reader affectively: 
And here’s a nekkid ass nekkid Lady CaCa on the cover of Rolling Stone looking 
like the Dutch Boy in drag as a porn version of Tank Girl. […] And whoever ran 
this mess through the Photoshop machine needs to come up to the podium to 
accept their award for pasting Cartman’s bare nalgas on Lady CaCa. (Michael K., 
2010a; emphasis added) 
The humorous tone of this extract ridicules the highly Photoshopped image of Gaga and 
might move the reading body in affective ways thereby performing a shift in how the 
reader will then perceive the cover shot: if the cover shot was earlier perceived as 
representing an edgy femininity, it might now tip into failed femininity. However, my 
focus here is not so much on the text, but rather on the affective work that is undertaken 
when readers click on the two hyperlinks incorporated within the text. The phrases 
‘Dutch boy’ and ‘Cartman’s bare nalgas’ (underlined in the above extract) are 
hyperlinks that connect the blog reader to two new images: the first depicting ‘Dutch 
boy’ and the other showing the naked bottom of Cartman.92 
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 Jodi Dean argues convincingly that ‘[a] problem specific to critical media theory is the 
turbulence of networked communications: that is, the rapidity of innovation, adoption, adaptation, and 
obsolescence. The object of one’s theoretical focus and critical ire quickly changes or even vanishes’ 
(2010: 1). In the case of the second hyperlink to Cartman’s image exactly this has happened: at the time 
of writing-up, Cartman’s image is no longer accessible through the link.  
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Figure 8: ‘Dutch Boy’, hyperlink 
(Michael K., 2010a) 
Figure 9: ‘Cartman’, hyperlink (Michael K., 
2010a) 
 
I suggest that it is through this surprising and unconventional encounter with these other 
images that the reading of Gaga’s cover photographis changed. To make my argument, I 
refer here to my own personal reading experience of this blog post and the surprising 
affective reactions this reading has caused. I do not argue that what I have experienced 
is generally applicable, but it helps me to illustrate how celebrity gossip blogs can move 
us in concrete ways.  
When I read this post for the first time and clicked on the hyperlinks, I had to 
laugh. Even though my body controlled the mouse click that led to the images showing 
up on my screen, and even though I was familiar with the appearances of Dutch Boy 
and Cartman, I was surprisingly moved when finally confronted with them. The 
encounter with these images made me laugh out loud. Unlike the original Rolling Stone 
cover photograph, which could not move me in any particular direction, the appearance 
of the hyperlinked images made my body react with laughter. Puzzled about my 
affective reaction to such a predictable and banal joke, I probed what made me laugh. 
Humour is often produced through incongruity when elements that seem contradictory 
are put together. Clearly Dlisted.com does this here when it compares Gaga’s 
appearance with that of Dutch Boy or Cartman. And yet, as the semiotic analysis above 
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has shown, Gaga’s cover image is full of contradictions that do not make me laugh. I 
suggest that humour is here provoked through the ways in which Dlisted.com mimics 
the tendencies of a post-modern celebrity culture to mix and match different elements in 
the creation of a new femininity, one which has the potential to raise interest and 
capture affective attention. Dlisted.com also plays with different surfaces and, like 
celebrity culture more generally, ironically embraces that which is highly 
commercialised, excessive, artificial, and of ‘low’ cultural status. However, 
Dlisted.com’s mimicking of these strategies is humorous because it is carried out in the 
wrong context. Gaga’s skin may typically be produced as artificial and even monstrous, 
always already embracing and integrating the other, but this is done in a very distinct 
style to create the desired effect of an edgy femininity: her clashing of femininity and 
masculine traits, of black and white, of machine and human emphasises her status as 
dangerous, unique and sexual. The pictures of Dutch Boy and Cartman, meanwhile, 
cannot be smoothly added to her skin because they have very different connotations and 
affects attached to them. The logo of a paint company, Dutch Boy suggests the 
amateurish and home-made, the improvised and DIY. The cartoon character Cartman 
connotes satire, vulgarity and obscenity. Rather than evoking feelings of curiosity and 
fascination like the Gaga cover image should do, their affective registers cluster around 
indifference (in Dutch Boy’s case) or amusement (in Cartman’s case). The clashing of 
these different semiotic and affective qualities causes humour and made me laugh. I 
suggest further that this cross-referencing and connecting of images enabled feelings 
which have changed how I read the cover photograph. Even though the links have lost 
their surprising affective force after some time, I still cannot look at Gaga’s cover image 
the way I looked at it before. Rather than reading her representation as boring (while 
understanding that it should be exciting and edgy), I experience it now as funny, clearly 
marking a failed femininity, a femininity at which I can laugh. This is because the 
  
 124
affective jolts I felt when I first encountered the hyperlinked images are transformed 
now through the reiterations and revisitations to this blogs post and its hyperlinks. They 
have made this cover image sticky with Cartman and Dutch Boy, thereby shifting its 
meaning. 
In this section, I have illustrated that blogs have specific material and 
technological affordances that enable particular sensory and visceral experiences which 
in turn have consequences for our meaning-making of the offline world, in this case the 
print cover photo. Through a semiotic analysis, I have shown the ambiguous nature of 
the original cover photo: refusing to provide a preferred reading as signifying either 
proper or improper femininity, the cover photo holds both elements in tension thereby 
producing the impression of an ‘edgy’ femininity. I have discussed how Dlisted.com 
produces ideas about improper femininity through humorous commenting, but 
particularly through hyperlinks. I have argued that this affective encounter, which is 
enabled through the blog’s technological affordances, shifted how I read the cover 
photo from an image towards which I felt indifference (while acknowledging that it 
should move me as edgy) to an account of failed femininity, a femininity I can deride. 
Even though I referred explicitly to my own subjective readings experience in this 
section, and can as such be critiqued as partial and overtly biased, I argue that it is 
productive as it has shown that sensing and making sense (Armstrong, 2000: 117, 121) 
are always intertwined when we read online representations. This very personal 
example has also illustrated that it is not only me who moves through the blog (through 
clicking and scrolling), but that the blog also moves me. In this sense, the blog is a 
particular kind of actor with the power to affect me thereby changing how I think and 
feel about particular representations of femininity. In the next section, I illustrate how 
blogs shape and re-shape the meanings of celebrity online representations not only 
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through their direct intervention (hyperlinks or image manipulation), but also through 
the circulation of these representations.  
 
Love/Hate Relationships, Skin Graffiti and Movement Online 
‘Skin graffiti’ is a hallmark of Perezhilton.com. The blog mocks celebrities by drawing 
– with white ink using MS Paint – comments, penises, stick figure babies or devil horns 
on their digital photographs. Through this graffiti technique, the control of celebrity 
skin begins to slip away from both the autonomous subject that creates its own bodily 
surface through practices of tanning, tattooing or dieting, and from the entertainment 
industry that produces a carefully constructed star image. Skin becomes here a public 
surface onto which Perezhilton.com sprays its ideas and comments, thereby re-
signifying the meaning of the celebrity figure independent of what the original 
paparazzi photo communicated. My aim in this section is twofold. Firstly, I 
demonstrate, through a comparison of similar images of Amy Winehouse that are 
inscribed by Perezhilton.com with seemingly contradictory meanings, that the meaning 
is not based on what is visible in the paparazzi photo but on how Perezhilton.com 
judges what seems to lies underneath the celebrity skin. The understanding of a 
celebrity as representing abject or respectable femininity is not necessarily dependent on 
what we see on the surface – a skin that is closed up, tight and even – but also on what 
we suspect might reside under that surface. Secondly, I illustrate how the concept of 
skin can be helpful when thinking about the limits of this graffiti technique that aims to 
fix meaning onto celebrity representations. Overall, this section contributes to my 
argument in this chapter that how we read online representations of femininity, or how 
we make skin meaningful, is not only a matter of vision, of what see in front of us in the 
present moment, but is rather an affective assemblage of past background knowledges 
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concerning the bearer of that skin, our own experiences, and the feelings that travel 
between us and the representation.   
Figure 10: ‘Amy Winehouse 
Continues To Grace London With 
Her clASS’ (Hilton, 2010f) 
Figure 11: ‘Amy Winehouse’s Alma Mater To 
Pay Tribute To Her’ (Hilton, 2011a) 
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Figure 12: ‘Wino Insults King Of 
Zulu’ (Hilton, 2010d) 
Figure 13: ‘Is Amy Winehouse Tying The Knot 
With Reg Travis?!’ (Hilton, 2011b) 
 
As these images show, abject and respectable femininity are not mutually 
exclusive categories fixed to certain celebrity figures – rather, they can be inhabited by 
the same skin. One celebrity can be both proper and improper. Dyer argues famously 
that much of the appeal of stars lies in their contradictory construction as ordinary while 
exceptional, famous and yet unhappy, pathetic and tragic (1979: 35). Winehouse is no 
exception to this rule: on the one hand reports about her self-destruction, addiction and 
disgrace tried to frame her in the public conscious as a failed femininity, while on the 
other hand, she stood for the myth of social and racial mobility, and was publicly 
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celebrated for her talent and passion. 93  This paradoxical construction produced 
Winehouse as a multilayered celebrity figure, with whom the audience could connect on 
a number of levels evoking such diverse affects such as adoration, empathy, pity or 
contempt. The capacity of Winehouse to arrest interest and evoke various affects made 
her a tabloid queen, and her ubiquitous representation made her the easy target of a very 
thorough public scrutiny. Through its use of skin graffiti, Perezhilton.com feeds into 
this public scrutiny by stigmatising Winehouse as an abject monster violating the 
borders of respectable femininity. The blog does so through depicting her skin as 
disrupted and leaky with excrements and bodily fluids (Figures 10 and 12), 
foregrounding a perceived incontinence and excess of bodily materiality. Owing to their 
transgression of bodily borders, leaky bodies represent the abject, and therefore have an 
uncanny effect on the viewer. In Figure 10, Winehouse’s skin is disrupted through the 
depiction of excrement. For Kristeva (1982), faeces provoke disgust and horror – as 
something that threatens borders of the clean and proper body, they signify the abject. 
Tomkins argues further that it is through faeces, and the way in which parents recoil 
from them, that a child learns the primary negative affect of disgust. As such, faeces 
stand for what is, on a fundamental level, disgusting rather than volatile in terms of 
affect (Hemmings, 2005: 560). Through disrupting Winehouse’s skin with depictions of 
excrement, Perezhilton.com others Winehouse affectively.  
In Figure 12, Perezhilton.com uses graffiti to depict Winehouse’s skin as leaky 
with an unidentifiable bodily fluid – seemingly saliva or semen – with an accompanying 
text that reads, ‘in classic Wino style, Amy made a fool of herself’ (Hilton, 2010d). 
Here, Winehouse is ridiculed for making a spectacle out of herself, and, as Mary Russo 
                                                             
93
 Winehouse’s working-class background was often embraced as signifying a virtuous 
ordinariness and lack of pretentiousness. She blurred racial boundaries (a privilege that is often reserved 
for white bodies) in that she used blackness as a trope in both her music and stage persona: her white, 
emaciated body inhabited black female vocality, her performative postures invoked masculine gestures 
from hip hop culture, and her stage persona was firmly rooted in 1960s nostalgia, putting black masculine 
coolness (embodied by her three backing dancers/singers) in visual conversation with a run-down white 
female body. For further discussion of this, see Brooks (2010). 
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argues, ‘a woman, making a spectacle out of herself ha[s] […] to do with a kind of 
inadvertency and loss of boundaries’ (1988: 213). Bodily fluids are the ultimate sign of 
a loss of boundaries, as they defy a solid form and ‘attest to the permeability of the 
body, its necessary dependence on an outside, its liability to collapse into this outside, to 
the perilous divisions between the body’s inside and its outside’ (Grosz, 1994: 193). 
This idea of fluids as something that, owing to their lack of form and control, disturb 
Western metaphysics is also a recurring theme in Irigaray’s work (1985a: 227-243; 
1985b), in which she maintains that fluids are the defining point of the feminine other, 
and the reason why women are excluded from a phallocentric world order. According to 
Irigaray, fluids trigger fear and horror because they threaten the masculine order, which 
strives for unity and closed up, unified forms. Obviously, Hilton’s cartoonish skin 
drawings have a different quality/textuality to that of actual faeces, pus, semen or saliva, 
and consequently do not evoke the same feelings of disgust and horror. Yet I suggest 
that they still unequivocally mark Winehouse as abject because they draw on the 
affective history of real bodily fluids and excrements. However, instead of disgust they 
now provoke laughter. In this carnal address – making the body laugh – 
Perezhilton.com relies on the reader’s ability to recognise the connection between 
Winehouse’s excessive behaviour and symbols that signify excess. The drawings might 
be perceived as amateurish, yet they seem to contain a kernel of truth. Media 
representations of Winehouse became, over time, intertwined with notions of notoriety, 
drug and alcohol abuse, as well as shameless, out-of-control behaviour. Hence, when 
Hilton draws these signs of bodily excess on her skin, they are perceived as humorous 
owing to the fact that they exaggerate what we already ‘know’ and ‘expect’ of 
Winehouse. In this sense, Figures 10 and 12 underline the work of Kristy Fairclough 
(2008) and Erin Meyers (2010), both of whom argue that the purportedly subversive act 
of deconstructing a carefully crafted celebrity image through satirical skin graffiti can 
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simultaneously function to reconstruct new femininities with ‘even more rigid 
boundaries of prescribed femininity’ (Fairclough, 2008: n.p.). I have illustrated that this 
in an affective process because it draws on a history that connects fluids and excrements 
with the abject. 
What is intriguing, however, is the way in which Hilton uses very similar 
photographs to accompany very different gossip-stories. Image 10 and 11 are paparazzi 
shots from the same evening. Their similarity suggests that they would most likely have 
been taken only a few seconds apart and yet one image (10) is marked with excrement, 
while the other (11) is adorned with a heart. The same can be said about the 
photographs in Figure 12 and 13. Both photographs show Winehouse with her fiancé 
Reg Travis at a restaurant, but in one Winehouse is caricatured with a beer bottle in her 
hand and saliva running out of her mouth, while the other is decorated with hearts. The 
difference between the ways in which these images are treated (Figures 10 and 12 
contrasted with Figures 11 and 13) raises key questions concerning the reasons behind 
this affective turn, and demand an interrogation of why Winehouse’s femininity can be 
celebrated in certain online representations and denigrated in others. The answer to the 
problems raised by these apparently contradictory depictions may lie in the suggestion 
that neither the celebrity appearance nor the paparazzi photograph are here treated as 
surfaces that allow us access to the truth. Further, Perezhilton.com also confounds the 
linear timeline that is constructed around the celebrity figure by using old photographs 
for new gossip stories, and in doing so the photograph loses its authority and the 
photographed skin is merely an isolated surface that lacks any meaning in itself. 
Meaning emerges only through the inscription Perezhilton.com makes through the skin 
graffiti. The way in which the blogger judges what qualifies as respectable and abject 
femininity must, therefore, lie outside of the realm of what is visible in these 
photographs. The positive depictions of Winehouse in Figures 11 and 13 demonstrate 
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that Winehouse evokes affection either when she is discussed (posthumously) as 
talented and productive, or when she was upheld by the media (when she was alive) as 
embodying the promise of transformation and improvement. In Figure 11, Winehouse is 
affectionately remembered as a talented singer/songwriter who will be honoured by her 
former school. The posting ends with the words, ‘She truly is missed by all’ (Hilton, 
2011a). In Figure 13, Hilton adorns the image with hearts as Winehouse is allegedly 
planning her wedding to the ‘right’ man, one who can keep her in line and tame her 
unproductive, out-of-control behaviour (Hilton, 2011b). The common ground for 
celebrating Winehouse, either because of her talent or her apparently healthy 
relationship, lies in the fact that these discourses and practices are seen as economically 
productive. Her talent made her, and those around her, hugely financially successful, 
and her image as a talented singer/songwriter can be used as a role model to keep 
newcomers motivated in their quests for fame and economic success. Her new healthy 
and heterosexual relationship will keep her productive (and maybe even re-productive) 
because the right man will keep her in control, will orient her towards the right things, 
and will prevent her from becoming a burden for society. Through the lens of 
governmentality this skin graffiti makes perfect sense: Perezhilton.com ridicules 
femininities that do not fulfil the imperative of self-improvement and it celebrates 
femininities when they submit to the values and ideas of a neo-liberal society. 
A reading through the concept of skin expands such an explanation and draws 
attention to the fact that Perezhilton.com’s policing of femininity might not be as 
successful and totalising as an approach through governmentality promises. This is 
because skin reminds us that a visible surface does not have meaning in itself, but 
becomes meaningful through the contact we have with it. Every new contact that the 
digital image has while it circulates online adds something to it thereby re-shaping its 
meanings. In other words, Perezhilton.com might add MS-Paint to the digital image, 
  
 132
thereby re-signifying its meaning to either symbolise proper or improper femininity 
(and the blogger does this independent of what the digital image signified before), but 
the process does not stop there. Rather, this digitally manipulated image circulates 
online, coming into contact with different readers. These readers encounter the 
manipulated image from different social locations and with their own personal 
experiences, which in turn shape how they re-interpret this image. They might not 
approve with her shaming, which in turn might motivate them to critically question 
Perezhilton.com’s own agenda or the policing of women more generally. Readers might 
not experience Winehouse as abject or adorable simply because Perezhilton.com 
represents her as such. This is what Skeggs and Wood call ‘looking through’. In these 
moments, readers/viewers look through the symbolic representation on the screen and 
find a different connection and evaluation of them (2012: 145). This different 
connection is often enabled through the reader’s own personal experience or memories 
that allow a connection with the celebrity in new ways, different from the preferred 
reading. Readers might remember their own feelings or situations they have been in so 
that they can, for instance, emphasise with an ‘abject’ representation, thereby re-reading 
it as endearing or sympathetic. There is a gap between how something is meant to feel 
and how it feels to us, the individual reader in a particular moment. Perezhilton.com 
might have a privileged position in re-signifying the paparazzi photograph because the 
skin graffiti images are placed at the centre of the blog post. But just as the blogger did 
not care about the significations of the original photo, users might not care about 
Perezhilton.com’s re-writing of them and over-write the manipulated image with their 
own ‘affective ink’, their memories and experiences.  
In this section, I have demonstrated how Perezhilton.com polices and 
reconstructs femininities by drawing on the digital photographs of celebrities. Through 
a comparison of several images of Winehouse, I have illustrated that the traditional role 
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of photographs and the appearance of celebrities as surfaces that give access to the truth 
might be challenged on Perezhilton.com, but that the binary between abject and proper 
femininity is maintained. Even though both femininities can be assembled on the same 
skin, how that skin is made meaningful is based on traditional neoliberal discourses of 
the proper female subject that transforms and improves itself constantly to become more 
profitable. Hence, Winehouse’s photographs were adorned with hearts when she 
‘improved’, but were spoiled when her behaviour was deemed as culturally shameful 
and in need of change, and when she refused to change for the better. In this sense, 
Perezhilton.com reads femininity through a normative gaze and polices deviance from 
these neoliberal discourses through visual humour. And yet, as I have argued, this 
policing might have its limits as the meanings of a celebrity online representation do not 
end with Perezhilton.com’s re-writing of it. Rather they continue to change through 
their online circulation and the different contacts they have.  
Reading celebrity online representations through the concept of skin allows us to 
understand digital images of celebrities as surfaces that change their materiality and 
meaning through online circulation. Every new virtual contact, every comment, every 
tag or even every viewing adds something to the image, thereby changing the possible 
meanings that it can take on. More concretely, when the digital paparazzi photo came 
into contact with Perezhilton.com, the blogger added MS-Paint to it. Through this 
addition, Perezhilton.com tried to make the reading of this image not only visually 
univocal but also affectively: either by making us appalled and laugh (when fluids and 
excrements are drawn onto the photo) or by feeling endeared (when adorning it with 
hearts). And yet through its circulation and the different contacts that the manipulated 
image had, its meanings changed again because through every virtual contact this image 
had, the reader added another layer onto it. This layer might not be as visual as the 
graffiti, but memories and experiences are powerful affective forces that can reshape 
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meaning. As this example has shown, humorous celebrity gossip blogs re-shape the 
meaning of a celebrity representation not only through their direct engagement with it 
(in this case through the use of MS-Paint), but also through their circulation and the 
individual contacts they enable through this.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explored some of the affective and embodied ways in which 
humorous celebrity gossip blogs produce ideas about femininity. Organised around the 
online discussions of cosmetic surgery and Photoshop, I have highlighted how 
Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com create boundaries between proper and 
improper forms of femininity through their (humorous) commenting, but also through 
technological possibilities which allow these blogs to integrate videos and hyperlinks or 
to manipulate images. These technological affordances shape not only how a celebrity 
representation manifests on our screen, but they influence also how the online 
representations can move us affectively. As I have shown, image comparisons or videos 
allow Jezebel.com to animate readers with anger and disgust towards artificial 
femininities. Hyperlinks on Dlisted.com can give the reader affective jolts which shift 
the celebrity representation of an edgy femininity into the realm of failed femininity, 
and image manipulation through skin graffiti on Perezhilton.com might try to fix the 
border between proper and improper forms of femininity through provoking endearment 
or laughter. All these examples have illustrated that blogs have particular technological 
possibilities that have the capacity to affect us thereby shaping our understandings of 
proper and improper femininity. This chapter has also shown, through the example of 
Dolly Parton and Jessica Lange, that blogs have particular cultural and political 
orientations that shape the background against which the celebrity figure is read. This 
background is not fixed and homogenous, but rather it changes depending on the 
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celebrity figure with which it in comes into contact. Hence, ideas about proper and 
improper femininity are not produced through what we see in front of us, but rather they 
become meaningful through the affective relations enabled through technology. More 
precisely, online representations of female celebrities come to signify proper or 
improper femininity only through the complex relations between the blog/blogger, other 
celebrities, and the individual reader. Through the example of Alexa Ray Joel and Heidi 
Montag, I have illustrated that even though both these celebrity skins are immaculate, 
only one is used to signify abject femininity. As I have argued, this is because of the 
affective relations between the skins (the celebrities and the readers). In this sense, 
reading representations through the skin reveals these as processes that constantly 
develop through different relationships between the images themselves, where these 
images are located (for example, on specific websites), and the embodied subject in 
front of the screen. 
This chapter has unpacked what it can mean to read these blogs and their online 
representations through the skin. My reading of the selected blog posts, but especially 
my reading of the Gaga blog post on Dlisted.com, has shown that reading through skin 
tries to account for the affective forces of the online representations and the kinds of 
affective reactions and feelings they enable. These affective forces and embodied 
feelings are important, I suggest, because it is in these moments that online content 
comes to matter to us and has the potentiality to re-shape our ideas about femininity. In 
these moments, online content sticks out of the flow of online data and might enter into, 
punctuate and impact upon our life, thereby tweaking or exacerbating how we move 
through life and feel about identity categories such as femininity. In this sense a reading 
through skin is productive because it shows that femininity and especially idealised 
femininity might be tied to a specific appearance, and crucially how we feel about this 
appearance. As my discussion of these texts has shown, it matters for instance if 
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idealised appearance is perceived as authentic and natural and therefore good, or if 
perfect skin is perceived as fake and felt as annoying and boring. This chapter has 
shown, especially in the example of Amy Winehouse on Perezhilton.com, that celebrity 
online representations might follow specific representational patterns that aim to 
communicate certain meanings, but that the meaning of online representations cannot be 
narrowed down because the circulation opens always new ways up in which reading 
body and online representations can encounter each other. Through extending a more 
traditional textual analysis in which online representations might be seen as static and in 
isolation, I apply in this chapter a more flexible approach that is able to account for the 
diverse affective responses we experience when encountering a celebrity representation. 
However, a reading through the skin is not blind to the pre-existing gendered, classed 
and raced histories that shape our representations. Rather, it attempts to acknowledge 
these histories, while being open to recognitions of the potentially productive nature of 
mis-readings. This reading through the skin will be explored in more depth in the two 
following chapters, in which I analyse the ways in which queerness and whiteness are 
produced and circulated within celebrity gossip blogs. 
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Chapter Three  
Queering Celebrity Skin: Animating Sexuality through 
Representations of Touch and Clothing  
 
The sex life of stars has always been a vital part of celebrity gossip. Our intimate 
knowledge about divorces, affairs and sexual escapades reinforce the myth of the 
celebrity as ordinary (even they get divorced and/or betrayed) while also extraordinary 
(the quality and quantity of partners, their sexual antics). Through gossip, we feel close 
to the celebrity because we feel as if we are seeing behind the façade. This intimate 
‘knowledge’ invites us not only to judge but also animates our fantasies (would we do 
the same; how must this feel?). I suggest that celebrities and their representations are 
deeply invested in the production of sexuality because their ubiquitous display of their 
family bliss or sexual transgressions has ‘consequences in terms of how people believe 
they can and should behave’ (Dyer, 1979: 8). As highly affective figures that invite us 
to feel the ups and downs of their love life, celebrities function as important sites 
through which ideas about sexuality – what passes as legitimate or sticks out as 
illegitimate sexuality –are constantly redefined, renegotiated and re-felt. In this chapter, 
I read Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com through skin in order to show how 
these sites affectively mediate and produce ideas about sexuality. More specifically, I 
am interested in how queerness, as expressions of sexuality that disturb 
heteronormativity, becomes produced. Queerness is a slippery term that resists any clear 
categorisation and definition. Michael Warner understands it as any kind of doing that 
challenges normativity in any respect (1991: 6).94 For the purposes of my argument, 
queerness is understood as any practice and/or form of sexuality that deviates from 
‘heteronormativity’, i.e. the dominant discourse of heterosexuality and the norms, 
                                                             
94
 While the word ‘queer’ was used as a derogatory term for effeminate men who engaged in 
deviant sexual conduct throughout much of the twentieth century, its appropriation by queer movements 
challenged the negativity of the term. Despite the fact that queer still signifies non-normative desires, 
behaviour, and identities, it now also connotes empowerment and an attack on the dominant, rigid, and 
implicitly violent sexual norms (Dyer, 2002a; Sullivan, 2003). 
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practices and values it prescribes.95 Sexuality is a matter of sensing not only because it is 
often performed and recognised through the feeling and touching of the skin, but also 
because sexuality is saturated with morality and emotions. The way we feel about 
certain kinds of sexuality inevitably shapes which sexualities can be officially enjoyed 
and proclaimed, and which sexualities are regarded as shameful and embarrassing. 
Sexuality is often understood as a drive (libido) that emerges from the inner depth of the 
self, as a feeling that draws us towards certain bodies and away from others, thereby 
giving society and culture its ‘natural’ structure.96As Ahmed (2007a) points out, such an 
understanding of the relationship between emotions and sexuality, however, effectively 
glosses over the socially constructed character of both.  
Scholars such as Gayle Rubin (1993: 11), Adrienne Rich (1980: 648) and 
Sedgwick (1990) highlight the hierarchy of sexualities, in which a certain type of 
heterosexual relationship – white, middle-class, marital and monogamous – is promoted 
as the best, most respectable, and cherished sexual lifestyle, providing social currency 
and status. Ahmed argues that this particular privileged heterosexual relationship also 
provides affective value:  
There is no doubt that it is hard to separate images of the good life from the 
historic privileging of heterosexual conduct, as expressed in romantic love and 
coupledom […]. There is also no doubt that heterosexual happiness is 
overrepresented in public culture, often through an anxious repetition of threats 
and obstacles to its proper achievement. Heterosexual love becomes about the 
possibility of a happy ending; about what life is aimed towards, as being what 
give life direction or purpose.(2010: 90) 
                                                             
95
 I use the terms ‘heteronormativity’ as interchangeable with the notion of the dominant 
discourse of heterosexuality in this chapter. This is not to argue that they are the same, but rather to signal 
the narrowness of the norms and regulations that the dominant discourse of heterosexuality instils.  
96
 Ahmed writes that ‘heterosexuality functions powerfully not only as a series of norms and 
ideals, but also through emotions that shape bodies as well as worlds: (hetero)norms are investments, 
which are “taken on” and “taken in” by subjects’ (2004a: 146-147). 
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According to this reading, heterosexuality provides the background or general 
orientation along which bodies are eager to align themselves, because it holds the 
promise of happiness, longevity and good feeling. As with many other ideals – such as 
the idealised femininity explored in Chapter Two, or the idealised whiteness I discuss in 
the following chapter – the ideal heterosexual relationship does not exist, and therefore 
cannot be lived or inhabited. However, owing to its positive affective appeal and its 
‘promise of happiness’ (Ahmed, 2010), it nevertheless continues to function as a point 
of orientation. How can this dominant discourse, this orientation which marginalises, 
punishes and crushes bodies that violate these norms, be challenged? In early 
discussions, some argued that an increase in visibility, within mainstream media, of 
sexual identities or practices that deviate from the heterosexual script might challenge 
heterosexuality and the norms and rules it installs (Drukman, 1995). However, others 
maintain that these new representations are not disruptive, but that they are a successful 
strategy through which to market heteronormative values and lifestyles such as kinship, 
marriage and the nuclear family. In other words, heterosexuality functions as such a 
powerful dominant discourse that queer representations are re-sold for the hegemonic 
effect.97 
While such critiques are valid in directing us towards the limitations of visibility 
and queer representations, it is important to acknowledge that no power system is 
absolute, and that representations can take on multiple and sometimes contradictory 
meanings depending on who is watching, through which means, and in what context. 
Celebrity culture arguably lends itself to a queer reading, by which I mean a reading that 
diverts from the preferred reading through its emphasis on the artificial, the 
                                                             
97
 In her discussion of Queer as Folk, Sally Munt (2000)discusses how these representations of 
queerness are white, middle-class and able-bodied, which thereby feeds into normative ideas about how 
queerness should look like. Giovanni Porfido (2012) argues similarly that Queer as Folk reinforces ideas 
of queerness as a white, middle class consumer target group, and Jennifer Reed (2012) demonstrates how 
Ellen DeGeneres’s subversive potential became, over time, more and more flattened out in order to attract 
mainstream audiences.  
  
 140
performative and the constructed, and which challenges notions of naturalness, essence 
and truth. In celebrity culture, the constructed nature of personas has become so obvious 
that it is now rarely commented on. By their very nature, celebrities expose identity as a 
performance or a necessary fiction that works on the blurred boundaries between fiction 
and reality, between appearance and essence. Celebrity culture is, at least in part, a 
world in which artifice is a way of life, and celebrity gossip blogs – especially those 
written by bloggers that identify as gay and use exaggeration, parody and bitchiness in 
their writing – provide ideal entry points for an analysis of how queerness is affectively 
constructed within celebrity culture. Despite the fact that Dlisted.com and Perezhilton 
are both written by bloggers who identify as gay, their political and cultural orientations 
could not be more different. As I mentioned in the Introduction, Dlisted.com can be 
seen as a queer space, whereas Perezhilton.com can be read as a homonormative space. 
However, these online spaces are not homogenous ones in which everything represented 
is either queer or homonormative. In this chapter, I am concerned with how queerness is 
differently understood and represented in humorous celebrity gossip blogs, and how 
these representations affectively produce ideas about sexuality. This affective reading is 
enabled by a reading through skin, most obviously because (queer) sexuality is 
performed through touch. In the first part of this chapter, I focus on the ‘queer touch’, 
which can be imaginative, visible or invisible, but which can move the reader in 
concrete ways. The second part of this chapter focuses on the clothes of celebrities and 
how blogs comment on these. Clothes are here understood as a form of second skin that 
work as a signifier for class, gender and sexuality. I demonstrate that this tangible and 
consumable second skin is an important affective and semiotic resource for how 
queerness is produced and mediated in these online spaces. I conclude by illustrating 
how this chapter has added to my central argument that reading through skin allows us a 
more nuanced and complex understanding of how online representations touch us and 
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become meaningful, not only through their relations with each other, but also through 
their relationship with the reading body in front of the screen. 
 
Queer Touch, Gay Sensibility and Humour 
Scholars such as Vito Russo (1981), Jack Babuscio (1993) and Dyer (2002b) argue that 
gay audiences can possess a ‘gay sensibility’ that allows them to detect the (repressed) 
homosexual or homoerotic elements contained in media representations such as 
mainstream cinema. In a culture in which heterosexuality functions as the dominant 
discourse, this sensibility ‘translate[s] silently what the world sees and what the 
actuality may be’ (Russo, 1981: 92). This ‘second sight’, as gay sensibility is sometimes 
called, is rooted in the experiences that the gay reader has had living in a heterosexual 
world.98 It is, as Babuscio argues, ‘a perception of the world which is colored, shaped, 
directed, and defined by the fact of one’s gayness’(1993: 19). Gay sensibility is a 
reading through skin in the sense that it functions as a filter through which 
representations can be read and re-created differently. This filter can, in turn, only be 
developed through living in a gay skin in heterosexual surroundings, and the bruises, 
injuries and pleasures that this brings with it. In this section, I explore how Dlisted.com 
challenges the privilege of the heterosexual gaze by humorously reading a cover image 
with gay sensibility. Through humour, and by leading the blog reader from the original 
photograph over the humorous comment and then on to the photomontage, Dlisted.com 
verfremdet (renders strange) a heterosexual reading of the cover image and encourages 
the reader to shift his/her gaze, and to see the homoerotic elements in the image. Finally, 
I reveal how feelings of amusement and laughter are evoked not because the queer 
reading is absurd, but rather because heteronormativity is here rendered strange so 
successfully. 
                                                             
98Even though I write about ‘a’ gay sensibility, I am aware that this terminus is also contingent, 
changing depended on the individual gay reader and his multiple reading positions.   
  
 142
 
 
Figure 14: ‘Panty Creamers Of The Day: 
The VD Cast On Entertainment Weekly’ (Michael K., 2012a) 
 
 In the above post (Figure 14), blogger Michael K., who identifies as gay, 
fantasises that Paul Wesley and Ian Somerhalder are touching each other, thereby 
revealing to his readers the ‘actual’ meaning of this cover photograph. Following the 
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conventional strategy of reading blogs from top to bottom, the reader first encounters 
the headline, and then the original cover photograph from Entertainment Weekly. The 
headline ‘Panty Creamers of the Day’, which alludes to the sexual charge of the cover 
photograph, seems to confirm the heterosexual orientation along which the image is 
constructed. Both men in the image are white, muscular, and significantly bigger than 
the woman between them. As such, they represent traditional markers of heterosexual 
masculinity. Nina Dubrev’s body is white, small-framed and ‘protected’ by the big, 
muscular male bodies next to her, and in this way she symbolises the traditional 
heterosexual feminine woman. The characters seem engaged in a ménage a trois, but 
homosexual connotations are mitigated through the woman between the two shirtless 
men. Through this careful arrangement of bodies, the picture is sexually provocative 
(the heteronormative idea of the monogamous couple is disrupted), while keeping the 
heterosexual matrix intact and obscuring the homoerotic elements that are nevertheless 
at work here.99 This heterosexual reading is then disrupted on Dlisted.com through the 
humorous comment beneath the photograph. The first sentence of the written comment 
seems to keep the male heterosexual gaze intact: ‘You can almost fap to the sexual 
tension on this cover’, but the second sentence makes visible the homoerotic elements 
in the photo that arouse the blogger:  
Just look at that Paul Wesley, staring deep into Ian Somerhalder’s adam’s apple 
like he wants to suck the core out of it. I see how Paul’s hand has temporarily 
made a stop on Nina Dobrev’s stomach before eventually making its way to 
Somerhalder. I see how Ian is touching Nina’s face only so his elbow can hover 
near Paul’s fingers and feel the heat. (Michael K., 2012a) 
                                                             
99
 The heterosexual matrix is a conceptual framework developed by Butler in Gender Trouble 
(1990), and refers to the way in which the ‘unity’ of gender is the effect of a regulatory practice that seeks 
to render gender identity uniform through a compulsory heterosexuality. The force of this practice is, 
through an exclusionary apparatus of production, to restrict the relative meanings of ‘heterosexuality’, 
‘homosexuality’, and ‘bisexuality’, as well as the subversive sites of their convergence and resignification 
(1990: 47-102).   
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Here, the heterosexual reading of the cover photo is dismissed, and the image is re-read 
as depicting the desire of two men to touch each other. The woman in the middle is no 
longer the object of desire, but rather a hindrance that prevents the homosexual touch.  
The gay sensibility that Dlisted.com reads in this cover photograph might not be 
visually represented (yet), but the homoerotic desire is, according to the author, so 
obvious and tangible that ‘Nina needs to quietly slip out’ (Michael K., 2012a). At this 
point, Dlisted.com’s queer reading causes amusement as it seems off-script, 
exaggerated, and more parodic of the tone of erotic novels – ‘Yes, I write a lot of low-
grade soft core in my spare time’ (Michael K., 2012a) – than seriously communicating 
gay sensibility. Humour is here provoked by the purported incongruity between 
Dlisted.com’s queer reading and the actual visual representation. This strong 
incongruity makes the humour inclusive: rather than excluding readers that cannot read 
through gay sensibility, it speaks to straight as well as queer audiences. At this point, 
Dlisted.com’s gay sensibility can be regarded as ‘just fun’ or as expression of camp 
humour for queer audiences.100 Through this inclusive humour, gay sensibility is here 
not a ‘ghetto sensibility’ (Russo, 1981) conceivable only for a particular group of 
readers, but a perspective that, while only in an ironic sense, everybody can take on. 
The blog reader who wants to follow Michael K.’s humorous narration therefore has to 
take on – even if only momentarily – a gay sensibility. Through humour, Dlisted.com 
makes gay sensibility the only possible lens through which this representation can be 
read. The photomontage that depicts Wesley and Somerhalden is introduced with the 
words ‘ONTD user enael read everybody’s minds and really made this cover (and fuck 
parts) pucker into tomorrow’ (Michael, 2012a; emphasis added). User enael apparently 
sees and then re-creates what ‘everybody’ is seeing when encountering the cover 
                                                             
100Camp humour is affiliated with homosexual culture and aims to throw into question the 
naturalisation of gender, sex and sexuality. Through the use of exaggeration, over-doing and theatricality, 
and by celebrating the conventionally ‘unacceptable’ and vulgar, camp humour reveals ‘the absurdity of 
those roles that each of us is urged to play with such a deadly seriousness’ (Babuscio, 1993: 26). 
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photograph. In the photomontage, the actress in the middle is literally cut out so that the 
two men are now hugging each other and nearly kissing. This visual representation 
provokes amusement as it is unexpected, and precisely not what everybody saw when 
viewing the original image beforehand, as the dominant discourse of heterosexuality 
prevented such a reading. Now, however, with the photomontage visible in front of us, 
this queer reading seems reasonable, or at least no less likely than a straight reading. 
The more the reader’s gaze travels between the ‘before’ (the original) and the ‘after’ 
image (the photomontage), the more obvious Dlisted.com’s queer reading becomes. It 
may even seem that the woman was not cut out of the cover photo, but rather 
Photoshopped into it. The line between ‘real’ heterosexual representation and ‘fake’ 
homosexual representation thus becomes blurred, and this disorientation provokes 
laughter as it shows that the normalised tendency to read representations through a 
heterosexual lens is socially constructed, rather than natural. Dlisted.com achieves here 
temporarily what Halberstam aims to provoke with his work: rendering heterosexuality 
strange (2012: 11). 101  This Verfremdungseffekt (‘making strange effect’) asks the 
spectator to re-evaluate the image, to reconsider something she/he had previously 
assumed to be normal, by momentarily making the image appear strange, odd or queer. 
However, this heterosexual orientation towards representations was nevertheless 
connected with feelings of security: it felt ‘right’ to the heterosexual reader. When this 
is disturbed, and the straight reader is disoriented, feelings of uncertainty and unease 
arise. In these moments, laughter serves to symbolically and affectively restore the lines 
that have been crossed.  
Dyer (2002b) suggests that lesbian/gay culture is different only to the degree to 
which the erasure of the gap between representation and lived experience is less 
                                                             
101 Halberstam writes that ‘[u]sing clips from Desperate Housewives, The Sopranos, The 
Bachelor and other TV shows, I would act like an anthropologist visiting a strange group of people 
engaged in odd sexual rituals, showing the class what heterosexuality looked like from the outside’ (2012: 
11). 
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naturalised than in heterosexuality. I do not intend to essentialise a ‘gay viewing 
position’ or a ‘gay gaze’ as if this were the only gaze through which all homosexual 
men experience representations. Rather, I want to argue that some people experience 
media representations as remarkably different from their own embodied experience. In 
this post, Dlisted.com re-enacts this experience for the straight audience by presenting 
gay sensibility as the only lens through which representations make sense. Through 
humour, and through the particular arrangement of the different elements of the blog 
post, Dlisted.com renders strange the heteronormative gaze thereby revealing its 
constructed nature. For Berthold Brecht (2000), collective recognition of the absurdity 
of otherwise naturalised bourgeois social conventions is the first stage in stimulating 
political mobilisation based upon a visceral awareness that such conventions need not 
rule human life– that things do not have to be this way. Heteronormativity is, as such, 
momentarily verfremdet (‘rendered strange’ or ‘defamiliarised’) and depending on the 
extent to which the reader opens up to the text, or the extent to which the text resonates 
with the reader’s own experience, it can enable change. In this sense, a reading through 
the concept of skin explores not only how bodies on the screen touch, but also how this 
on-screen touching moves the reading body, thereby pushing it in new critical 
directions.   
 
Feeling Comfortable, Queer Liberalism and the Domesticated Queer Touch 
Ahmed argues that heterosexuality can be seen as an orientation that shapes public 
spaces (2007a). Bodies that do not follow this heterosexual orientation feel 
uncomfortable and disorientated in these spaces because they cannot align themselves 
with this structure, but instead are excluded from it. In this section, I explore how ‘queer 
liberalism’ (Eng, Halberstam and Muñoz, 2005) enables particular queer bodies to feel 
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comfortable within a culture that is narrowly heterosexually orientated. 102  Feeling 
comfortable is here associated with being ‘out’, i.e. visible as gay and ‘proud’ of one’s 
gay identity rather than ashamed. While these feelings and attitudes may seem 
universally positive, I illustrate, through the example of a post about Lady Gaga, that 
these feelings can serve to reinforce the dominant discourse of heterosexuality, and help 
to hide the fact that these ‘out-loud-and-proud’ gestures are only do-able for particular 
raced, classed and gendered bodies. Using the example of a blog post about the 
unveiling of Lady Gaga’s wax figure at Madam Tussauds, in which blogger Perez 
Hilton touches her breast, I demonstrate the ways in which this seemingly subversive 
queer touch reinforces heterosexuality as the norm.  
 
 
                                                             
102 Within queer liberalism, particular gay and lesbian identities become rehabilitated and 
integrated into mainstream culture and national citizenship because this identity can function as a 
consumer citizen while disciplining and normalising queer bodies (Puar, 2005: 122). 
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Figure 15: ‘Perez & GaGalicious!’ (Hilton, 2010e) 
 
The touch between Hilton and Gaga, shown in Figure 15, can be considered as 
queer because it mocks the vulgar and sexually offensive meaning this touch has in a 
heteronormative understanding. According to the heteronormative politics of intimacy, 
a man touching a women’s breast is seen as a sexual contact that should be carried out 
in private rather than in the public sphere. The highly parodic nature of Hilton’s gesture 
is not only proliferated through blog readers’ knowledge about his gay identity (any 
sexual intention towards Gaga is therefore apparently foreclosed), but also through his 
exaggerated and theatrical facial expression, in which his mouth is wide open. This 
touch can therefore be read as a camp act that aims to lay bare, through over-performing 
and theatricality, the misogynist structure of heterosexuality where femininity is equated 
with passivity (and is therefore touched) and masculinity is associated with activeness 
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(and does the touching). It can also be read as dismantling the arbitrary ways in which 
heteronormativity draws borders across our skin, determining which kind of touch is 
taboo within the public sphere. However, rather than reading this touch as a queer 
critique on representations and hegemonic discourses on gender and sexuality, I instead 
interpret this ‘out, loud and proud’ touch in the context of queer liberalism. Jasbir Puar 
argues that queer liberalism hints at an ‘unsettling but not entirely unexpected 
reconciliation of the radical convictions of queerness as a post-structuralist anti- and 
transidentity critique with the liberal demands of national subject formation’ (2005: 
122). Through this reconciliation, queer no longer functions as a critique of social 
normalisations, but rather as a demarcation of a specific gay and lesbian identity that 
advocates the economic interests of neoliberalism and whiteness. Through liberal 
political norms as such marriage, custody, inheritance, and service in the military, this 
specific gay and lesbian identity is incorporated into heterosexual culture (Eng, 2010). 
Queer liberalism creates a normalised form of gay and lesbian identity that does not feel 
at odds with its heterosexually orientated surrounding, but rather comfortable within it. 
These subjects do not feel fear or pain caused by the hatred of a nonetheless 
homophobic culture, because they demonstrate, through consumption, marriage and 
conservatism, that they take part and enjoy such normative discourses and practices. 
As the image accompanying the post shows, Perez Hilton does not feel restricted 
or scrutinised under the public gaze and the lenses of the paparazzi. Rather, he feels 
comfortable in the heterosexual structured public space, and presents the ideal gay 
subject of queer liberalism: a happy, ‘out, loud and proud’ gay identity. Such public 
performances of highly visible gay pride and happy queerness are demanded by queer 
liberalism because they provide visible evidence of a secular and gay-friendly America. 
However, feeling comfortable and feeling proud is only possible for Hilton because of 
his privileged position as a celebrity and his general compliance with heteronormative 
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standards and values. His whiteness, his American nationality, his wealth and his 
celebrity status as the ‘queen of all media’ make his queerness unproblematic and 
marketable.103 His privileged social position allows him to represent gay pride as a self-
transformative strategy that is open to everyone, thereby not only re-establishing the 
idea of the autonomous and intentionally motivated subject, but also glossing over 
structural power inequalities that limit access to that strategy. Queerness, as it is 
performed here through this highly visible touch, is not about shattering concepts of 
identity and subjectivity, but is rather about building one unambiguous identity and 
making it visible, thereby reaffirming the subject as the author of her/his self-
transformation without taking into account to whom this strategy is available. 
Halberstam has highlighted that pride is deeply invested in the identity politics of white 
gay men, and that this has obscured more radical agendas. He maintains: 
[...] it is white gay male shame that has proposed ‘pride’ as the appropriate 
remedy and that focuses its libidinal and other energies on simply rebuilding the 
self that shame dismantled rather than taking apart the social processes that 
project shame onto queer subjects in the first place. […] The notion that social 
change can come about through adjustments to the self, through a focus on 
interiority without a concomitant attention to social, political, and economic 
relations, can be a disastrous tactic for queer studies and queer activism. (2005: 
223-224) 
The ‘out, loud and proud’ touch performed on Lady Gaga’s wax figure provides a 
compelling fantasy of agency for the homonormative viewer, while simultaneously 
silencing questions concerning structural and institutional politics and inequalities of 
power 
                                                             
103
 While Hilton is of Latino decent, he performs a white identity through his political views and 
values. This means that non-white identities can become white (or whiten themselves) when they agree 
and support the white workings of power through their behaviour and political orientation while reducing 
their ethnical or racial heritage to an a-political folklore gimmick. Stephen Knadler explains this in more 
detail in his work on the celebrity figure of Jennifer Lopez (2005).  
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Furthermore, it is important to recognise the way in which Hilton domesticates 
the potentially subversive meanings that his touch can have. His touch is normalised 
because it conforms to the morality standards of bourgeois, liberal heterosexuality: it is 
empty of any sexual connotations because, as a woman, Gaga cannot be his object of 
desire.104 Moreover, the touch is not read as sexually offensive because Gaga herself is 
often understood as queer within mainstream culture. Her queerness is not based on her 
sexuality, but rather on her performances and costumes that, through their 
outrageousness and highly artificiality, undermine heteronormative rules and values 
regarding sexuality and gender. 105  Gaga is emblematic of the commodification of 
queerness as a lifestyle choice: owing to her white, slim, young and healthy body she 
can put queerness on and take it off like a costume. In such a liberalist understanding of 
queerness, both Hilton and Gaga can be seen as being part of a ‘queer community’, 
operating within the same discourses constituted by shared concepts of norms of 
communication. In other words, both are ‘in on the joke’, making fun of the rules of a 
heteronormative society. However, this seemingly transgressive act is carefully 
constructed around the moral standards of a white, heterosexual bourgeois, and this 
touch is only morally acceptable because of their mutual queerness. The touch is further 
domesticated through the text that accompanies the image: ‘Check us out! Fierce! Last 
night, we had the honor of unveiling the last addition to the Madame Tussaud's 
collection in Hollywood - Lady GaGa! […] Check out more of the pics of us with our 
                                                             
104
 Even though Lady Gaga claims in interviews and through her performances and videos to be 
bisexual, she has never been publicly involved with a woman (Capulet, 2010: 298-299).  
105Gaga’s queer status is secured through her performances, which seem to defy notions of 
essentialism, identity and originality: ‘[b]y refusing to acknowledge any identity behind the endlessly 
reproduced image of the artist and instead “reducing” her identity to clothes, masks and wigs, she 
constantly foregrounds the performative of (artistic) identity and gender performance’ (Horn, 2012: 88). 
This understanding of Gaga can certainly be critiqued. Scholars such as Shaviro (2010) and Skeggs 
(1997) point out that such surface performances are only possible for particular white and able-bodied 
identities. 
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(fake) wifey below! P.S. We just had to cop a feel! Ha’(Hilton, 2010e).106 Hilton’s 
reference to Gaga as his ‘(fake) wifey’ takes on a double signification here: on the one 
hand it describes her artificiality – after all Hilton is touching a wax figure and not Gaga 
herself while, on the other hand, ‘fake’ is put in parentheses, and can as such also be 
erased from the sentence, and through this, Hilton explicitly mimics the 
heteronormative institution of marriage. Furthermore, he imitates clichés regarding 
straight, masculine behaviour when he writes ‘We just had to cop a feel!’ as a 
justification for him grabbing her breast. Again, this could be read as a camp tactic to 
dismantle the artificial character of heterosexual norms. However, as Butler observes, 
not all strategies that expose the naturalised character of heterosexuality will lead to its 
subversion. Indeed, ‘[h]eterosexuality can augment its hegemony through its 
denaturalization, as when we see denaturalizing parodies which reidealize heterosexual 
norms without calling them into question’ (Butler, 1993: 22). Considering the queer 
liberalist context in which I read this post, I argue that Hilton re-idealises, rather than 
denaturalises, the heterosexual framework. Through his domesticated queer touch, 
Hilton portrays the queer community as harmless, fun loving and not so different(after 
all Gaga is his ‘wifey’), and therefore as that which is easily integrated into the 
framework of heteronormativity. 
If media representations are one of the main channels through which heterosexist 
and heteronormative values are diffused and queerness made invisible and excluded, 
then it is necessary to consider under which circumstance queerness is made visible and 
how the viewer participates in this process. The uncritical celebration of the visibility of 
gay pride prevents any enquiry into the ways in which (queer) sexuality intersects with 
other axes of difference and neoliberal frameworks, or, ultimately, for whom these 
practices are available. Through the lens of queer liberalism, I have shown that the 
                                                             
106
 Hilton’s use of ‘we’ instead of ‘I’ in the blog post is typical for his writing. It underlines his 
status as a ‘queen’ (the queen of all media) and can be seen as a camp move. It also hints towards Hilton’s 
self-understanding as part of the gay community, representing always more than just himself. 
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‘happy and proud’ queerness represented in this photograph and circulated online fails 
to threaten a (celebrity) culture in which the assemblages of heterosexuality, whiteness, 
nationality and neoliberalism create proper queer bodies and representations. Rather, 
Hilton’s touch is desexualised, normalised and depoliticised so that it can be easily 
consumed without discomfort. From this perspective, Perezhilton.com helps to sustain, 
through this blog post, queer liberalism and its social structures at the level of affect and 
affective networks. In the next section, I explore the affective quality of a queer touch 
that is not visually represented.  
 
The Invisible Touch, Queer Pleasure and Affective Fabrics 
Interactive technological platforms like online blogs do not create the active audience – 
rather, they make the active audience visible through the texts and images that readers 
leave online (Meyers, 2012). Consumers of all kinds of media content ‘take advantage 
of new media technologies that enable them to archive, annotate, appropriate, and 
recirculate media content’ (Jenkins, 2008: 136). Hence, ‘active’ consumption becomes 
visible online in the form of comments, tags and blog entries, and shows that singular 
members of the audience engage differently and creatively with media 
representations. 107  In this section, I explore a posting in which guest blogger Lux 
Alptraum ‘takes advantage of new media technologies’, and publishes on Jezebel.com 
her reading of two characters from the American musical teen series Glee.108Alptraum, 
who identifies as queer, explains in this blog entry ‘Why Glee’s Brittany And Santana 
                                                             
107
 I use here the term ‘audience’ rather than ‘spectator’ because it is less psychoanalytically 
laden, and it highlights my concern with how actual individuals interpret and experience media 
representations rather than the subject positions constructed by the representation. Psychoanalytic 
scholars infer ‘spectator positions’ from their analysis of a text because they believe that the text itself 
situates women and men in universal and repeatable ways (Walters, 1995: 89-90). For a critique of a 
purely textual position of the spectator, see: Stacey (1994: 29). 
108
 Jezebel.com uses often guest bloggers to write about special issues or to write about media 
and other events from an alternative, non-mainstream position. Glee revolves around the glee club 
members at the fictitious William McKinley High in Lima, Ohio. What makes Glee stand out among the 
broad range of contemporary Western teen series is its significant number of gay teenagers. For more on 
the representation of gay teenagers in Glee, see: Frederik Dhaenens (2012). 
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Are [Her] Queer Icons’(Alptraum, 2010).109 My interest in this blog entry is twofold. 
Firstly, it intrigues me that even though Brittany and Santana’s queer relationship is 
never visually represented, it is still strong enough to touch Alptraum in front of the 
(television)screen, engendering within her feelings of pleasure, belonging and 
empowerment and motivating her to share her reading of them online. This connection 
between non-visuality and affect challenges the privileged position of vision as the only 
or primary sense through which a queering of heteronormativity can occur. Secondly, 
this post shows how a reading in which the viewer of the television shows fills in the 
gaps with her own ideas and desires materialises online as an ‘affective fabric’, thereby 
producing rather than representing ideas about queerness through feeling.  
Figure 16: ‘Why Glee’s Brittany And Santana Are My Queer Icons’ (Alptraum, 2010) 
At the time when Alptraum wrote her blog entry on Jezebel.com, Brittany and 
Santana’s queer relationship had not been visually represented in Glee; it had only been 
insinuated through gestures and utterances. This lack of visibility arguably prevents 
                                                             
109
 The two characters from Glee might not be celebrities in the traditional sense (they are two 
characters on a television show and not star personae), yet they have some of the same qualities as 
celebrities: their representations are highly visible and invoke people to engage with them affectively and 
to negotiate through them questions about identity and value.   
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their queer desire from being objectified or misrepresented as ‘lesbian chic’. It also 
saves this un-labelled relationship from being turned into a visual spectacle, and 
impedes the assimilationist move within mainstream media to render one butch and the 
other femme.110 Yet this invisible queer connection is strong enough to affectively move 
guest blogger Alptraum, who writes euphorically about how representations of Brittany 
and Santana’s sexual encounters evoke in her feelings of belonging, empowerment and 
pleasure: 
I’ve never really had any TV characters I could identify with, who seemed to 
represent my personal experience of sexuality. But then I discovered Brittany and 
Santana on Glee. To be honest, I didn’t feel an immediate kinship with the two 
Cheerios. Unlike the ubergay Kurt, their queer nature wasn’t telegraphed from 
episode 1. In fact, it wasn’t even until halfway through Glee’s first season that the 
first hint of queerness was even mentioned. But as the characters got more and 
more fleshed out through the second half of season I started to find myself drawn 
to the two of them and their unconventional – yet, for me, totally relatable – 
relationship. (Alptraum, 2010) 
In her post, Alptraum describes a representation of queerness that develops slowly, 
rather than one which forces itself upon the viewer like the ‘ubergay Kurt’. It is notable 
here that the lack of visual representation does not erase queer sexuality, as proponents 
of gay visibility might argue. Rather, it is precisely the palpable sexuality between 
Brittany and Santana that is highlighted in this post, and named as the reason for 
Alptraum’s excitement. The blogger describes how she became increasingly ‘drawn to’ 
the two girls when the queer sexual connotations became clearer (yet still not visually 
represented). This connecting and opening up to other queer bodies happens across the 
                                                             
110
 For more on how mainstream cinema appropriates the lesbian identities by rending one butch 
and the other femme, see Weiss (1992) or Barale (1991). Barale argues that the visual display of 
sex/gender positioning is often completed by a difference in hair colour: blonde for the femme and dark 
hair for the butch. Even though Brittany and Santana visually embody these oppositions (Brittany is white 
with blond hair while Santana is Latina), they do not reiterate this binary construction.  
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seemingly separate spheres of representation and reality, and thereby shows the extent 
to which this boundary is blurred. The post details the way in which she gradually felt a 
connection with the characters, because Brittany and Santana’s sexual encounters seem 
to resonate with her own lived and felt sexuality – these bodies from purportedly 
separate spheres belong together through the virtue of their difference to the 
heterosexual norm. This felt connection engenders feelings of excitement and belonging 
that bring these bodies, real and imagined, closer together, thereby increasing the ability 
of the real body to feel empowered, to feel comfortable in her own skin. 
Not only does Alptraum’s post illustrate how queerness emerges through 
imagination and feeling in addition to what is visually represented, but it also illustrates 
the ways in which representations of queer/lesbian desire take on different meanings 
when read through a female queer gaze rather than through the straight male 
gaze.111Through Alptraum’s lived experience and her queer gaze, she can identify with 
the two characters, and this identification is experienced as empowering: 
Brittany and Santana probably aren’t lesbians – their numerous dalliances with 
boys make that pretty clear – but they’re definitely not straight. Maybe you’d call 
it bisexual, maybe you’d call it heteroflexible, maybe you’d call it bicurious: 
whatever they are, it’s definitely a bit queer. And as a girl who’s been attracted to 
men, women, and everything in between, it’s thrilling to see this sort of sexual 
fluidity represented on one of the most popular shows on television.(Alptraum, 
2010) 
                                                             
111I am not implying a universality of reception amongst queer and lesbian viewers, and am not 
framing the queer female gaze is an essential category that defines itself against the male heterosexual 
gaze and vice versa. Rather, I use it, strategically, in order to express a particular investment and viewing 
context that differs from the male straight gaze. Gay and lesbian theorists have also made significant 
contributions to the ‘rereading’ of film spectatorship. Andrea Weiss (1991), and Patricia White (1991), 
among others, suggest that lesbian spectatorial desire challenges the traditional heterosexist paradigm, 
creating a dynamic of desire outside of previously theorised notions of spectatorship. If lesbian spectators 
are outside of the traditional heterosexual system of desire, then they pose a significant threat to previous 
theories of spectatorship. 
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The ‘thrilling’ feeling that Alptraum describes here when encountering representations 
that portray sexual fluidity, and the rejection of any kind of (sexual) categorisation, is 
not shared by her friends. The blogger writes ‘my designation of Brittany and Santana 
as queer icons has met with some derision: their relationship is played for laughs, I’ve 
been told. They’re just straight girls making out for male attention. They’re not really 
queer’ (Alptraum, 2010; emphasis in original.) And yet Alptraum clearly read them as 
queer, as figures that manage to be sustained at the fringes, avoiding the complete 
assimilation and pinning down that often characterises more explicit visual 
representations with mainstream media. 
 
 
Figure 17: Mini-dialogue field in ‘Why Glee’s Brittany And Santana Are My Queer 
Icons’(Alptraum, 2010) 
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Alptraum communicates this experience and her queer re-reading of the 
characters online on Jezebel.com. Her affective reading that emerged at the intersections 
of television and lived reality is now online, turned into a text as part of a blog, visible 
on a shifting screen. This text circulates as a ‘packet of data’ connecting different 
people, readers like me who stop their online browsing and engage with the blog post. 
Alptraum’s post is not just a flat text on the distant screen but an ‘affective fabric’ 
which we grab and model through our touch with the cursor. It affects readers who feel 
compelled to comment, and some of these comments open up their own mini-dialogue 
field (Figure 17). For instance, user CurtCole writes in response to Alptraum’s post: 
‘They’re my favorite characters on the show, both of them subvert traditional 
stereotypes of bisexuality in a subtle and often humorous ways’. This comment in turn 
motivates other readers to react to CurtCole’s message either by commenting or by 
adding a GIF (see Figure 17). All added elements in this mini-dialogue field celebrate 
Brittany and Santana as representations of a fluid sexual identity, as queer. Through this 
repetitive touching and adding content online, Brittany and Samantha’s queerness 
becomes more and more visible and palpable. Dean writes that particular posts in blogs 
come to matter only when they accrue their affective force through, for instance, virtual 
touching: ‘[e]very little tweet or comment, every forwarded image or petition, accrues a 
tiny affective nugget, a little surplus enjoyment, a smidgen of attention that attaches to 
it, making it stand out from the larger flow before it blends back in’ (2010: 95). This 
illustrates that the blog post about Brittany and Santana matters in the constant stream 
of online content only because it is picked up on, commented on and extended with 
images. Questions about if and how online posts/representations come to matter are 
always already connected with questions about what they can mean and what they can 
do. I argue that through the numerous different engagements with the blog post, the 
affective fabric of the original blog post becomes thicker, thereby fixing (maybe only 
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momentarily) Brittany and Santana’s representations of queerness. Ironically, these 
online practices and affective involvements are fixing what Alptraum so euphorically 
described as unstable and fluid. However, perhaps more importantly, this example also 
shows that celebrity gossip blogs like Jezebel.com can create ideas about queerness 
rather than merely representing what exists in this form already elsewhere. 
In this section, I have argued that how queerness becomes produced is not 
necessarily a matter of visual expressiveness. Rather, it is created affectively through 
the ways in which the viewer – with her specific experiences and history – and the 
representations touch each other. Alptraum is differently orientated towards these 
representations than, for instance, a straight male viewer might be. She feels connected 
and similar to these characters, and this in turn evokes in her feelings of belonging and 
pleasure. I have explored how her reading is translated online. Conceptualising her blog 
post as an affective fabric which users grab and re-work illustrates how online spaces 
like celebrity gossip blogs can be seen as skins on which different actors and mediate 
formats meet, thereby producing through their dynamic and interactive practices ideas 
about queerness. In the next section, I shift my attention away from touch towards 
clothing, and explore how ideas about sexuality become produced online when gossip 
blogs discuss the sartorial practices of celebrities. 
 
Wearing Sexuality: Sartorial Practices and Queerness 
Scholars have rightly argued that clothes are a tangible and concrete texture that makes 
and communicates meaning (Iqani, 2012; Owyong, 2009). Like a second skin, clothes 
protect our bodies from external influences like sun exposure or cold, and like a second 
skin, clothes are only superficial but they read, enact, and create power relations 
between people. However, unlike skin, clothes are not understood as a matter of nature 
or being. Dressing up or wearing something is a form of consciousness; it is never 
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natural, but always acquired. As such, in Western consumer culture, clothing is a 
medium through which we express our individuality and identity. Fashionable and 
stylish attire is valued as an expression of individualism, class and good taste, and 
clothes are signifiers that give us clues about the gendered, classed and sexualised self 
of the individual. Clothing is in close affinity with discussions of gender construction, 
performance, and enactment, and thereby functions as a cultural code that enables an 
identification of the other, but also identification with the other.112 In this section, I 
explore the ways in which Dlisted.com comments on the clothing of celebrities. I argue 
that the humorous comments on celebrities’ outfits reveal which sexuality or sexual 
practices are valued by the blogger and which are critiqued. I illustrate the ways in 
which, through humour, Dlisted.com develops an elaborate web of subversive gestures 
that undermines the normalising discourses and practices of heterosexuality, and 
celebrates the outlandish, the failed and that which refuses the logic of the normal. 
It is a recurrent strategy on Dlisted.com to mock celebrity couples that try to 
express, through matching outfits, their monogamous, middle- or upper-class, and 
therefore happy relationship.113 In a post from January 2011, Dlisted.com comments 
humorously on the break-up between actors Keira Knightley and Rupert Friend: 
‘[b]ecause coordinating outfits with your piece gets exhausting after a while, Keira 
Knightley and her boyfriend of 5 years Rupert Friend have stuffed the pieces of their 
relationship into a GLAD bag and thrown it on the back of a truck heading for the 
nearest dumpster’(Michael, 2011b). 
 
                                                             
112
 Accounting for the potential of clothes to be seen an access to the sexuality of a subject, Dyer 
explains the significance clothing and fashion had for gay men: ‘Fashion and the other style trades gave 
us a space to exercise a skill we have had to be very good at, namely, presentation. Surviving as a queer 
meant mastering appearances, knowing how to manipulate clothes, mannerisms and lifestyle so as to be 
able to pass for straight and also to signal that we weren’t’ (2002a: 63). 
113
 Dlisted.com ridicules both queer and straight couples for this practice. See, for instance, a 
post about actor Neil Patrick Harris and his partner David Burtka from a photo shoot for People Magazine 
(Michael K., 2010b). 
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          Figure 18: ‘Two Boring Pretty People Broke Up’ (Michael K., 2011b) 
Before I explain why Dlisted.com’s ridiculing of the ‘coordinat[ed] outfits’ is important 
in the deconstruction of heteronormativity, it is necessary to clarify some of the 
semantics of matching outfits. Like uniforms, matching outfits can symbolise, for 
instance, belonging to a group – different bodies come to look alike, their individuality 
is played down while their similarity and togetherness is highlighted. In the world of 
celebrities, the semantics of matching outfits is often used to symbolise the coherence of 
a band, but there is also a trend of celebrity couples dressing alike to demonstrate their 
togetherness in a highly visible manner. Through their similarity, matching clothes 
produce the couple as an entity, as a social ‘one’. Within the dominant discourse of 
heterosexuality, notions of ‘unity’ and ‘twos’ that become ‘ones’ have historically been 
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ascribed, by social conventions and institutions like the church, medicine and the law, to 
monogamous heterosexual couples. In a neoliberal climate, ideas concerning 
monogamy, coupledom, the nuclear family and belonging are extended to encompass 
particular queer bodies, and clothing is one way of demonstrating and embodying this 
belonging on and through their skin.  
By mocking the practice of demonstrating togetherness through ‘tasteful’ 
matching outfits that celebrity couples wear, Dlisted.com humorously draws attention to 
the fact that monogamous coupledom, as the privileged space within which sexuality 
can take place, is a performance that not only requires careful scrutiny and labour, but 
also one that only privileged bodies (with money) can enact. In the above post, clothes 
stand not for an expression of individuality, but rather as an expression of belonging 
together with, in this case, a differently gendered person. Sexual desire is here not only 
felt in the body, but also felt on and expressed through the skin. Through clothes, the 
normative fantasy of a relationship where two become one is tangible and consumable. 
Dlisted.com illustrates that the monogamous couple, which Hollywood tries so eagerly 
to naturalise by representing it as normal and as a source of happiness, is a performance 
that needs to be artificially maintained and requires hard work: ‘coordinating outfits 
with your piece gets exhausting after a while’. Dlisted.com reduces the relationship to 
pieces of clothing that are not only put on for a good performance, but that can also be 
stuffed in a bag and thrown away. Relationships are, in this reading, only skin deep, a 
surface appearance rather than some essential truth. Through this humorous reading of 
Knightley and Friend’s relationship, Dlisted.com disrupts the myth that Hollywood tries 
to create around coupledom as the only route to happiness. 
Rather than celebrating a dress code that reinforces the dominant discourse of 
heterosexuality and its privileged expression in the form of the monogamous couple, 
Dlisted.com hails celebrities that queer, through their excessive outfits, normative 
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understandings of gender-appropriate and tasteful attire. In this section, I use a post 
about fitness icon Richard Simmons to demonstrate the ways in which Dlisted.com’s 
humorous treatment of celebrities whose style disrupts normative sex/gender 
expectations can be understood as more than malicious mocking. Instead, I reconsider 
the politics of queer humour, and suggest that this post can touch the reader affectively, 
thereby enabling a counter-hegemonic discourse for critiques of gender and sex roles. 
 
Figure 19: ‘Richard Simmons Serving You Dementia-Stricken 
Drag Queen As Poison Ivy’ (Michael K., 2012b) 
 
I LURVE this crazy old lady. […] Mother Nature and Uma Thurman can punch 
out early, because Richard Simmons’ Poison Ivy poses are burning Beverly Hills 
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to the GROUND. He even accessorized with butterflies like a true woodland diva 
does it.  
Auntie Richie blends so well into those bushes with his costume camouflage 
magic. Imagine you’re going down to the shrubs to get a blowie (old gays still do 
this – we call them cock zombies), and THAT pops out at you with a 
‘HEELLLOOOO BATMAN!’ and offering to pull down his tights? Scared 
straight! 
And he has so many faces and emotions. He’s giving you ‘Am I at the right bus 
stop?’ ‘Ooh, is that the Gallagher's new poolboy?’ ‘Thinking about the nighttime.’ 
and ‘A locked ward don’t mean SHIT to POISON IVY.’ Never change, Richard. 
Check out more pics of the utterly flawless Richard Simmons and his green 
finery. (Michael K., 2012b) 
As the image of Simmons in this post (Figure 19) shows, it is the feminised, bizarre 
clothing that marks him as not a proper – i.e. masculine and heterosexual – man. The 
image is out of context and thus Simmons seems to wear this outfit without any special 
reason, such as a costume party. This marks him, through a heteronormative gaze, as 
opposed to dominant ideas of masculinity and as a pathologised form of gendered 
subjectivity. At first, the humorous comment that accompanies the image might seem 
offensive –blogger Michael K. refers to Simmons in the headline as a ‘Dementia-
Stricken Poison Ivy Drag Queen’, and he jokes about his potential to ‘scare’ people 
‘straight’. Yet I suggest that this post cannot be reduced to merely othering the 
flamboyant celebrity, but that rather what resonates here is a humorous camp reading of 
Simmons’s outfit that reveals to the reader, in a highly affective way (by making us 
laugh), that all gender and sex roles are artificial constructs.   
The root of camp humour is in a relationship between ‘queens and their 
circumstances’ (Medhurst, 1997: 276). It is, as such, a type of humour that emerges out 
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of the queers’ experiences and perceptions, and functions as ‘a means of dealing with a 
hostile environment and, in the process, of defining a positive identity’ (Babuscio, 1993: 
27). Camp humour takes the form of biting irony, self-deprecating jokes and bitter wit 
because it digests feelings such as fear and pain that a hostile environment evokes in 
those who do not embody heterosexual norms. Camp humour is difficult to grasp for 
‘outsiders’, which means in this context all identities that are not gay white men. This 
illustrates that, in discussions about camp humour, ‘queer’ and ‘gay’ are often 
problematically conflated.114 Because camp humour has such an ‘insider’ function, it 
appears cynical and malicious while actually being affectionate. This is reflected in 
Dlisted.com’s statement: ‘I LURVE this crazy old lady’ (Michael K., 2012b). The 
deprecating description as ‘crazy’ reflects the outsider’s view of Simmons, while ‘I 
LURVE’ signals the feelings of love and appreciation towards him. Dlisted.com is not 
laughing at Simmons – rather, it celebrates the shameless flaunting of a flamboyant 
aesthetic, the highly staged and artificial nature of his outfit. Arguing for the benign 
nature of camp (humour), Susan Sontag writes: 
Camp taste is, above all, a mode of enjoyment, of appreciation – not judgment. 
Camp is generous. It wants to enjoy. It only seems like malice, cynicism. (Or, if it 
is cynicism, it’s not a ruthless but a sweet cynicism.) Camp taste doesn’t propose 
that it is in bad taste to be serious; it doesn’t sneer at someone who succeeds in 
being seriously dramatic. What it does is to find the success in certain passionate 
failures.(1966: 291) 
Simmons’ ‘passionate failure’, which he carries on his skin in the form of an eccentric 
dress made of artificial leaves, is, on Dlisted.com, not understood as a failure to succeed 
in the performance of normative categories, but rather as a failure to participate in a 
                                                             
114
 While scholars such as Pamela Robertson (1996) argue that camp can also convert to a 
feminist politics in that it highlight the performative nature of gender and sex roles, Andy Medhurst 
insists that camp is the exclusive property of gay men. Women or straight men, it seems, have no claims 
to the sensibility of camp. Indeed Medhurst concludes with the remark that camp is ‘ours, all ours, just 
ours, and the time has come to bring it back home’ (1997: 291). 
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system of valuation that is predicated on conformity. Simmons fails in a system where 
validation is only given to male sexed bodies that behave and dress in a straight 
masculine way. Critics such as Muñoz and Halberstam have both argued that failure can 
be read as a form of resistance. The ‘modality of being off script, off page […] is not so 
much a failure to succeed as it is a failure to participate in a system of validation that is 
predicated on exploitation and conformity’ (Muñoz, 2009: 174). According to 
Halberstam, failure, rather than symbolising that people cannot rule themselves, can be 
understood as a commitment to refuse the logic of rule, be it colonial, capitalist, feudal, 
or neoliberal (2012: 133-134). Dlisted.com recognises this potential in Simmons, and 
declares him, as such, ‘utterly flawless’. 
Dlisted.com’s frenetic hailing of Simmons’s queer outfit does not only glorify 
what the normative and the mainstream would abject. 115  Rather, Dlisted.com’s 
humorous celebration of the highly artificial and queer can be understood as an attack 
on the dominant discourse of heterosexuality that shapes our ideas of masculinity and 
femininity.116 This attack works affectively in that Dlisted.com’s camp humour produces 
new ways of relating to each other (bodies that are perceived to represent ‘normal’ and 
‘deviant’ sexualities). This queer reading of Simmons is inclusive, rather than being 
exclusively for a particular readership. It acknowledges on the one hand how 
Simmons’s outfit must appear to the sober straight gaze, i.e. ‘crazy’, and as something a 
‘dementia stricken drag queen’ would wear. However, the humorous tone also allows 
Dlisted.com to express feelings of affection and love for Simmons because of his 
uniqueness, a uniqueness based on mutation, perversion and deviance from the norm. 
                                                             
115
 Even though celebrity culture can be seen as camp because it praises style over content, 
celebrates the play with surfaces, and realises that performance is everything, figures like Simmons would 
typically be rejected, made fun of, or at most be used as ‘freaks’ to sell something. 
116
 I use the word ‘attack’ here in order to highlight the political and cultural seriousness of 
Dlisted.com’s project. Camp humour is characterised as being funny while being deadly serious. As a 
character in a Christopher Isherwood novel remarks: ‘You can’t camp about something you don’t take 
seriously; you’re not making fun of it; you’re making fun out of it. You’re expressing what’s basically 
serious to you in terms of fun and artifice and elegance’ (2012 [1984]: 125). If we take this definition of 
camp humour seriously, then we can conclude that joking about Simmon’s outfit has some serious 
significance for Dlisted.com. 
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‘Never change, Richard’, Dlisted.com advises Simmons, thereby pledging alliance to 
him and reminding him not to become absorbed into the mainstream. Through this kind 
of humour, Dlisted.com bridges the gap between those who have not yet come into 
contact with or felt the politically subversive power of camp practices like drag, and 
those who are camp savvy and know about the multiple potentialities and functions of 
this practice. Dlisted.com’s camp banter is inclusive and imaginative, (theoretically) 
including everyone in the joke. The reader is, for instance, invited to ‘imagine […] 
going down to the shrubs to get a blowie’ (Michael K., 2012b). Dlisted.com does not 
care about the sexed body or the sexual orientation that the reader might inhabit – 
rather, every reader is invited to take on the position of an old gay male, so-called ‘cock 
zombies’. Through this ‘going gaga’ (Halberstam, 2012), being offensive yet 
affectionate, dismissive yet supportive, and blind towards gender and sex distinctions 
and yet celebrating difference, Dlisted.com invites its readers not only to imagine a 
different social, cultural and sexual position, but also a different view, where deviation 
from the norm becomes that which is beautiful and flawless, rather than the ability to fit 
in perfectly.  
 Jonathan Gray argues that comedy and humour are transformative and 
transgresssive because they invite ‘at least some degree of critical intersexuality, for 
when we laugh, we acknowledge having moved with the joke to other territory, and 
having been treated to an alternative view of that territory’ (2006: 105). Through its 
camp humour, Dlisted.com enables an alternative view of a seemingly known territory: 
we might laugh about Simmons, but we can also appreciate him for illustrating that 
gender and sexual orientation is a performance, a question of style and aesthetics. Why 
is his outfit more ridiculous than those of Rihanna or Lady Gaga? Muñoz argues that we 
need to create utopias for the purpose of imagining a future that is unimaginable in 
normative and straight time (2009: 178). I suggest that Dlisted.com accomplishes this 
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through its camp and vulgar celebration of the queerly dressed. In this online space, 
transgressions are encouraged and enjoyed, transgressions and vulgarities that cannot 
find expression in more conventional media representations. As such, Dlisted.com 
enables the reader to – at least momentarily – imagine a different reality, to make 
detours around the usual, and to distort the everyday ideologies that are regarded as 
common sense or true. In the next section, I explore how ideas about happy 
relationships become affectively reinforced on Perezhilton.com, and how this affective 
intensification contributes to the dominant discourse of heterosexuality.  
 
Homonormativity, School Uniforms and ‘Positive’ Affect 
In their arguments against gay marriage, Butler and Halberstam maintain that this 
heteronormative institution does not disrupt the violent normativity that distinguishes 
between legitimate and illegitimate lives and sexualities, but rather reinforces it and 
extends it to new territory. Rather than the hierarchy resting on a distinction between 
gay and straight, it becomes displaced onto a new distinction between more and less 
legitimate queer relationships (Butler, 2002: 18; Halberstam, 2012: 100). With this 
argument, they illustrate the problems that emerge when gay activism dovetails with 
neoliberal politics, a movement that Lisa Duggan (2002) has called ‘new 
homonormativity’. 117  New homonormativity describes the enactment of queer 
subjectivities that participate in, or desire to participate in, institutions and practices of 
heterosexuality. As such, homonormativity is a politics that does not ‘contest 
heteronormative assumptions and institutions’ (2002: 51), but is rather one which 
sustains these normalising practices through aligning the queer and straight through 
their private acts of consumption and domestication. Perezhilton.com’s post from 
November 2011 about the Entertainment Weekly cover photograph of Glee’s gay 
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 See also Puar for a discussion of ‘homonationalism’ in which she builds on Lisa Duggan’s 
work and explores how the figure of the homonational functions to further other and animate the figure of 
the terrorist (2008). 
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characters Blaine Anderson and Kurt Hummel is a salient example of the blog’s 
contribution to homonormativity. Homonormativity can also be understood as a ‘the 
mainstreaming of gay culture […] focused on the embrace of white heterosexual and 
nationalist norms and the turn from a politics of freedom to a politics of consumption 
and assimilation’ (Love, 2008: 53). For Heather Love, homonormativity is increasingly 
underpinned with notions of happiness. She argues further: ‘In the era of gay 
normalization, gays and lesbians not only have to be like every else (get married, raise 
kids, mow the grass, etc.), they have to look and feel good doing it’ (2008: 54).  
Figure 20: ‘Awww! Chris Colfer & Darren Criss Grace  
the Cover Of Entertainment Weekly’ (Hilton, 2011c) 
 
For gay teenagers, homonormativity may provide a narrow space within the 
heterosexual matrix in which they can feel secure and accepted. Kim Hackford-Peer 
(2010) argues that teenagers adopt a homonormative identity, meaning here a fixed 
sexual identity in which they conform to gender norms, to reduce the risk of being 
harassed. Homonormativity thus seems to provide a secure space where the gay 
teenager can find happiness and confidence. This is semiotically represented within the 
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cover photograph, which shows two white, conventionally attractive young men, 
dressed in their school uniforms. Their close relationship is represented through the 
similarity of their school uniform, which marks them as sharing the same educational 
background. It also marks them as respectable young teenagers that dress according to 
gender norms: they wear the masculine school uniform which makes them – at least 
visually – undistinguishable from their fellow students. They are therefore assimilated 
into the masculine traditional dress code.118 They are both smiling, and Chris Colfer 
leans towards Darren Criss, resting his head on Criss’. Young gay sexuality is here 
represented as respectable, tender, and non-threatening to straight gender norms.  
Perezhilton.com’s comment on this cover photo is positive and affirming. Under 
the headline ‘Awww! Chris Colfer & Darren Criss Grace The Cover Of Entertainment 
Weekly’, the blogger writes: 
This is so special, we’re actually tearing up a bit. 
This week’s Entertainment Weekly cover boys are none other than Glee’s Darren 
Criss and Chris Colfer. Dressed in their Warbler garbs, the boys are the talk of the 
town, as well as the highlight of this issue celebrating gay teen characters on TV. 
Aren't they adorable? Don’t U just love them? (Hilton, 2011c) 
Both headline and comment are very affective. As an expression of delight in the 
headline of this post, ‘Awww’ signals Perezhilton.com’s positive orientation towards 
the public appearance of Criss and Colfer. The comment ‘[w]e are tearing up a bit’ 
humorously alludes to the fact that the blogger(s) are/is seriously moved by such a 
highly visible performance of gay teenage coupledom. According to Perezhilton.com, 
they are the ‘highlight of this issue celebrating gay teen characters on TV’. In this 
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 The revalorisation of the masculine gay man and the feminine gay woman was initially a 
response to the essentialist and widespread assumption that gender and sexuality are inextricably linked, 
and that gay men are, by definition, feminine and gay women masculine. However, notwithstanding the 
necessity for deconstructing and dismantling the binary and gendered approach to sexuality, it has 
benefited the assimilationist project that typifies homonormativity. Gay men and women acting in gender-
appropriate ways are less of a threat to the heterosexual matrix, since the reification of traditional gender 
roles supports the superiority of patriarchal masculinity. 
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sentence, two statements are made: firstly that public visibility of gay teenagers through 
television representations is good, and secondly that this particular kind of 
representation of gay coupledom is the best possible form in which this can be 
presented. My point here is not to argue that mainstream media representations of gay 
teenagers are always already flawed – rather, I want to highlight the problematic 
assumptions upon which Perezhilton.com’s celebratory tone is based. Perezhilton.com 
celebrates a form of gay teenage coupledom in which both partners represent a clear-cut 
and fixed sexual identity. Both are (in the television show) openly gay, but both obey 
the gender norms of heterosexuality, according to which boys (the male sexed body) 
dress in a masculine way. The idea of sexuality as a dynamic process, something that 
emerges and is shaped through the different contacts and experiences we have, is here 
repudiated for the sake of a rigid and unified sexual identity that can be labelled, 
controlled, and policed. This homonormative understanding of sexuality does not 
challenge the heterosexual matrix, but rather represents a variation that is easily 
integrated into heteronormative society. The other problematic aspect of this particular 
post on Perezhilton.com is its valorisation of the teen that succeeds at coming out in 
public over those who stay – for different reasons – ‘in the closet’. As Diana Fuss 
reminds us, coming out as gay does not challenge the heteronormative discourse per se 
(1991). Rather, it creates hierarchies between the ‘out and loud’ teenagers and those that 
stay in the closet. In this hierarchy, the normalised gay identity (gender conformist, 
monogamous, consumer citizen) is preferable to the queer teenager that cannot be easily 
defined by a label. Through the use of rhetorical questions like ‘Aren’t they adorable’, 
Perezhilton.com tries to elicit a positive response from the blog reader, so that everyone 
is positively oriented towards this ‘healthy’ and good-looking version of gay teenage 
romance. In this sense, Perezhilton.com attempts to create an uplifting momentum for 
gay teenagers, and to counter those notions of unhappiness, loneliness, injury, and fear 
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of verbal or physical abuse that resonate within many debates surrounding and 
representations of gay teens. However, this praise for a particular kind of visibility and 
outing installs a moral hierarchy that privileges the highly visible gay teen (in the 
television show, the print cover and online) over the closeted one, while glossing over 
the ways in which visibility grants a heteronormative society the power to control 
sexual deviancy. As such, it contributes affectively to a discourse that installs 
homonormative coupledom as the only way to happiness. 
In this section I have illustrated how Perezhilton.com narrows queerness down 
to homonormativity by re-publishing and celebrating the cover photo of Criss and 
Colfer online with an uplifting and supportive comment. The visibility of their gay 
romance and harmony, which is expressed through their body language and the 
matching outfits, should – according to Perezhilton.com – move the reader in affective 
ways, evoking feelings of endearment, sympathy and joy. In a similar way to the 
discussion about Brittany and Santana on Jezebel.com, television characters and their 
representations are here used to connect abstract ideas about specific forms of non-
heteronormativity with visible public figures. 119  These highly visible figures are 
necessary because through their representation they can animate these terms with 
feelings so that they can be experienced by the readers/viewers. Celebrity gossip blogs 
remediate these celebrity representations, coloured by their own cultural and political 
orientation. As I argued in the Introduction, I position Perezhilton.com as a 
homonormative online space. The blog functions here to intensify the positive 
experience of homonormativity for blog readers by using the public affection these 
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 There is a slight difference between Brittany’s and Santana’s representations on Jezebel.com 
and Perezhilton.com’s representations of Criss and Colfer because the girls are referred to with their 
character’s name while the boys are named by their real life names. The reason for this does not lie in the 
‘real-life’ sexuality of these actors: only Criss identifies himself as gay while Colfer, Heather Morris 
(Brittany) and Naya Rivera (Santana) identify themselves as straight. Rather, I suggest that it hints 
towards the different ends these posts are used: in Jezebel.com staying within the realm of fiction gestures 
towards a space outside of the ‘reality’, an alternative place. In Perezhilton.com the representations of the 
gay teenagers are mobilised to enable an identity politics in reality – the here and now. This is why 
Perezhilton.com refers to their real names. 
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characters already have (and their social visibility) and re-enforcing through its own 
affective language. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have illustrated how Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com 
affectively mediate meanings of queerness. Since queerness resists any clear definition, 
I have located it in those moments where heteronormativity is challenged, and in blog 
entries where non-heterosexual relationships are represented. Unlike the previous 
chapter on femininity, or the following chapter on whiteness, queerness (or sexuality) is 
not commonly understood to be readable on the skin in the way that gender and race 
are. Rather, sexuality is understood to be recognisable through the ways in which we 
touch or dress our skin. Hence, the concept of skin invited me to approach the subject of 
sexuality through online representations in which bloggers and/or users comment on the 
ways in which celebrities touch or dress. My aim in this chapter has been to highlight 
how the concept of skin can help us to make visible (and palpable) the affective ways in 
which humorous celebrity gossip blogs can enable a queering of the dominant discourse 
of heterosexuality, while also pointing out where the limits of these practices are. I have 
fleshed out moments in which posts on Dlisted.com or Jezebel.com can be read as 
challenging dominant discourses of heterosexuality:  Dlisted.com’s mocking of Keira 
Kneightley and Rupert Friend illustrated affectively the constructed nature of 
heterosexuality and Alptraum’s blog post on Jezebel.com demonstrated that queer 
representations do not have to be explicitly and visibly represented in order to move and 
touch the viewer in empowering and pleasurable ways. Reading online representations 
on Perezhilton.com through skin illustrated how humorous celebrity gossip blogs can 
also limit the ways in which queerness can be thought and understood. I have illustrated 
how online representations that initially seem to queer heteronormativity, actually 
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reinforce these norms by building upon the logic, values and feelings of dominant 
classed, raced, gendered and sexualised discourses.  
Overall, this chapter has built on the discussions in Chapter Two, and has 
extended my critique of visibility as the primary sense through which we make 
meaning. By reading these online representations of queerness through the skin rather 
than the eye, I have highlighted that what we see and how we read an online 
representation is necessarily shaped by our embodied experience and the feelings and 
memories we have made in our skins. With this archive of feelings and experiences that 
we posses, representations are not only cognitively decoded but also sensuously 
produced in the body of the reader. This is why our individual reading of a celebrity 
representation might be quite different from the intended meaning of the celebrity 
him/herself, the blogger or the television series producers. Owing to their 
multimediality and interactivity, blogs can be suitable vehicles to express and 
communicate this unique reading of celebrity representations to others. As I have 
argued, Dlisted.com’s humorous re-reading of the Entertainment Weekly cover 
photograph and subsequent integrated photomontage can engender a 
Verfremdungseffekt (‘making strange effect’) which enables readers to think critically 
about the established rules and norms of heterosexuality. Alptraum’s guest blogging on 
Jezebel.com illustrated how a blog can provided a space in which these queer fantasies 
and ideas became played out and manifested on affective fabrics. This is not to argue 
that we can read whatever we want; after all, these representations are embedded within 
historical and cultural circuits of power, and are shaped by gendered, classed and raced 
histories. Yet this chapter has shown that, through their affective charge and their 
technological affordances such as commenting on image manipulation, celebrity gossip 
blogs enable pockets where the ‘object’ of heteronormativity is drawn ‘into a zone of 
crude contact where one can finger it familiarly on all sides, turn it upside down, inside 
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out, peer at it from above and below, break it open its external shell, look into its centre, 
doubt it, take it apart, dismember it. Lay it bare and expose it, examine it freely and 
experiment with it’ (Bakhtin, 1981: 23). Through their affectively charged online 
celebrity representations, the discourses and practices of heteronormativity become 
constantly re-touched, re-formulated and experimented with. Reading through the skin 
pays close attention to the different ways in which such experimenting can unfold. 
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Chapter Four  
White Stars and Orange Celebrities: 
The (Un)Doing of Whiteness Online 
 
Skin has long been understood as the primary signifier of race, where the bodily surface 
allegedly reveals the racial ‘truth’ about an individual, a truth read through the gaze of 
the other. However, the way in which we read skin, and skin colour, is one that is 
shaped by historical and cultural discourses and practices which prompt us to look for 
and produce differences – for example between ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ skin.120 Yet 
difference is only meaningful when it can be measured against a norm. Usually, the 
more something deviates from the norm, the lower its value is understood to be. As 
many have shown, in Western cultures, whiteness serves as the ideological background, 
as the ubiquitous norm against which every other difference can be read. 121  This 
interpretation illustrates that the concept of whiteness concerns not only white skin 
(even though bodies that inhabit certain types of white skin are seen as representatives 
of whiteness), but that it also penetrates below surface appearance and can be seen as a 
system, a network of power relations, or ‘a point from which the world unfolds’ 
(Ahmed, 2007b: 154). In other words, whiteness forms our perception and shapes the 
way in which we become orientated towards certain things and averted from others. 
Whiteness has, like all raced identities, no valid foundation in biology or anthropology, 
and yet this does not prevent it from congealing as a social identity.122Scholars such as 
Peggy McIntosh (1988) argue that whiteness creates an identity that allows privileged 
                                                             
120
 I am aware of the problematic use of the term ‘non-white’ because it always already implies a 
hierarchy and defines a group through its negativity. Negativity understands the group ‘non-white’ as 
lacking, where this lack constitutes their identity. However, I refer to non-white in this specific context to 
make my argument, looking for differences between A and not-A, clearer. 
121
 Dyer writes in this context that ‘[t]he assumption that white people are just people, which is 
not far off from saying that whites are people whereas other colours are something else, is endemic to 
white culture’ (1997: 2), and Vron Ware and Les Back argue that ‘whiteness is brought into being as a 
normative structure’ which implicates a racial domination which makes every deviation ‘other’ (2002: 
13). 
122
 For analysis of the missing basis of race in biology and anthropology, see: Lipsitz (2006), 
Markus & Moya (2010: 1-102), Winant (2000: 172) and Rattansi (2007: 74-75).    
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access to wealth, prestige and opportunity. However, whiteness intersects with many 
other axes of difference such as class, nation, gender and sexuality, and as such is not a 
monolithic category, but rather one that consists of many different forms and shapes. 
Some forms of whiteness have more values than others. This inner hierarchy becomes 
recognisable when we think about the differences between idealised whiteness, in the 
form of the ‘English Rose’ and ‘unrespectable’ working class whiteness, often labelled 
as ‘white trash’ (US) or ‘chav’ (UK). Acknowledging the differences and hierarchies 
within the category of whiteness, Dyer (1997) and Sean Redmond (2007) focus on the 
potent relationship between celebrity representations and whiteness, and Redmond 
argues that ‘when idealized whiteness and stardom come together, an extraordinarily 
powerful representation emerges that ontologically privileges and secures this form of 
whiteness (white stardom) as the highest ideal available to man/women’ (2007: 263). 
For both, this influential meaning arises as a result of the Western socio-historical 
construction of whiteness as a signifier for purity, demeanour, self-control and beauty, 
upon which these celebrity representations of idealised whiteness are built. This 
discursive construction is synthesised within representations that are, in turn, 
constitutive and generative of our perception of the world. Their work demonstrates 
how such representations are produced within an ideology of whiteness, and function to 
reinforce it. 
While these approaches to representations of whiteness acknowledge the 
complex interrelations of texts and meanings, their emphasis on discourse and language 
has been often understood as unsuitable to grasp the surprises in the encounter with 
texts that stem from visceral or material forces. This chapter fleshes out the ways in 
which feelings such as anxiety, anger, shame, resentment, laughter, affection and 
enjoyment are all part of the affective landscape upon which whiteness is built, and how 
humour can move us as an discursive-affective tool, thereby shifting affects that 
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constitute whiteness in relation to its imaginary racialised others, and saturating 
representations of whiteness. As in the previous chapters, humour is used as a lens for 
illuminating the interpretive-affective dimensions of these representations. I do not 
suggest that the unstable efficacy of humour and irony are powerful enough to invert or 
subvert historically rooted hierarchies of injustice immediately or permanently. 
However, if the very power of whiteness is enabled, as Dyer argues, by the fact that its 
borders are unclear and its status is unstable, then this shaky ground is also the plateau 
on which resistance and resignification can take place (1997: 19-20). Whiteness, and 
what counts as ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ whiteness, becomes intelligible and lived 
through repetitive acts and affects. Practices of humour and irony allow us to repeat 
differently, enabling whiteness to be ‘re-felt’. This affective approach to whiteness 
further develops my argument concerning the way in which skin can be used as a useful 
heuristic device for reading online representations. I have illustrated in the previous 
chapters how skin as the fleshy material that can be touched, and which connects us 
with the world, is rethought in these blogs. I have shown that the concept of skin invites 
us to consider the textures of the online images and the ways in which different texts 
and actors meet online (Chapter Two). I have explored how experiences and the 
embodied position of the blogger shapes what we see and how we make meaning 
(Chapter Three). I now focus in this chapter on the particular ways in which humour 
touches us affectively. Clearly, the affective force of humour has been central in all 
these chapters, but in this chapter I tease out specifically those surprising encounters 
within online texts.  
My aim is to explore how the meaning of whiteness is affectively mediated and 
employed in celebrity gossip blogs, and how it can take on different significations 
through humour. In particular, I analyse the affective ways in which the figures of 
idealised whiteness and white trash become animated within Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com 
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and Perezhilton.com. In the first part of this chapter, I demonstrate how idealised 
whiteness is not only constructed through discourses of class, race, nation and gender, 
but also through its proximity to ‘happy’ objects and ‘good’ habits that, in turn, saturate 
it with positive affects (Ahmed, 2010). I then highlight how humour and irony function 
to disturb this positive affective economy, which gives high value to idealised 
whiteness. The second part of the chapter explores the affective value of fake-tanned 
skin and its connection to ‘white trash’ or ‘chav’ figures. I end the chapter with an 
examination of the user comments on Perezhilton.com about the orange cast members 
of Jersey Shore. These comments reveal that affect complicates a structural reading that 
assumes a straightforward relationship between gendered, classed and raced discourses 
and the social positioning of the viewer. Overall, I argue that, although the humorous 
representations and discussions of celebrities in these online spaces are undoubtedly 
part of a media industry that produces difference for the purpose of commodification, 
they nonetheless offer the potential for a certain shifting and re-signification of how we 
feel and understand whiteness. An affective reading of these online representations 
makes visible not only how feelings and affects allow whiteness to retain its privileged 
status, but also how they deconstruct these privileged spaces. 
 
Idealised Whiteness, Femininity, and Ridicule  
The figure of the ‘English Rose’ is understood as the most valued form of idealised 
whiteness. Constructed along the lines of social class, gender, age, sexuality and 
nationality, and personal attributes such as skin tone, hair colour, face, physique and 
polite manners, this extraordinary embodiment of idealised whiteness is culturally 
understood as good and as something to which we aspire (Redmond, 2007: 263-270). 
Dyer (1997) and Redmond (2007) have analysed the ways in which representations of 
idealised whiteness become discursively constructed to maintain an ideology of 
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whiteness. Yet even though these representations can be invested with intentions and 
functions, they do not dictate or determine all the ways in which we encounter and 
experience them. In this section, I analyse the role of affect in the mediation of idealised 
whiteness. More specifically, I explore the ways in which, through their use of humour, 
celebrity online representations on Dlisted.com challenge traditional meanings of 
idealised female whiteness as a signifier of purity, moral goodness, and aesthetic 
superiority. Drawing on the work of Ahmed (2000, 2004a, 2010) and Tyler (2008, 
2010), my argument is based on the assumption that cultural objects – in this case 
celebrities – are always already saturated with affects, affects which are not innate to 
them, but which instead emerge through interaction, accumulating their affective 
intensity and value through circulation. Celebrities thereby become sticky with certain 
affects as a result of the particular ways in which they are repeatedly represented in 
cultural discourses and media.123 An example of this is Gwyneth Paltrow, who is often 
understood to embody idealised whiteness not only because she is enveloped by white, 
immaculate skin, but also because she is discursively placed in proximity to objects and 
values which are culturally judged as good. Diane Negra writes that she is often 
represented by mainstream media as ‘the remote and graceful cinema goddess’ who 
stands in stark contrast to such ‘overexposed tabloid “trash” [as] Britney Spears, Kerry 
Katona and Paris Hilton’ (2008: n.p.). She argues further that Paltrow is celebrated in 
magazines and talk-shows, where she functions as ‘a yardstick for measuring style, 
glamour, taste and etiquette and testing public beliefs about morality, intimacy, 
parenthood and wealth’ (Negra, 2008: n.p.). Positive affects thus bind Paltrow and the 
concept of idealised whiteness together. However, I argue that when Dlisted.com 
ridicules idealised white femininities such as that of Paltrow, this humorous mediation 
provokes quite different affective responses (resentment and derision) than the 
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 For more on this, see Ahmed’s discussion of, for instance, the figure of the asylum seeker and 
‘stranger danger’ (2004b). 
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responses aimed at by mainstream media representations (affection and admiration).124 I 
suggest that this affective turn consequently shifts the way in which idealised whiteness 
is experienced and valued by the reader.  
Michael K. of Dlisted.com regularly pokes fun at Paltrow’s image as the perfect 
white subject, delighting in pointing out the flaws and cracks in the construction of this 
image. One blog post, concerning the release of Paltrow’s recipe book, exemplifies the 
tone of parody and humour through which Dlisted.com mocks Paltrow’s status. 
 
Figure 21: ‘Fishsticks Paltrow Loves Hot Dog Buns, Hates Hot Dogs’  
(Michael K., 2011c) 
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 I write here that media, and as such also bloggers, often aim to evoke particular emotions. 
This is not to suggest that just because they intend to produce certain affective reactions, that they 
therefore do so. After all, I understand affect and the emotions it produces as uncontrollable. And yet 
certain discourses and images are ‘sticky’ with affect, which means that their citation in media is likely to 
evoke particular affects. 
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Now [sic], I haven’t read Fishsticks Paltrow's Ode To My Perfect Life (No Poors 
Allowed), because I can feel bad about my diet for free by calling my mother up 
and telling her what I had for lunch. But Eater must’ve been behind on their eye 
rolling exercise for the week, because they dipped their retinas into the imported 
copper pot of naive pretentiousness and pulled out the best (see: worst) quotes. 
[…] GP ‘One evening when I had my wood-burning stove going I realized I 
hadn’t thought of dessert.’ Me: That one is from the chapter titled: ‘Being a rich 
white lady is hard.’ (Michael K., 2011c; emphasis in original) 
Paltrow’s book underlines her star image, as a celebrity who embodies idealised 
whiteness. Both her whiteness and the recipe book itself are constructed along the lines 
of stereotypical gender roles. Paltrow presents herself as a responsible, caring mother, 
who has written a book composed of vegetarian recipes (all prepared with organic 
ingredients), which, as the front cover proclaims, are designed for ‘family and 
togetherness’. Not only does this representation repeat the current neoliberal myth of the 
successful ‘yummy mummy’ (a woman who is economically successful while being a 
physically attractive mother and housewife), but it also uses ‘happy objects’ such as 
‘family’ and ‘togetherness’ to endow Paltrow with positive affect.125 Her whiteness, in 
accordance with the cultural script, is also classed. Her upper-class status is mediated 
through the knowledge that readers already have about Paltrow, but also through the 
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 Ros Gill (2008), Jessica Ringrose and Valerie Walkerdine (2008) have argued that this kind 
of femininity is very much in tune with, and constructed through, neoliberalism and post-feminism. They 
argue that women, and especially young, middle-class women, are useful subjects for neoliberalism 
because they provide, owing to their education, not only productive value for the market, but also follow 
willingly the rule of neoliberalism of constant self-improvement. This means that, in a socio-political 
climate where every aspect of life is measured by and integrated into the logic of economy, they function 
not only as productive workers but also as productive carers, mothers and housewives. One might argue 
that the expression ‘togetherness’ was chosen in order to appeal to the consumer target group of the queer 
or single community. Ahmed (2010) argues convincingly that the queer subject is historically positioned 
as an ‘unhappy’ object. However, as the work of David Eng (2010) demonstrates, some queer subjects 
can become integrated into mainstream discourses. It might therefore be worth considering if queer 
unhappy objects can become happy objects through commercialism and consumption. 
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type of food (expensive and organic) she consumes, and the ways in which she prepares 
it (in a wood-burning oven).126 
Scholars have often discussed how the construction of race is always already 
gendered and classed, but I also want to highlight how this construction can be used to 
deconstruct the positive affects which surround idealised whiteness.127 The affective 
manner in which Dlisted.com portrays the public relations strategy for this book shifts 
Paltrow’s status from idealised whiteness to the abject, thereby disturbing the feel-good 
myth about whiteness. In the post discussed above, Paltrow is portrayed as the body 
which makes other bodies ‘roll their eyes’, her privileged lifestyle is not only the effect 
of the inclusion of ‘happy objects’ but also the result of exclusion (‘no poors allowed’), 
and her happiness and economic success are predicated on making other people feel bad 
(‘I can feel bad for free by calling up my mother’). Through humour, Dlisted.com 
makes visible what is usually left unsaid, and yet at the same time, the basis for what is 
said: things we feel and judge as good are always the result of violent repression of 
things we consider bad.  
The problem with whiteness – and idealised whiteness in particular – is that it is 
a social construct and performance that requires labour and careful self-scrutiny. Dyer 
suggests that ‘[w]hiteness as an ideal can never be attained, not only because white skin 
can never be hue white, but because ideally white is absence: to be really, absolutely 
white is to be nothing’ (1997: 78). Whiteness thus carries with it the danger of its own 
annihilation if it is embraced too excessively. Redmond observes that ‘[i]dealized white 
stars who are too saintly, too pure, too exterior, become too unattainable, too much of 
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 For analysis of the construction of race through ‘foodways’, see Bailey (2007) and Negra 
(2002). Cathryn Bailey (2007) argues that proper whiteness relies crucially on regimes of bodily 
discipline and the suppression of appetite while at the same time fetishising food: food has to be healthy, 
ethnically diverse (signifying the consumption of the other in a non-threatening manner for the 
construction of whiteness with a ‘little’ difference) and ethical, that is vegetarian and/or organic. 
127
 Margaret L. Andersen and Patricia Hill Collins discuss how race, class and gender are 
‘interlocking systems of societal relationships’ (1998: xi) rather than separate entities that shapes the 
individuals life. Stuart Hall argues that race, class and gender articulate one another, meaning that 
systems of oppression function by intersecting these categories. Race is not a monolithic category, but 
intersects with issues of class and gender (Hall, 1997). 
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“not from this world” for adoring fans to get a proper hold of/on’ (2007: 268). In other 
words, if stars and/or celebrities appear too out if touch with the ‘real’ world, and the 
struggles, injuries and feelings that living and moving through it encompasses, then the 
audience member, reader or fan cannot relate to the celebrity. The balance between 
extraordinariness and ordinariness on which stars are built is skewed, damaging the 
celebrity status of the ‘too saintly’ figure. Hence, idealised stars such as Paltrow must 
represent themselves as ordinary and earthly in order to retain their affective appeal for 
their audience.128I argue that Dlisted.com challenges the notion of goodness in idealised 
whiteness by highlighting, with humour and irony, cracks and gaps in the performance 
of whiteness. Paltrow’s attempt to represent herself as not too white is humorously 
disrupted in the Dlisted.com post, ‘Straight Outta Her Private Sauna In Her Multi-
Million Dollar London Townhouse’ (Michael K., 2011d), which includes an embedded 
video of Paltrow rapping on The Graham Norton Show. The video is accompanied by a 
derisive comment and a moving image (GIF) of rapper Ice Cube and actor Chris 
Tucker, in which they seem to jerk away in horror from something they have witnessed 
(Figure 22). The combination of video, text and GIF in this post illustrates how the 
affective quality of idealised whiteness can be shifted from affection to derision and 
contempt not only through humorous discourse, but also through the strategic use of 
different media forms. 
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 Dlisted.com ridicules Paltrow’s uber-whiteness regularly through the nickname ‘Fishsticks 
Paltrow’ because, as blogger Michael K. explains, she is ‘cold, much too thin and overly white breaded’ 
(Michael K., 2011e). This nickname points not only to the fact that her whiteness is excessive (she is ‘too 
thin and overly white breaded’), but it is also affective: she is perceived as cold, stiff and unable to show 
emotions. 
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Figure 22: ‘Straight Outta Her Private Sauna In Her  
Multi-Million Dollar London Townhouse’ (Michael K., 2011d) 
 
The video shows Paltrow rapping an N.W.A. song, and speaks to the so-called 
‘post-racial’ attitude that American media and popular culture is so keen to 
promote.129Reflecting the neoliberal ideas of meritocracy and individualism, this media 
culture is considered to be a colour-blind space in which only the skills, talent and 
charisma of the individual count, rather than one’s skin colour and the structural 
inequalities and possibilities of access that result from this. According to the logic of 
colour-blindness, Paltrow is not only entitled to take on, even though only momentarily 
and ironically, a stereotypically black, masculine performance that requires a level of 
authenticity, but she is also cheered for doing so by the smiling talk show host, her 
fellow talk show guests (who mime the sound of police sirens in the background) and 
the applauding audience. As a light-hearted, mainstream-camp media product, The 
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 Laura Gray-Rosendale et al. use the example of Lady Gaga to discuss the American post-
racial landscape which obscures the fact that ‘Gaga’s whiteness enables her to “play” Other, appropriating 
signs of Otherness to her own ends’ (2012: 222). Robyn Wiegman argues that media representations like 
Forrest Gump, as the good and colour-blind white guy, express and reinforce ideas of America as post-
racial (1999). 
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Graham Norton Show is emblematic of a socio-cultural climate in which structural 
inequalities linked to sexuality, race and/or class are regarded as problems of the past, 
and are glossed over for the sake of entertainment. As such, it provides the ideal space 
for Paltrow’s performance. In presenting herself as a fan of N.W.A., and therefore as 
literate in the subculture of black gangster rap, Paltrow not only constructs herself as 
‘white with a little difference’ (Traber, 2007), but also reinforces the cliché of gangster 
rap as inherently black, dangerous and other. Dlisted.com publishes this video, but 
disrupts the affective quality of Paltrow’s performance of whiteness through different 
strategies, one of which is the comment that accompanies the clip: 
At the 6:23 mark above is the moment when Graham Norton asked hip hop 
aficionado and $725 tank top dress enthusiast Fishsticks Paltrow to lay out a little 
N.W.A. and she fucking did it. Rose Hills will be covered with even more hills 
tonight because Eazy-E will be rocking the hell out of his grave over an over-
privileged princess snowflake rapping about Compton. (Michael K., 2011d) 
The discursive foundation of the humour is the incongruity that arises when race and 
class stereotypes are pitted against each other. The ‘overprivileged princess snowflake’ 
who buys ‘$725 tank tops’ slips into the stereotypically black space of gangster rap, and 
the ‘Multi-Million Dollar London Townhouse’ clashes with the reference to the 
economically deprived, inner-city ‘Compton’. Stereotypes of both white and black 
culture are juxtaposed here to make the reader laugh, but also to position Paltrow 
unambiguously in one space – that of the ‘rich white lady’. Through the use of 
hyperbole in its allusions to the ‘$725 tank tops’, and through its invocation of fairytale 
and make-believe in its description of Paltrow as ‘princess snowflake’, Dlisted.com not 
only gestures towards the fact that she is very privileged and as such positioned as out 
of touch with the real world, but also clearly demarcates Paltrow’s space as the space of 
the other. Any attempt by Paltrow to transgress her own privileged space by slipping 
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into the space of rap is perceived as an illegitimate crossing of borders. The comment 
‘Eazy-E will be rocking the hell out of his grave’ (Michael K., 2011d) evokes 
amusement precisely because it figuratively epitomises this fundamental violation of 
borders. Paltrow’s whiteness is no longer a privilege that allows her to travel unimpeded 
through different spaces – rather, she is now the other, restricted to her deluded ‘rich 
white lady’ space. She is understood as out-of-place and abject in the realm of rap – in 
this instance, her hyper-white performance and her white skin restrict her. 
It is not only humorous discourse that is employed by Dlisted.com to make the 
reader feel how wrong Paltrow’s transgression is. The GIF at the end of the 
aforementioned blog post is composed of frames from the movie Friday (1995). In this 
GIF, actor Chris Tucker and Ice Cube, a former member of the rap group N.W.A., 
cringe away from something they have seen. Juxtaposed with the text above, the image 
marks Paltrow as a horrifying monster that inspires loathing in those who encounter her 
rapping. As a consequence of this, Paltrow’s idealised whiteness, which is normally 
understood as something towards which we turn admiringly, is now portrayed as 
something from which we violently turn away. Tucker and (especially) Ice Cube 
function here not only as authorities who have the expertise on who can and who cannot 
rap, but, more importantly, they represent in Friday, the film from which the GIF is 
taken, a non-threatening, light-hearted and laid-back black masculinity with which the 
audience can identify. They therefore function here as mediators between a number of 
different socio-cultural spaces that all respond to Paltrow’s rap performance with 
disgust and rejection. This disgust and rejection is not discursively expressed, but is 
rather conveyed through the movement of their bodies and facial expressions in the 
moving image. This movement mediates negative feelings in ways that cannot be 
expressed in words, but which can only be known and understood through the body. 
The reader, already negatively orientated towards Paltrow as result of the derisive tone 
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of the written blog post, and aligned to the mediators Tucker and Ice Cube, is now 
invited to feel with them their bodily reaction. The moving picture blurs the boundary 
between bodies (those on the screen and those in front of the screen) through 
‘kinaesthetic empathy’ (Laukkanen, 2010) – that is, the feeling of sensations in one’s 
body that are similar to those watched on the screen. This entanglement of sensation and 
perception occurs as a result of the so-called ‘somatic archives’ (Paasonen, 2011: 202) 
that bodies collect through their lived experiences and sensations, which allow bodies to 
relate to other bodies through their memories of which particular feelings are connected 
with particular movements. The affective and embodied feedback loops between 
onscreen bodies and off screen body has often been theorised in gamer culture. Martti 
Lahti argues, for instance, that videogames ‘tie the body into a cybernetic loop with the 
computer, where its affective thrills can spill over into the player’s space’ (2003: 163) 
and describes in his work how new technologies can make the virtual body and the real 
body complementary rather than mutually exclusive realms. Jenny Sundén writes in a 
similar vein about her experiences with World of Warcraft:  
When I move around and play my green-haired female troll character, these 
movements and experiences do things to my body, to how I move and feel. When 
she jumps, something in me jumps with her. When she laughs her pre-
programmed rough troll laughter, it has resonance in me, in my body, in my own 
laughter. (2010: 50) 
Hence, movements of bodies on the screen can call forth affective responses in one’s 
own body, particularly when ‘sensations, textures, and motions […] have been 
previously experienced’ (Paasonen, 2011: 202). In accordance with the actions of 
Tucker and Ice Cube in this GIF, the audience are invited to move away from Paltrow’s 
performance of whiteness. On the one hand, this GIF is hyperbolic. Yet on the other 
hand, it encapsulates and effectively conveys the implied meaning of the accompanying 
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text – that whiteness, even when it tries to stage itself as anti-racist and colour-blind, is 
not universally good, but can in fact be ridiculous and grotesque. 
 Through the example of Paltrow, I have suggested that idealised whiteness is 
given meaning not only through discourse, but also through affects that link it to 
traditionally happy objects such as marriage, family, wealth and adoration. I have also 
demonstrated the ways in which Dlisted.com disturbs, through humour, the affective 
economy through which Paltrow, whiteness, and positive feelings become connected. 
Ahmed argues that articulations of affect are explanations of sensations through which 
objects are given shape and value and are made sense of (2004a). Hence, this 
disturbance – the shift from affects of adoration and sympathy to those of contempt and 
defiance – gives new meaning to idealised whiteness. This change is premised on the 
assumption that meanings are unstable and can be experienced differently, but the 
humorous representations of Paltrow are only successful in this affective shifting when 
they resonate with the reader’s own experiences and socio-political views. In other 
words, an online community is only touched or moved by the texts and images because 
they are already orientated towards those things they need to be close to in order for the 
humour to work. In this example, certain readers might already be critical towards 
certain forms of whiteness and how their status becomes maintained and reinforced 
within mainstream media. Because this practice is limited to a certain context within a 
certain community, it can be critiqued as marginal and ineffective. However, even 
though these critiques are valid, I maintain that these examples nevertheless show that 
humour is an affective mode through which we can learn how to orientate ourselves 
differently towards happy objects such as idealised whiteness. 
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Intensification, Commenting and Renegotiation of Idealised Whiteness  
The Perezhilton.com blog post, ‘William And Kate Have A Delightful Visit…To Skid 
Row!’(Hilton, 2011d) initially appears to stand in contrast to Dlisted.com’s posts about 
Paltrow. This is because idealised whiteness, here embodied through the celebrity 
figures of Prince William and Kate Middleton, is allegedly celebrated rather than 
ridiculed. Perezhilton.com writes:  
Kind of hard to believe, but their visit was a huge success! Last week, we learned 
that William & Kate had plans to visit downtown Los Angeles’ Skid Row, which 
is the homeless capital with over 4,000 people crammed in a 50-square block area 
living in dirty tents and cardboard boxes. We had heard that they were planning 
on painting and making ceramics with impoverished children at the Inner-City 
Arts academy…but we were still a bit nervous for them. Fortunately, everything 
turned out fine, and William & Kate got along wonderfully with the kids! (Hilton, 
2011d) 
By highlighting the positive outcome of William and Kate’s visit to the Inner-City Arts 
academy where they spend time with impoverished children, Perezhilton.com seems to 
reinforce traditional racialised images in which the white empathetic subject helps the 
victimised other. Before complicating this literal reading of the post, it is important to 
keep in mind that celebrity personae William and Kate arrive in this narrative already as 
affective figurations. As Paasonen (2011) points out, traditional studies of 
representation analyse the meaning of the things depicted on the screen by taking their 
historical and social background into account. Historical discourses and practices are as 
such understood as essential for our reading of the current representation in front of us. 
Tyler and Bruce Bennett (2010) argue convincingly that not only do histories of gender, 
class and race structure such examples discursively, but that these histories also 
underpin the affective mediation of representations. In other words, history does not 
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only shape the meaning of the image but also the feelings and emotions we experience 
when encountering them. Hence, William’s aristocratic and Kate’s upper middle-class 
background, their heteronormative sexuality, their immaculate appearance and their 
remote and graceful behaviour which adheres to traditional gender stereotypes, all not 
only discursively construct them as idealised white subjects, but also animate them with 
positive affect. Their status as a newly-married couple symbolises a form of 
heterosexuality that is valued as good: it is a monogamous relationship involving 
matrimony and procreation, which are sanctioned by the church and the state. This 
relationship is therefore in close proximity to such affective values as natural, healthy 
and holy.130 Furthermore, their heterosexual marriage supports the notion that white 
tradition, in this case royalty, has a future. This romanticised view of white tradition and 
royalty, underpinned by the spectacle of William and Kate’s wedding in 2011, works to 
gloss over a violent history of colonialism and turns royalty into a happy object that 
evokes affects of security and belonging.131 William and Kate are, as such, already 
strongly charged affective figures who connote a number of positive values and 
meanings in a social setting in which, according to Ahmed (2007b), whiteness is the 
point of orientation and the point from which the world unfolds. Hence, even though 
race is not explicitly mentioned in the text, we make meaning of their representations 
against a background of a white history. Their extraordinary state of being, in a white 
world, constructs them as figures towards whom we turn with positive affect.  
My key concern here is to demonstrate how the positive affective economy 
surrounding William and Kate shifts into negative affects. An analysis of the reader 
comments beneath the blog post shows that some react with anger, frustration and 
resentment over the positive opinions expressed by Perezhilton.com towards the couple:  
                                                             
130
 For more on the distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sex, see Gayle Rubin (1993), Michael 
Warner (2000: 1-5), Don Kulick and Margaret Willson (1995: 208).  
131
 Ahmed argues, with reference to Fanon, that colonialism makes the world ‘white’, and that 
this white world is then inherited, and is therefore already a given before the individual ‘arrives’ (2007b: 
153). 
  
 192
‘You’re such an ignorant tool.’ (adg100, see: Hilton, 2011d) 
‘The royal assholes are disgusting.’ (idon’tbelieveyou, see: Hilton, 2011d) 
‘[…] THESE 2 PRICKS SHOULD TRY LIVING THERE FOR A YEAR. BET 
IT WONT BE THAT MUCH “FUN”. NEXT.’ (xcalibur, see: Hilton, 2011d) 
The first comment is directed toward blogger Hilton, insulting him for his ‘ignorance’ 
because he apparently cannot see through William and Kate’s performance. The 
negative affective responses to William and Kate’s representation in the following two 
comments might initially seem surprising, and at odds with the positive affective 
economy of idealised whiteness. In reference to Lynne Pearce’s notion of ‘implicated 
reading’ and Sedgwick’s ‘reparative reading’, Paasonen maintains that the relationship 
between the text and the reader is full of surprises, observing that reading is ‘an 
interactive activity that includes a wide range of emotions and is far less certain in its 
outcomes’ (2007: 45). In this sense, while Perezhilton.com may cite practices and 
discourses that construct Kate and William as figurations of idealised whiteness, this by 
no means guarantees that all readers will experience the same positive affective 
response towards them. I argue that Hilton’s post on William and Kate can be seen as an 
intensified mediation of whiteness, one which offers ‘exit points’ to a different affective 
economy. I use the adjective ‘intensified’ here to draw attention to the capacity of a text 
to convey different ideas through quantity, and through exaggeration. Alterations in 
tone change the intensities of how we experience a text and how it affects us. As 
Sobchack argues, affective encounters, the feelings of being touched by a text or an 
image, depend on the substance and texture of that text (2004: 65). Perezhilton.com 
uses a variety of strategies to make the connotations of its text as overloaded as 
possible, in order to problematise a straightforward reading. There are a number of 
stylistic devices traditionally used in the portrayal of idealised whiteness that Hilton 
inflates in order to provoke an affective reaction. For example, mainstream gossip 
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magazines tend to use an overtly cheerful tone when celebrities act in a way which is 
generally perceived as good, such as falling in love, living a healthy and drug-free 
lifestyle, undertaking charity work, or raising awareness of important social or political 
issues. In this post Perezhilton.com mimics this overly cheerful tone (‘We are SO happy 
that their Skid Row visit went so well!’), but then contrasts this with an underdeveloped 
writing style through the repetitive use of direct speech: ‘William playfully said the 
following [...] And then here’s what William said to Kate when the turtle was finished 
[…] And here’s what William had to say before they left for the day’ (Hilton, 2011d). 
This juxtaposition of overtly cheerful tone and underdeveloped writing style – the 
repetitive and excessive use of direct speech mimicking the rhythm of poor language – 
signals to the reader that this text is too compliant, and therefore implies a lack of 
credibility and quality. This can be off-putting for some readers, who then react with 
frustration and anger.132 
The other tactic used by Hilton to inspire a strong affective reaction in the reader 
is the textual and visual creation of two clearly contrasting sets of identities in this post. 
Whiteness is traditionally constructed against a background of representations of the 
Other (Dyer, 1997; Lipsitz, 2006). On Perezhilton.com, this binary opposition is 
foregrounded in the headline: ‘William And Kate Have A Delightful Visit…To Skid 
Row!’(Hilton, 2011d). The humour is here based on the juxtaposition of ‘delightful’ and 
‘Skid Row’, two terms that seemingly do not belong together. ‘Skid Row’ is perceived 
as a space of poverty, social struggle and a general lack of good things such as 
education, security and happy families, clearly marking it as ‘not delightful’. 
‘Delightful’ might invoke connotations of upper-class-language, and is meaningful in 
                                                             
132
 The bloggers of Perezhilton.com are professional bloggers who aim to write in a uniform 
style so that Perezhilton.com still gives the impression of being written by one person only. It can be 
argued that the writers use a poor writing style strategically to elicit reactions (which then in turn pay off 
as so-called ‘page hits’ when the reader becomes a writer by typing in their responses. Every stroke on the 
keyboard is a ‘hit’, which can then be sold to advertisers). This, however, does not restrict the blog’s 
potential to push affects and discourses that deconstruct the imaginary picture of idealised whiteness as 
something to which aspire. 
  
 194
proximity to William and Kate because they embody idealised whiteness, which is 
valued as good. Following the logic of two contrasting identity sets, one identity is 
given a full and rich interior perspective, while the other – the identity belonging to the 
inhabitants of Skid Row – is portrayed as homogenous and one-dimensional. The post 
describes extensively how William and Kate experience this event, what they say, and 
even the jokes they make, yet the voices of the children they visit are silenced. The 
concluding comment, ‘[s]ounds like it was definitely a meaningful experience for 
William, Kate, and all of those kids!’ (Hilton, 2011d) again places the emphasis on 
William and Kate’s experience, thus reiterating their status as privileged. Further, the 
throwaway description ‘those kids’ positions the marginalised group as monolithic and 
unspecific.133The picture accompanying the post discussed above (Figure 23) follows 
this binary construction of identity sets, and ties into well-known figures of the celebrity 
charity worker and the traditional idea of the ‘white enabler’. It centres on the white-
skinned persons (William and Kate), who stand out from the mass of smaller, dark 
skinned, uniformly-dressed children.  
  
                                                             
133
 This may also respond to the work of bell hooks (1989) and Audre Lorde (1984), both of 
whom demonstrate how feeling bad about racism or white privilege can function as a form of self-
centeredness, which returns the white subject ‘back into’ itself, as the one whose feelings matter. 
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Figure 23: ‘William and Kate Have A Delightful Visit ... 
To Skid Row!’ (Hilton, 2011d) 
 
William and Kate smile and lean down towards the children, embodying through these 
gestures historically and culturally rooted images of the active, sympathetic enabler. 
The composition of this picture rests on a semantic consensus that puts the donor in an 
empowered, morally good and active position, while the receiver remains in the position 
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of object.134 Through these three strategies (an overtly cheerful tone, an underdeveloped 
writing style and binary constructions), Perezhilton.com intensifies the experience of 
representations of idealised whiteness to a point where it becomes overbearing and ‘too 
thick’ (as user ‘allboutit’ comments, see Hilton, 2011d) for some users. Those readers 
who perceive this highly stylised portrayal of the event as disturbing engage, in their 
comments, with notions of social inequality, white privilege, celebrity image 
production, and Hilton’s own political views to express a different range of affects: 
‘why would you be nervous for someone to visit skid row and an art center for children? 
seems quite judgmental and rude for someone who wants equality for all…’ 
(justme2244, see: Hilton, 2011d). Such comments illustrate that the complex connection 
between reader and representation is not only dependent on how the reader is embedded 
in his or her offline context, but also on the locations of both the blogger and of the 
celebrity figure being represented. 
Reading is always already an act of proximity and intimacy premised on the 
reader’s willingness to engage with the text, to either orient oneself towards the text, or 
to detach oneself from it (Paasonen, 2011: 144; Sedgwick, 2003: 123-146). Celebrity-
gossip texts can provide a particular feeling of intimacy as the reader is given the 
impression that they are encountering the real and authentic person behind the star 
image.135 This gives the reader the illusion that they know and understand the reasons 
and motives behind a celebrity’s behaviour, reasons that they then compare with her 
                                                             
134 Berlant (2004) has illustrated how representations of suffering can reiterate, rather than 
challenge, unequal power relations. Following the paradigm of orientalism, which centres on 
ethnocentrism and the colonial other, these representations, often used for charity work, can be 
understood as informed by Western discourses that construct the white subject as the active and altruistic 
enabler who aids the passive and helpless other. This, in turn, reiterates hierarchies of economic and 
political power and re-positions the receiver of charity work as a monolithic subject who needs to be 
spoken for instead of self-represented. Danielle Endres and Mary Gould found that unequal power 
relations became reinforced when white students were undertaking charity work with immigrants and 
refugees from Burma, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan. They argue that ‘service learning was a significant 
factor in the way our students upheld conventions of White privilege because it allowed them to approach 
working with underserved and underresourced community members as privileged Whites who were 
providing charity, instead of acting as students and allies’ (Endres and Gould, 2009: 419) 
135
 Richard Schickel argues that gossip media provides an ‘illusion of intimacy’ between the 
audience and the celebrity (1986). 
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own experience. Depending on the context of the representation and the audience’s 
prior knowledge of the celebrity persona, reader and text touch each other (Meyers, 
2005: 894). This touch structures the way in which we make sense of and perceive the 
representation in front of us. However, this process is neither absolute nor purely 
discursive. 136  It is, as Dyer argues, unstable and affective: ‘audiences cannot make 
media images mean anything they want to, but they can select from the complexity of 
the image and meanings and feelings, the variations, inflections and contradictions that 
work for them’ (1986: 5). In other words, how we understand representations of 
idealised whiteness may be constituted by dominant discourses and affective 
economies, but it is not wholly determined by it. Hilton uses his ‘citational’ writing 
style to reiterate, in an exaggerated manner, the central discourses and affective 
responses that construct idealised whiteness within mainstream media gossip, thus 
creating a space in which to perform a different affective economy concerning idealised 
whiteness.  
 
Race, Class and the Limits of Humour 
In a post from April 2011, Jezebel.com introduces its readers to a humorous Twitter 
account called ‘WhiteGirlProblems’, which ridicules the purported problems of 
wealthy, young, white girls that are currently represented across different media such as 
reality television, magazines and new media.137 The post on Jezebel.com reads: 
The writers, brothers David and Tanner Cohen and friend Lara Schoenhals, who 
tweet under the persona of ‘bored and obnoxious socialite’ Babe Walker, say they 
conceived of the idea in the same way that any good idea is conceived: by 
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 Marshall maintains that the stars, public performances, and the media coverage of their 
private lives ‘ensure that whatever intimacy is permitted between the audience and the star is purely on 
the discursive level’ (1997: 90). 
137
 The use of new media formats such as Twitter is crucial for these socialites because part of 
their celebrity status is based on their sheer ubiquity across different media. In this way, it can be seen as 
ironic that ‘WhiteGirlProblems’ utilises the medium of Twitter to ridicule them. 
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drinking heavily. […] ‘We kept identifying things as white girl problems,’ Tanner 
said. ‘It was a hit amongst our friends’. […] ‘Everyone has seen that girl on TV 
like the Kardashians or Carrie Bradshaw, who have all this drama,’ says 
Schoenhals. ‘Everyone’s like, “There’s nothing to be complaining about, your life 
is amazing”’. (Moore, 2011) 
Babe Walker might not qualify as a celebrity in the traditional sense, as she is fictional, 
and as such does not possess that split between star image and real persona that 
determines, according to many, the affective quality and relation between celebrities 
and audience (Dyer, 1979, 1986; Gamson, 1994; Schickel, 1986). I suggest, however, 
that it is precisely this fictional nature that constructs her as the ideal affective figure 
through which ideas, norms and values about whiteness are negotiated. Behind her 
image is not one person but three, each of whom regard their ideas about whiteness as 
funny and worth publishing. Walker’s tweets are thereby perceived as authentic. 
Readers compare the ideas expressed through the online performance of a white, upper-
class femininity with their own personal experiences, and are differently moved by the 
humorous content of the tweets. A look at the reader comments beneath the blog post 
reveals that the majority of Jezebel.com readers distance themselves from this kind of 
humour: instead of engendering positive affects like amusement and joy, 
‘WhiteGirlProblems’ provokes anger and resentment in this particular demographic. 
They critique the Twitter account for equating whiteness with wealth, and argue that 
this merely reinforces stereotypes, rather than deconstructing them:  
Right, because they couldn’t have called it ‘Rich Girl Problem’ or ‘High Class 
Problems’? Instead, they utilize their [the authors] privileged position to assert a 
double stereotype wherein women of color couldn’t possibly be rich enough or 
‘cultured’ enough to inhabit the social strata and tax bracket assumed to utter such 
nonsense. (ZoraJD, see: Moore, 2011) 
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Parts of this critique can be seen as justified, in so far as this parody of whiteness is 
exclusively linked to femininity, and carries the danger of reiterating ‘white narcissism’ 
rather than deconstructing whiteness as a site of privilege. This means that subjects who 
feel touched by these humorous tweets are encouraged to feel good about their lived 
whiteness, because – as opposed to those white subjects who are oblivious to their 
advantaged status and therefore do not get the joke – they (at least) recognise their own 
privileged position. 138  I suggest, however, that these readers do not recognise the 
polysemic meaning of this racial humour, and therefore do not appreciate the potential 
within this satire to disturb the power that resides in ‘the discursive space of “white”’ 
(Nakayama & Krizek, 1995: 291). Humour can disrupt dominant discourses like 
whiteness by expressing that which has been silenced. 
The ‘WhiteGirlProblems’ tweets could also be read as challenging whiteness 
through reversing ‘the gaze from racism as site of victimization toward whiteness as site 
of privilege’ (Ringrose, 2007: 325). By shedding light on a specific type of privileged 
existence, that of the so-called ‘it girls’ who live in the public eye, and to whom young 
people are told to aspire by mainstream media productions, ‘WhiteGirlProblems’ can be 
understood to be unmasking the absurdity of a racialised system in which certain 
bodies, often represented as inhabiting an immaculate white skin, seem to float carefree 
through space.139 This leads to such invented problems like ‘I hate my horse’, or ‘My fat 
friends always make me go to brunch and my skinny friends always make me go to 
                                                             
138
 Ahmed argues that shame and disgust about racism are problematic, as the expression of 
shame can be understood as sufficient to achieve an anti-racist future: ‘[t]he declaration of such an 
identity is not in my view an anti-racist action. Indeed, it sustains the narcissism of whiteness and allows 
whiteness studies to make white subjects feel good about themselves, by feeling good about “their” 
antiracism’ (2004c: n.p.). Ahmed is focusing specifically on feelings of shame and disgust here, but I 
suggest that self-irony of the white subject can be seen to function in a similar way. 
139
 This is because, as Ahmed argues, spaces take on the shape of the skins that inhabit them. 
Since, in Western consumer cultures, most spaces are colonised by the rules and norms of whiteness, 
bodies that inhabit what is perceived as white skin blend into these spaces, and do not stand out like non-
white bodies. These spaces and white skin blend seamlessly into each other, so that spaces can be seen as 
an expansion of their skin. This means not only that the space of their possibilities becomes enlarged, but 
also that their skin does not get bruised or sore from clashing against a wall of formal and informal racism 
(Ahmed, 2007b; 2011). 
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yoga’ (Moore, 2011). These problems might first provoke laughter or amusement 
because they are seen as absurd. Walker has problems that most of the readers cannot 
relate to: from her perspective a horse that hates her is a problem, from other people’s 
perspective a horse (however hateful) is a sign of privilege and therefore the problem 
cannot be that serious. Indeed it is a laughable problem. I suggest that these satirical 
twitter messages not only make the figure of Walker a target of social derision, but their 
humorous potential unfolds in the moment when readers recognise themselves in these 
messages. The reader might not be as privileged as Walker – after all, some of her 
tweets have to be full of hyperbole and exaggeration in order to be marked as humorous 
– but I suggest that some of them still invite the reader to recognise herself/himself in 
the situations (for instance the tweet about brunch and yoga). By recognising the 
similarities between Walker and herself/himself, the reader can recognise how 
ridiculous it is to moan about problems that only ever emerge through their own 
(however shaped) privileged position. In this sense ‘WhiteGirlProblems’ has the 
potential to dismantle white privilege by confronting the reader affectively, through 
humour, with his/her own privileged position.  
But why does the humour of ‘WhiteGirlProblems’ not work for some 
Jezebel.com readers, and why do these readers view this satirical Twitter account as 
reinforcing, rather than challenging, the position of idealised whiteness? I want to 
explore these questions by reading these comments of Jezebel.com readers through the 
skin. Reading through the skin here means exploring how living in a neoliberal 
consumer culture shapes the ways in which we understand and feel towards whiteness. 
How we feel about certain ideas of whiteness, and what we perceive as funny or 
problematic, is imbued with neoliberal discourses and practices, as well as the way in 
which we have lived this environment in our own skin. It is beyond the scope of my 
thesis to take the lived experiences of any individual reader into account, but the 
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comments suggest that these readers perceive racism as wrong, and that they are 
engaging eloquently in an anti-racist discourse, while arguing that class is the real and 
unaddressed vector of difference. I show here that this seemingly anti-racist discourse 
resonates in a dangerously successful way with the neoliberal project. 
The critical comments on Jezebel.com regarding ‘WhiteGirlProblems’ 
demonstrate a strong emotional repudiation of racial stereotypes that conflate race with 
class: 
I’m equally bothered with the name, and I agree with your reasoning and want to 
add that it also reinforces the stereotype that equates ‘whiteness’ with financial 
stability, which ignores the reality of poverty. […] Reinforcing these stereotypes 
[…] contributes to people voting against their interests economically and 
politically (RayBradbury’s_ElephantMonastery, see: Moore, 2011). 
Following this comment, neither the white nor the black subject should be limited to a 
social stereotype, as such stereotypes do not represent reality and are understood as 
contributing to the continuation of an unjust system. Yet the paradox here is that, even 
though these readers condemn stereotypes, users rely on racial labels to make their own 
social critique as the following discussion shows. Here they discuss how white and 
black children are differently affected by poverty:  
‘[…] A much bigger proportion of blacks and Hispanics [sic] population are 
poorer than whites’(Cookie monstress, see: Moore, 2011). 
‘[…] a black child is more likely to live in poverty than a white child’ (Kitkat, 
see: Moore, 2011). 
These comments illustrate the readers’ acknowledgement of the fact that racial 
minorities are more likely to live in poverty, but they disavow the stereotype that white 
people are (economically) privileged. This paradox demonstrates that users possess, on 
the one hand, repertoires of knowledge about a system of whiteness, racism and 
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structural inequalities, but on the other hand are capable of repudiating an identity that 
is determined in important ways through these racialised structural forces. Howard 
Winant (2004) explains this schizophrenic position of the new liberal white subject. He 
argues that, owing to the post-civil rights movements in the 1960s, whites still profit 
from the legacy of white supremacy, but suggests that they are also ‘subject to the moral 
and political challenges posed to that inheritance by the partial but real successes of the 
black movement’ (2004: 4). This ambiguous position, between privilege and equality, 
colour consciousness and colour blindness, is what Winant calls ‘white racial dualism’. 
This dualist position is ‘uncomfortable’ for certain white subjects because they enjoy 
(and want to continue enjoying) the privileges that whiteness enables them, while still 
feeling guilty about them. 
In an effort to overcome this paradoxical positioning and the messy feelings that 
are connected to it, subjects attempt to leave race behind and focus on other axes of 
difference such as class. Some users suggest that the blog should be called ‘rich girl 
problems’ or ‘high class problems’. The use of class-based criteria instead of race for 
the achievement of social and political equality is a typical trace of neoliberalism: class 
you can escape when you climb the social ladder but race seems to be stuck on your 
skin. In a logic where the flexibility of the individual is important, ‘stubborn’ issues like 
race become understood as tools that hold individuals back. 
I’m not suggesting that we live in some sort of post-racial society, but that poverty 
affects us all, regardless of race. But uneducated and semi-educated whites have 
been fed the same line as everyone else, that white people have financial privilege, 
and so they vote with upper class interests and this damages our society and 
economy, and further divides us racially. We have to take the focus off of race. 
(RayBradbury’s_ElephantMonastery, see: Moore, 2011) 
  
 203
By taking the focus ‘off […] race’ and concentrating instead on class, the uneven 
distribution of wealth, racial hostility, segregation and discrimination are seemingly 
expected to vanish automatically. People like the ‘WhiteGirlProblems’ authors, who 
refuse to let go of race, but who rather make it hyper visible, become perceived as 
hindrance to the neoliberal post-racial project: 
The upper class of this country that controls the vast majority of the wealth and 
information will continue to use the media to play up racial stereotypes and 
divisions, because as long as we are focused those things that divide us, like race, 
we fail to take advantage of our commonality as a citizenship that is being robbed 
of its rights and protections. […] Not to mention that we have such a diverse 
society, race lines are becoming weaker and weaker. 
(RayBradbury’s_ElephantMonastery, see: Moore, 2011; emphasis added) 
These comments show this reader acknowledging intersectionality, 140  while also 
undermining it. He/she fails to recognise that, given that relationships of power 
intersect, how we inhabit any given category depends upon how we inhabit others 
(Lorde, 1984: 114-123). Instead, class and race are here portrayed as separate identities 
that can be dissolved independently, with one being more important than the other. 
Some have critically examined the consequences of leaving race behind. Alana 
Lentin argues, for instance, that  
The problematisation of race put forward by anti-racist activists and scholars has 
been hampered by a post-racial agenda that participates in relativizing the 
experience of racism, consequently assisting in perpetuating it. […] The declared 
                                                             
140
 I use the term intersectionality in the same sense as Kimberlé Chrenshaw(1991), Avtar Brah 
et al. (1999) and Suki Ali (2003): as a critique of the single-axis framework that has dominated some 
feminist theory and antiracist politics. Single-axis framework means here that one form of oppression is 
privileged over another, for example, privileging experiences of gender oppression over other axes such 
as race and sexuality. Intersectionality shows that identities and subjectivities are (re)produced through 
complex imbrications of gender, race, class, sexuality, national, ability, religion and culture. 
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commitment to racial equality acts as a means of shutting down anti-racist 
critique. (2011: 160)141 
Within a neoliberal climate, the notion of leaving race behind often means silencing 
race, to regard it as something from the past or as that which sticks to the uneducated 
and ignorant.142 It glosses over the fact that, ‘whether or not race is named, refusing the 
language of race does not mean avoiding acting in ways that produce racialised 
inequalities’ (Lentin, 2011: 161; emphasis in original).It is not surprising that, in times 
of economic instability, poverty, and social cuts, a heightened interest in class is 
apparent. This interest is useful and necessary in order to tackle the problem that a 
neoliberal system has created. Yet it should not lead to the marginalisation of other 
differences such as race. In a neoliberal climate, those who bring up the issue of race are 
seen as troublemakers. Those who make race highly visible – such as the authors of 
‘WhiteGirlProblems’ who parody the hyper-privileged position of white girls – are 
understood to be creating, rather than describing, a problem. It is for this reason, I 
suggest, that readers of Jezebel.com understand these tweets as provoking racism, rather 
than as a humorous disruption. Despite the fact that the tweets can easily be read as an 
anti-racist critique (after all, they are making fun of whiteness), these readers react with 
contempt and anger towards the ‘WhiteGirlProblems’ tweets, and regard them as 
thwarting the happy future that a focus on class issues could provide. 
In this section, I have used the example of user comments on Jezebel.com to 
explore how an anti-racist attitude can problematically resonate with neoconservative 
politics. In a neoliberal climate, anti-racism is perceived as good, and racism understood 
                                                             
141
 Ahmed argues that, not only does equality mean that everybody is equally responsible for 
making this a fairer society, but also that everybody is marginalised and discriminated. This allows also 
the white subject to claim attention for discrimination, and silences the non-white subject (2004c). Jon 
Kraszewski demonstrates how mixed-race reality stars are used in the U.S.A. as the visible evidence of a 
diverse and open-minded society, where discrimination is no longer based on race but on individual 
problems (2010). 
142
 For more on this, see, for instance, Stephanie Lawler’s discussion of ‘white trash’ or ‘chav’ 
identities (2005). 
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as something that belongs to the past, to the ignorant and to ‘the haters’. By labelling 
the authors of ‘WhiteGirlProblems’ as racist because of their satirical conflation of race 
and class, users (unwillingly) subscribe to a politics of one axes of difference, 
privileging class over race. This rhetoric is popular within neoconversative politics, and 
is based on the belief that class is a much more mutable category than race: you can 
move up in society, but you cannot leave your skin behind. Reading through skin meant 
here to attend to the ways in which our surrounding shapes and can intensify what we 
perceive as ‘good’ and what we perceive as ‘bad’ and ‘damaging’. Jezebel.com is an 
online surrounding that defines itself as a critical online space in which racism is seen as 
bad. Therefore users are only allowed to comment if their contribution is anti-racist. 
Even though this is clearly a positive regulation of online content, I have argued that 
these ‘good’ comments leave their own discursive strategies and assumptions 
unquestioned. I have shown that the online environment in which they engage with the 
Twitter messages as well as the neoliberal climate which surrounds readers intensify 
negative feelings towards the authors of ‘WhiteGirlProblems’ thereby closing channels 
of debate that might challenge traditional ideas about whiteness, while at the same time 
veiling the ways in which anti-racist discourses can reinforce the current system of 
whiteness.    
 
Fake-Tanned Skin, ‘White Trash’ and Affect 
Recent discussions in gossip magazines have displayed a fascination with the ‘orange 
skin’ of certain celebrities. Geared to reveal the imperfections of the star image, these 
discussions ridicule celebrities’ over- and misuse of fake tanning practices, and 
scrutinise their skin for traces of orange. In its most usual sense, fake tanning refers to 
the application of chemicals to the skin to deliver a tanned complexion without 
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ultraviolet exposure. 143  Properly tanned skin is, in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, through classed, raced and gendered histories, constructed as a marker of 
beauty, wealth and health that evokes the semantics of holiday and leisure time. It is as 
such commonly understood as good, as something for which we strive.144 However, 
tanning is not a monolithic or singular practice that allows us to draw a straightforward 
binary between the good tanned subject and the bad pale subject. Rather, it is a complex 
assemblage of different practices, discourses and affects, which construct some tanning 
practices as good and tasteful, while others are perceived as bad and excessive. Skin can 
become darkened through natural or artificial methods (some of them more complex, 
expensive and time-consuming than others), which in turn result in different skin 
hues.145 Skin tone, which can range from lightly bronzed to dark orange, is pivotal when 
we examine how tanned skin is read. Skin tone can reveal whether or not the body 
became tanned through the ‘right’ technique and the ‘right’ consumption of tanning 
practices. This, in turn, is understood to expose the truth about the subject inhabiting the 
tanned skin: responsible subjects are controlled in their tanning practices and tan in a 
‘safe’ way (Ahmed, 1998: 58). The skin tone seems to reflect as such some inner 
qualities about the tanned subject. 
In this section, I explore how discourses of excessiveness and lack of taste place 
‘orange’ skin in proximity to so-called ‘white trash’ or ‘chav’ figures online. The 
constant repetition of these discourses accumulates particular affects, and this in turn 
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 The popularity of sunless tanning has risen since the 1960s, after links were made by health 
authorities between exposure to the sun, and other sun tanning methods, such as sunbeds or tanning beds, 
and the incidence of skin cancer (Rogers, 2005). 
144
 Until the early twentieth century, suntanned skin was associated with outdoor labourers, 
whereas fair skin was associated with wealth and was therefore viewed as desirable. The suntan did not 
become popular until the 1920s, when Coco Chanel integrated a tanned appearance with her clothing 
designs as a new fashion statement. Tanned skin then became seen as a marker of privilege, and was 
associated with the affluent white subject who could afford to travel to exotic places and who had enough 
leisure time to tan in the sun. Through these racialised and classed discourses, the suntan became 
indicative of good health, beauty, wealth, and prestige (Dyer, 1997; Kenway & Bullen, 2011; Mahler, 
Beckerley, & Vogel, 2010; Rogers, 2005), and was connected with such positive affects as enjoyment, 
delight and happiness. In other words, inhabiting tanned skin meant inhabiting the good life. 
145
 For more on this, see Cindy Rogers’ discussion of spray-on tanning (2005). 
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results in a metonymic slide which unequivocally equates the bearer of orange skin with 
‘white trash’.146 Through this, orange skin becomes perceived not only as a bad tanning 
practice, but also as an effective tool to ridicule celebrity figures who do not represent 
the idealised standard of white bronzed skin, as the following examples of ZacEfron, 
Lindsay Lohan and Victoria Gotti show. 
 
 
Figure 24: ‘Open Post: Hosted By Zac 
Efron’s Terracotta Face’(Michael K., 
2011f) 
Figure 25: ‘Two Orange Peas In A Blonde 
Weave Pod’ (Michael K., 2011g) 
 
The humour in the headlines used by Dlisted.com to accompany the pictures of Zac 
Efron and of Lindsay Lohan and Victoria Gotti is based on the cultural meaning that 
fake-tanned or orange skin has gained. It is understood to be ugly and tasteless, and 
stands in stark contrast to the image of celebrity as the embodiment of current beauty 
norms (Blum, 2003: 55). But celebrities are also the visible surface upon which new 
beauty trends and skin practices are played out, and thus always already bear the danger 
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 Ahmed explains the sticky relations between signs and words in many of her works (2004a, 
2004b, 2011). One example would be the association of the asylum seeker with the terrorist (2004b: 134). 
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of ‘doing it wrong’. As many have shown, some skin practices are read as signs of self-
improvement while others trigger scepticism and ridicule (Davis, 2003; Dyer, 1997; 
Kenway & Bullen, 2011; Peiss, 1998). For instance, working-class tanning practices are 
often read as an attempt to ‘pass’ as an affluent white middle-class subject with the help 
of fake tan. Ironically, it is precisely tanned, orange skin tone which hinders a smooth 
transition across class barriers, and which serves as a source of mockery. Derision 
works here to create and maintain social barriers between the improper white working-
class subject and the proper white middle-class subject. Laughter affectively produces a 
circle of subjects who are ‘in’ on the joke (white middle-class subjects who understand 
the link between proper tanning and class) and those who are ‘outside’ and laughed at 
(because they do not have the right knowledge): ‘[Laughter] creates a distance between 
“them” and “us,” asserting moral judgments and a superior class position’ (Tyler, 2008: 
23). Citing Winfried Menninghaus (2003), Tyler maintains further that laughter is – like 
disgust – an affective bodily reaction that aims to expel that which is seen as the abject, 
the polluted, the improper. Orange-skinned working-class subjects are considered to be 
out of place in the realm of proper whiteness. They might not be perceived as race 
traitors, like the black subject who bleaches her or his skin, but they are seen as class 
traitors: they attempt to slip from one class to the other unnoticed, and thereby threaten 
the borders of proper whiteness. Poking fun at them can therefore be seen as a technique 
to repress these subjects.  
Even though celebrities like Efron and Lohan might not be considered working-
class in a traditional sense, within an ‘increasingly hierarchised celebrity culture’ (Tyler 
& Bennett, 2010: 379) their orange skin tone functions to mark them as ‘white trash’ or 
‘chavvy’. ‘White trash’ can be understood as a derogatory term that marks certain white 
bodies as ill-fitting and other to the rest of proper whiteness (Hartigan, 1997; Newitz & 
Wray, 1997). This category is historically and culturally constructed as a form of ‘dirty’ 
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whiteness, polluted through poverty and a lack of ideal ‘white’ qualities such as respect, 
honour, demeanour, morality, beauty, and the ability to keep a job and to consume the 
right goods. In this sense, even though the term ‘white trash’ is directed towards white-
skinned people, it is their purported lack of self-control, excessiveness and bad habits 
which marginalise this group of people as ‘not quite white’ (Nayak, 2007).147 ‘White 
trash’ is therefore a slippery term: rather than referring to a static list of character or 
class traits and bodily features, it can be applied to everybody who exceeds the class and 
racial etiquettes that proper whiteness requires (Hartigan, 1997). The notion of excess is 
important here, because it is the excessive use of tanning practices and products that is 
understood as the cause of orange skin. Orange skin is excessive skin in the sense that it 
is overly tanned, thereby violating the borders of good taste which are constitutive of 
proper whiteness. By contrast, the proper white subject is controlled in its desire to 
darken its skin. It regulates its desire to be tanned through reason, which makes its 
tanning an acceptable and positive habit. Thus, celebrities are understood as ‘white 
trash’ when they inhabit orange skin, and despite the significant amounts of time and 
money they spend on beauty regimes, their orange skin becomes the visible signifier of 
their excessive, abject white nature and their lack of good taste.  
The images of Efron, Lohan and Gotti are ridiculed by Dlisted.com because 
these celebrities seem to misperceive the meaning of their orange skin: they do not 
recognise that their skin tone makes them grotesque rather than beautiful. This positive 
feeling towards something that is commonly understood as bad and tasteless positions 
these celebrities as other in an affective way: they are ‘othered’ not only through what 
they do or say but rather through what they feel when they encounter or inhabit orange 
skin. Ahmed argues that the objects we encounter are not neutral, but that they enter our 
                                                             
147
 There are also discussions that describe ‘white trash’ subjects as too white, as excessively 
white, because they embody white racism which is, at least on the level of lip service, officially 
condemned in a multicultural society that celebrates ‘difference within sameness’ (Haylett, 2001, cited in 
Lawler, 2005: 437) 
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sphere with affective value already in place (2010: 34). Hence, objects that are 
considered good or tasteful are inherited within a specific culture and society. Taste and 
preferences are, as Bourdieu (2010) argues, deeply entangled within class, and function 
to represent one’s social status while distancing oneself from a lower class. However, 
taste is an affective category, as we have to experience or feel these objects (which are 
socially and culturally understood as tasteful) as pleasurable and good. Hence, as 
Skeggs suggests, ‘what counts as tasteful is experienced as enjoyable by those with 
good taste’ (cited in Ahmed, 2010: 34). Tasteful (white, middle-class) subjects are then 
affected by the right object in the right way.148 Orange skin, however, connotes a lack of 
taste because it violates the borders of white decorum through its excessiveness. Bodies 
that are oriented towards orange skin and/or inhabit it can therefore be understood as 
being affected by the wrong object in the wrong way. They are perceived as ‘affect 
aliens’ (Ahmed, 2010), because orange skin does not evoke the same negative affective 
responses in them as it does in the proper white subject. On the contrary, they seem to 
like it and to perceive it as beautiful, which marks them as the affective other. 
Owing to their alleged ‘white trash’ background, some celebrity skins (like 
Lohan’s) are more carefully scrutinised by the media than others. In a post from 23 June 
2011 about Lohan’s court hearing in Los Angeles, Dlisted.com published a picture of 
her badly spray-tanned hand, accompanied by the following text: 
[…] LiLo accessorized her business casual outfit with a cokehead tan. You know, 
a cokehead tan is when you have them spray everything but your hands so that 
when you use your finger to scoop up the bad shit powder, you won’t get any of 
that nasty tan sludge up your nostrils. Tanned coke is gross. (Michael K., 2011h) 
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 For more on the connection between taste and identity construction, see Skeggs (1997). 
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Figure 26: ‘The L.A. County Court System's  
Brightest Star Returns To Her Stage!’ (Michael K., 2011h) 
 
This photograph, which appears on the blog entry in a ‘thumbnail image’,149 shows 
clearly how new media productions underpin the inspection and careful scrutiny of the 
female celebrity body. 150 The close-up of Lohan’s hand is featured on Dlisted.com 
because, on this part of her skin, her failed performance of proper white femininity is 
apparently hyper-visible. As discussed in Chapter Two, proper femininity is historically 
tied to middle- or upper-class whiteness, and becomes embodied through a smooth, 
immaculate bodily surface and an even skin tone.151 Female celebrities are particularly 
interpellated to inhabit this kind of iconic skin, which shows no traces of otherness like 
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 A thumbnail image is a small graphics file about ‘the size of a thumbnail’, usually 
accompanying an article or blog entry with one main picture. Thumbnail images are created from 
standard size images and are often clickable, resulting in a larger image to load at the user’s discretion.  
150
 For further discussion of the significance of the body in the construction of the female 
celebrity in Western consumer culture, see David Marshall (1997: 266-7). 
151
 Femininity and whiteness are intimately interlinked through class. In reference to Maxine 
Leeds Craig (2006), Pedwell notes that late nineteenth-century ‘racist and classist aesthetics […] 
portrayed black and working-class female bodies as grotesque, ugly and licentious against constructions 
of white, middle- and upper-class female bodies as classical, beautiful and virtuous’(2008: 97; emphasis 
in original). Skeggs (1997), Carole Anne Tyler (2003) and Tyler and Bennett (2010) have argued that 
working-class women have often aspired to embody white, middle class femininity as it symbolises 
cultural capital and social mobility. However, their failed attempt to ‘do femininity’ properly has often 
been ridiculed as a ‘class drag act’. 
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skin irregularities, cellulite, spots and stretch marks. Lohan’s cracked skin (the pale 
hand versus the spray tanned arm) violates this cultural script by displaying her uneven 
skin tone. Hence, her crime is not the use of fake tan (or the wrong use of it), but rather 
her failure to hide it. 
 As a celebrity, Lohan is aware of the public scrutiny of her body, and despite 
the fact that she is making a public appearance before court, she still refuses to pull 
down her sleeve, and adorns her hand with a ring and bracelets. This could be read, I 
suggest, as a sign that she wants to draw attention to this part of her body. In making her 
hybrid otherness (she inhabits two skins) publicly visible, Lohan can be read as 
sabotaging the current public image of respectable, white femininity. As Jones (2008) 
argues in relation to cosmetic surgery, it is common knowledge in our current neoliberal 
consumer-culture that beauty practices like spray tanning are conducted, and they can 
be even necessary for the integration and normalisation of white femininity. These 
practices allow white feminine subjects to reinvent themselves as ‘white with a 
difference’, as exotic, wealthy and healthy (Baumann, 2008; Dyer, 1997). The transition 
from pale to bronzed skin can be gradual but should be holistic, integrating the entire 
visible bodily surface rather than only parts of it. If the transition is too visible because 
it only happens partially, then the self-improving subject remains in the stage of 
transition and becomes a ‘special agen[t] of an abject, hybrid otherness’ (Jones, 2008: 
107). In other words, by arresting the process of her transition from pale skin to orange 
skin rather than completing it and by making this unfinished process highly visible, 
Lohan is marked as the abject other, neither pale nor orange but rather the in-between. 
Lohan makes her artificial construction publicly recognisable, and this can be read as a 
subversive statement. However, a different reading of this online representation is also 
possible. As many have shown, cracked skin has, in Western culture, an uncanny effect, 
as it reminds us of the instability of our bodily borders which in turn threatens our ideas 
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about individuality and the ‘I’ (Creed, 1993; Kristeva, 1984; Shildrick, 2002). Cracked 
skin, or two skins meeting on one body, disrupts the symbolic order where one 
individual is enveloped by one skin only, and often engenders disgust, loathing and 
laughter. As these affects are understandable and potentially widely experienced, it is 
arguably difficult to conceive why a celebrity would want to draw attention to 
something that causes such negative affects. In the Dlisted.com post, this irrational 
behaviour is framed within the context of other media coverage, which often portrays 
Lohan as an unstable, drug-addicted celebrity who is unintelligent, passive, and not in 
control of her own star image production. Hence, her intersected skin is read through 
her ‘white trash’ background, and is understood as mirroring her dysfunctional 
personality.  
As these examples demonstrate, orange skin is publicly perceived as a failed 
performance of proper whiteness. It is understood as the visible evidence of the 
subject’s excessiveness and lack of taste, and places ‘orange skin’ in proximity to so-
called ‘white trash’ or ‘chav’ figures. I have shown that the metonym between orange 
skin and white trash is enabled through emotions and feelings which in turn grow out of 
the history of raced and classed discourses and our current ideas about the proper 
neoliberal subject (a subject that acts responsible and self-improves rather than 
diminishing its own value through wrong beauty practices). Online spaces like 
Dlisted.com repeat this mocking of orange-skinned celebrities mainly through 
humorous commenting but also by providing the visual ‘evidence’ of their beauty faux 
pas. In this sense, celebrity gossip blogs like Dlisted.com exacerbate the intensity of 
negative feelings which fix orange-skinned celebrities and white working-class subjects 
as disgusting and worth of social derision. Nevertheless, I suggest that celebrity gossip 
blogs have also the potential to move us in critical directions rather than always already 
reiterating unequal power structures and their affective economies. I will explore in the 
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next section how representations of orange-skinned celebrities can not only evoke 
feelings of contempt and disgust, but also positive emotions such as affection and love. 
 
Orange Celebrities and Contradictory Feelings 
Thus far, I have shown that particular discourses are saturated with certain affects, and 
have sought to illustrate some of the specific ways in which discourse and affect are 
intertwined. And yet my reading of the affective production of whiteness through 
celebrity representations is also based on the assumption that affects cannot be fully 
controlled. Indeed, one can be intrigued, touched and moved by a representation in ways 
that contradict, or at least complicate, a structural reading of affect. Owing to the fact 
that readers can leave comments on blogs, these sites can therefore aid an understanding 
of how audience members are differently affected by particular celebrity 
representations. In order to illustrate how orange celebrities not only engender feelings 
of contempt and disgust but also of affection and pleasure, I focus in this section on 
reader comments on Perezhilton.com concerning the semi-scripted MTV reality show 
Jersey Shore. 
 
  
 215
 
 
Figure 27:‘Jersey Shore Season 5 Premieres January 5th’ (Hilton, 2011h) 
 
This series features eight young Americans of Italian descent(self-proclaimed ‘guidos’ 
and ‘guidettes’) in scenes of excessive drinking, partying, sexual promiscuity and 
misogynistic behaviour. Primarily occupied with tanning and shaping their bodies 
according to so-called ‘white trash’ beauty standards, the cast members represent 
improper whiteness through their orange skin, but also through their apparent ignorance, 
irresponsibility and lack of talent. Read through a white, middle-class gaze, Jersey 
Shore can, as such, be seen as affectively engaged in the (re)production of ‘white trash’ 
or ‘chav’ figures. By following specific conventions of representations, Jersey Shore 
aims to provoke negative affects that grab and shock the viewing body. Drawing on 
Ahmed’s notion of ‘affective economies’ (2004: 44-49), Tyler (2008) illustrates how 
the figure of the ‘chav’, which already evokes feelings of class disgust, can further 
accumulate these emotions by moving through different media sites. Owing to the 
programme’s popularity, discussions and representations of Jersey Shore travel through 
numerous media, and accrete negative feelings concerning representations of ‘white 
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trash’. This affective value then sticks to Jersey Shore and its characters, and is repeated 
online in the Perezhilton.com user comments. A brief examination of a selection of 
these comments confirms this: 
‘Well America, you’ve only got yourself to blame for making these talentless, 
ugly losers rich and famous!’ (xtinainthecity, see: Hilton, 2011e) 
‘The news about Snooky on media is enough to trigger my gag reflex.’ 
(mitri2010, see: Hilton, 2011e) 
‘Disgusting….humanity is in big trouble because most young people act like this 
now…I have never been more for birth control and abortions than now after 
watching this.’ (andydo, see: Hilton, 2011f) 
Despite the fact that the posts about the series on Perezhilton.com are themselves 
relatively neutral, the show is so strongly laden with affect that some users nevertheless 
feel compelled to express their disgust and anger in comments. Users go as far as to 
invoke discourses concerning ignorance, nation and eugenics to mark the Jersey Shore 
cast as the ultimate other against which the proper self – that which has internalised the 
cultural achievements of whiteness, such as refinement, reliability, intelligence and 
diligence – can be measured. 
From the perspective of a white middle-class gaze, Jersey Shore thrives on 
notions of disgust, contempt and resentment, which are knowingly sought out, evoked, 
provoked, and formulated through the actions and appearances of the cast members. 
However, as a number of user comments on Perezhilton.com demonstrate, this 
programme nevertheless encourages shared pleasure, and provokes positive affects of 
delight, enjoyment and affection: 
‘loveittt !!!!snooks never fails to get me laughing…’ (dancin_dg, see: Hilton, 
2009)  
‘Snooki is mahgurlllll’ (petey plastic, see: Hilton, 2009) 
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‘Snooki is fuckin’ adorable!!’ (POPSCIDICTATOR, see: Hilton, 2011f) 
‘Love snookie and pauly d, funniest people in the house!’ (Shivers, see: Hilton, 
2011f)  
The comments indicate that it is Snooki’s character in particular that evokes positive 
feelings. The representation of working-class femininity is sometimes read through the 
lens of female empowerment and authenticity, and engenders affection from the viewer. 
Using the celebrity figure of Kerry Katona as an example, Tyler and Bennett 
demonstrate the ways in which abject celebrity representations can earn positive value 
either through ‘“the carnivalesque”: a ritualised interval in which class hierarchies are 
reversed temporarily and an anti-classical counter-aesthetic briefly emerges’, or when 
the figure is read as a ‘respectable working-class character marked by tenacity and lack 
of pretention’ (2010: 383). These two strategies enable the ‘disgusting’ working-class 
celebrity to become endearing and loveable for the middle-class audience. I want to 
extend these analyses by drawing attention to the ambiguous nature of affect. Skeggs 
and Wood (2012) argue that viewing positions are more ambivalent than traditional 
audience studies account for. In their empirical research, they claim that middle-class 
women, for instance, feel anger and frustration, as well as empathy and care, for the 
participants of reality television programs, depending on which feature of the participant 
is in focus. This ambivalent and unstable affective relation to working-class 
representations enables viewers to subvert or refuse the viewing position of rejection 
and contempt into which they are apparently discursively hailed. This illustrates that 
affect is not determined through a straightforward relationship between gendered, 
classed, and raced discourses on which the representation is built, and the social 
positioning of the viewer. Rather, we connect in much more complex affective ways 
with representations. Paasonen suggests in this vein that it is often impossible to predict 
what will resonate with or fascinate us – certain images stick, intrigue us and encourage 
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a further re-viewing, re-visiting or re-posting, and we are unable to explain why (2011: 
182). As she experienced through her own reading experience of online pornography, 
some (online) representations touch us in ways that cannot be explained by logic.  
In this sense, even though Jersey Shore, as its representation of improper 
whiteness, is apparently ‘disgusting’ (Hilton, 2011f), viewers find different ways to 
affectively engage with the programme. Jersey Shore is a light-hearted reality television 
programme full of parody and self-ironic moments that allow the viewer to read the 
crossing of borders of good taste and demeanour as playful and non-threatening. We can 
see this feeling of irony reflected in user comments online, for instance when they 
mimic the Jersey Shore slang: ‘Snooki is mahgurlllll’ (Hilton, 2009). This is not to say 
that the feelings expressed in this manner are less real than other emotions, but I see 
them as discursive-affective expressions that symbolise the alignment with the orange-
skinned Jersey Shore cast. This alignment is not necessarily enabled through 
identification, or through the recognition of similarity with the viewer’s own embodied 
social position – rather, it is also possible through the humorous quality of the text. The 
parodic and humorous nature of the TV series Jersey Shore invites the viewer to shift 
the ‘controlling and pervasive nature of the middle-class gaze’, which ‘encourages a 
preferred reading by the audience in terms of classed identities, thus (re)producing 
symbolic violence through viewer affects’ (Lyle, 2008: 322), to a more self-reflective 
and self-ironic one. Through humour, the viewer can distance him/herself 
(momentarily) from his/her own social positioning. This distance enables a new gaze 
that makes clear that both orange and ideally-bronzed skin tones are forms of 
aestheticisation, and that the categorisation into right or wrong skin tone is only valid 
from a white, middle-class perspective. Through this new, distant gaze, the viewer can 
relate differently to the orange-skinned cast members – the wrong skin tone can, for 
instance, be seen as much more subversive and rebellious than the idealised bronzed 
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skin because it does not satisfy white, bourgeois middle-class demands.  
Overall, the expressions of positive feelings towards the orange-skinned cast 
members of Jersey Shore visible on Perezhilton.com invite us to understand affect not 
simply as a structural by-product of gendered, classed and raced discourses, but as an 
unpredictable force that can grab us, distance us from ourselves, and enable us to relate 
to others in new ways. The positive user comments on Perezhilton.com thereby 
challenge readings that attempt to restrict ‘white trash’ representations to one range of 
affective reaction, to that of contempt and disgust. Online environments like 
Perezhilton.com allow readers/viewers to illustrate through their commenting some of 
the different ways in which they make sense out of media representations they might 
have seen elsewhere, on television or print magazines. Online media like gossip blogs 
are important tools, which shape and re-shape through their interactive and affective 
nature the meaning of these ‘white trash’ figures. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Whiteness maintains its privileged status through ever-changing representations, which 
constantly shift and adapt to new trends, technologies and socio-political frameworks. 
Celebrities play a crucial role in this process as they embody and perform diverse types 
of whiteness, which then become publicly discussed, evaluated, negotiated and 
reappropriated. If we are to understand the workings of these processes better, we first 
need to investigate the patterns of feelings that generate and animate these 
representations. While these affective structures may often reinforce pre-existing 
knowledges in that they gloss over the constructed and relational nature of celebrity 
representations (and present them as simply being good or bad), they also always offer 
possible exit points – ways of reading and feeling them differently from the dominant 
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meaning. I have demonstrated in this chapter how celebrity online representations of 
idealised whiteness not only engender feelings of adoration and affection, but also have 
the capacity to make us laugh, or to provoke anger and frustration when accompanied 
by humour and parody. The mediation of these white-skinned celebrity representations 
through sites such as Dlisted.com and Perezhilton.com can intervene in affective 
economies of whiteness, thus transforming their meaning. The transformation of 
idealised whiteness through affect, to which I gesture in the first section of this chapter, 
is of course partial – for example, the humorous representations of Paltrow are only 
successful in this affective shift when they resonate with the reader’s own experiences 
and socio-political views. With this example, the reader might already be critical 
towards certain forms of whiteness, as well as towards how their status becomes 
maintained and reinforced within mainstream media. This practice is limited to a certain 
context within a certain community, and can therefore be critiqued as marginal and 
ineffective. While such critiques are valid, I maintain that this example nevertheless 
reveals the ways in which dominant systems like whiteness can be challenged through 
humour. Through this affective mode, we can learn to orientate ourselves differently 
towards happy objects, such as idealised whiteness. 
As my consideration of the reaction to the orange skin of celebrities illustrates, 
badly fake-tanned skin evokes affects of disgust and resentment because it becomes, 
through discourses of ‘lack of taste’ and excessiveness, metonymical with improper 
whiteness. However, an affective reading through skin demands that we also account for 
emotional responses that do not conform to white, middle-class expectations. We need 
to account for those surprising and non-compliant affective responses because these 
feelings can be potential sites of transformative potentiality, a place from which we can 
reimagine and deconstruct whiteness. Affect matters in important and novel ways, and 
theorising it can provide us with crucial frameworks that we can use to understand the 
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connection between new media, celebrity and whiteness. Reading through skin attunes 
us to the affective quality of online representations because it draws attention to the 
ways in which these celebrity representations make us feel. By this, I do not only mean 
those feelings that work through representations to keep dominant systems like 
whiteness in its place, but also those that grab us unexpectedly and might as such offer a 
way to explore possible sites for transformation. Skin and affect must be part of our 
theorisation of celebrity culture – especially in the context of new media – because they 
offer critical tools for exploring the complex mixture of commodification and 
transformative potentiality that shapes current celebrity representations.  
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Conclusion 
Selling Out Difference?  
Celebrity Gossip Blogs and Affective Labour  
 
Throughout this thesis, I have used skin as a heuristic device to illustrate the affective 
and sensuous relations through which we make meaning, arguing that humorous online 
celebrity representations touch us in sometimes unforeseen, complex and embodied 
ways, thereby shifting our ideas about gender, sexuality and race. Even though I have 
made clear that this shifting does not necessarily mean deconstructing – rather, it can 
mean reinforcing dominant discourses, or even reinventing new borders and 
mechanisms of exclusion – my writing has nonetheless been guided by the desire to 
point out possible ‘lines of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). In other words, I have 
aimed to point out moments in which the affective force of online representations might 
not only exacerbate dominant discourses and emotions, but also enable new ways of 
thinking and feeling about gender, sexuality and race and the power relations in which 
they are embedded and through which they become mobilised. The heuristic device of 
skin has helped me to show the tensions, cracks and gaps that these humorous online 
celebrity representations afford and that might otherwise pass unnoticed. Applying the 
concept of skin to the analysis of celebrity culture has enabled me to illustrate that 
online representations can be understood as skins in the sense that they are porous and 
provide cracks and gaps which allow them breathe, and through which they remain in 
contact with the world and the changes that occur in it over time. As such, my focus on 
skin has highlighted that online celebrity representations are not immune to their 
surroundings and interpretations; rather they are affected and infected by them. They 
reconfigure themselves according to the touch of history, materiality, personality, 
method, intention, politics and culture of any given interpretation. As a result, attention 
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to skin has revealed not only the power of the active reader but also the agency and 
dynamic of online celebrity representations. 
In this conclusion, I want to explore some of the wider implications of my 
analysis in the context of contemporary political dynamics. More precisely, I want to 
think through more critically if and how humorous online representations in celebrity 
gossip blogs can create critical difference in a ‘society of control’ (Deleuze, 1992) 
where the economic circuits are already fully invested in affect.152 In such a social 
formation, affect cannot be thought of as outside or even subversive to power, but rather 
it becomes a vehicle of power through commercial exploitation. These questions are 
important because the political economy of online media platforms like gossip blogs 
shapes their content, as well as our paths of interaction with it, in significant ways. As 
such, questions about the economic network of new media cannot be sidelined when we 
examine the ways in which they produce meaning and with what social and cultural 
consequences. As I mentioned in the Introduction, celebrity gossip blogs can be seen as 
part of an economy which modulates affect for the sake of profit. Thus the pressing 
question is if and how these humorous online representations can create alternative 
ways of thinking, feeling and living if they are embedded in an economy that thrives on 
affect?153 If social and political change starts with feeling differently, as Hemmings 
argues (2012: 150), then what kind of power is afforded to these humorous online 
                                                             
152By critical difference, I refer to ways of thinking, feeling and living that do not reiterate 
dominant discourses, practices and feeling structures but provide alternatives to these modes. In this sense 
critical difference is, similar to ‘lines of flight’, any form of creative escape from the standardisation, 
oppression, and stratification of society and culture. Critical difference is a difference that really matters 
to us because it provides instances of thinking and acting ‘outside of the box’, with a greater 
understanding of what the box is, how it works, and how we can break it open and perhaps transform it 
for the better. 
153
 An economy that thrives on affect can refer to a number of developments in late capitalism. It 
means, for instance, that products which are virtually the same – they have the same quality and function 
– are sold because of their affective charge: through identity branding these products are laden with 
images, ideas and feelings that set them apart from other products in their range and motivate the 
consumer to buy. This idea is not entirely new but developed through marketing and advertising over 
time. An economy that thrives on affect refers also to a post-industrial economy that makes profit not 
from producing and selling actual material goods, but rather from so-called immaterial goods such as 
services, communication and information. The Internet plays an important role in this kind of economy 
because it changed the ways of communication and exchange while collecting data and information.  
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representations, and the feelings they circulate? How much influence do they have 
within a society of control in which the incessant commodification of difference has 
seemingly compromised the capacity for political and social change? In order to unpack 
these questions, I first summarise the key findings of my core chapters in order to flesh 
out what reading online representations through the skin means, and how it can be 
productive. I then explore how we might understand these affective online 
representations in the context of a society of control and the commodification of affect. 
Juxtaposing debates about affect within critiques of a society of control with writings 
about affect within queer scholarship (Halberstam, 2012 and Muñoz, 2009) I support 
and extend my argument that humorous celebrity gossip blogs can be seen as spaces of 
affective movement with the potential to create new ways of thinking and feeling. 
This thesis has explored how femininity, queerness and whiteness are affectively 
produced and mediated in Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com. In my three 
core chapters, I have argued that normative ideas about gender, sexuality and race are 
not only discursively produced with material effects on bodies that do not align 
themselves along these rules and norms, but that they are also emotionally mediated, 
created and maintained. The complex fabric of feelings adoration, sympathy, anger, 
contempt and schadenfreude emerges through our physical and intellectual interactions 
with these blogs; blogs and their humorous celebrity online representations draw on 
politics of emotion (Ahmed, 2004a) that are already in place, but they can give also rise 
to affective jolts that might interrupt these historical patterns. I have explored in all 
these chapters how humour is used as a particular affective-discursive strategy that can 
challenge and/or reinforce stereotypes through the complex and sometimes 
contradictory feelings that it can engender. I have also examined in each chapter how 
the technological affordances of online blogs – their capacity to link to other texts and 
images, or to include videos and GIFs, and the possibility to comment and dispute – 
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influences our meaning-making processes. In this regard, the three core chapters do not 
work in a linear way to build my argument, but rather they work in a web-like fashion, 
reinforcing my argument for a reading through skin from different perspectives. On the 
whole, they illustrate how the concept of skin encourages us to think through the 
emotional, technological and embodied nature of online celebrity representations. 
In Chapter Two, I explored the ways in which ideas about proper and improper 
femininities are affectively mediated and produced in these celebrity gossip blogs. By 
reading blog entries about cosmetic surgery and Photoshop through skin, I introduced 
one of my key arguments: online representations become meaningful to us not only 
through what we see (the represented celebrity skin), but also through affects that 
accompany these online representations. I highlighted the potential of skin to betray the 
gaze, and I illustrated how traditional feminist discussions about representations and 
cosmetic surgery can be critiqued. This is not only because they rely, at times 
problematically, on a media-effects model and reinforce binaries such as representation 
and reality, naturalness and artificiality, agency and structure, but also because they 
strengthen the idea that vision can give us access to truth. With the help of the work of 
feminist scholars such as Irigaray (1985a) and Shildrick (2002), which foregrounds the 
importance of touch for meaning-making, I argued that how we understand humorous 
online celebrity representations depends not only on what we see in front of us, but also 
on what we suspect to lie beneath the surface or how we expect this surface to feel. The 
concept of skin encourages us to explore such questions about the materiality and 
texture of online representations. This chapter demonstrated that meaning is not simply 
a matter of vision, of what see in the present moment. Rather, it is shaped by our own 
memories and experiences, the feelings that travel between us and the particular online 
representation, as well as the feelings that emerge between the celebrity representations 
on the screen. Overall, the concept of skin encouraged us in this chapter to challenge the 
  
 226
primacy of visuality in reading-processes, and to foreground the role of texture, touch 
and relationality in these online representations. 
In Chapter Three, I challenged the privileged role of vision in meaning-making 
processes further by exploring how queerness is affectively mediated through online 
celebrity representations. Sexuality and queerness are not commonly understood to be 
directly inscribed on our bodily surface in the way that gender and race are. Rather, 
sexuality is signalled indirectly through the skin. It finds expression in the ways in 
which we touch each other, or in the kind of clothes we wear as a form of second skin. 
By focusing on posts that show celebrities touching or blog entries that comment on 
their sartorial practices, I illustrated how affective strategies such as camp humour and a 
particular gay sensibility work to challenge the objectivity and self-evidence of celebrity 
representation. I demonstrated how these strategies can produce meanings that deviate 
from the dominant reading induced through a heterosexual gaze, and I paid close 
attention to the ways in which (camp) humour works in these instances. Focusing on 
queer critiques of homonormativity, I challenged the new visibility of queerness and 
unpacked ‘happy’ (Ahmed, 2010) representations of queerness. Reading through the 
skin here meant teasing out how the embodied position of the blogger/reader influences 
the affective production of queerness. This is because the embodied position of the 
blogger shapes how he/she reads celebrity representations that she/he found elsewhere 
(on television or a print magazine cover) and the kind of humour that he/she uses to 
represent them online. I also highlighted how blogs provide technological possibilities 
such as text and image-manipulation that make the ‘queer gaze’ of the blogger highly 
visible and palpable for their readers. This makes clear that celebrity gossip blogs do not 
function as passive vehicles which communicate the blogger’s humorous take on a 
celebrity representation, but that they have agency. Their technology moves readers 
who engage with them in diverse ways, thereby creating a space where (new) ideas 
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about sexuality, or how we judge and value particular forms of sexuality, are affectively 
(re)negotiated. 
In Chapter Four, I further elaborated upon my argument that making sense of 
online celebrity representations is afforded through affective and embodied processes 
aided by technology. I did this by examining how whiteness is affectively produced 
through our interactions with blogs. Whiteness is commonly understood as a marker 
that is embodied through our skin tone, but I drew on feminist and critical race scholars 
who challenge this view to argue that different forms of whiteness emerge through the 
diverse ways in which historical discourses about gender, nation, class and race 
intersect. These scholars also highlight the affective dimensions of different forms of 
whiteness. Structured through the figures of idealised whiteness and the ‘celebrity 
chav’, I explored the affective landscape upon which different forms of celebrity 
whiteness are built, and how humour – produced through digital texts or images – can 
disrupt affective economies that keep those different forms of whiteness in their social 
place. In this chapter, I paid close attention to the technological possibilities of gossip 
blogs. The ways in which these online platforms can assemble different media formats 
(images, texts and videos) into an online celebrity representation influence how an 
online representation manifests on our screen and how we make meaning of it. As I 
illustrated using the example of a blog post with a GIF, meaning can be communicated 
in non-verbal ways through bodily feeling. Technology also shapes the ways in which 
we can interact with online representations, and this in turn influences how online 
celebrity representations can be re-worked and re-signified. My discussion of user 
comments emphasised how feelings of disgust and contempt can be knowingly 
provoked by the blogger when she/he is drawing on discourses and representations that 
are already saturated with particular affects. Yet I also illustrated the uncontrollable 
character of affect in this chapter. Through the example of user comments on the 
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television show Jersey Shore, I demonstrated how blogs can function as a vehicle to 
vent and express these affective reactions that might not always correspond to cultural 
(white, middle-class) expectations. Reading through skin draws attention to these 
individual and surprising affective reactions that online celebrity representations of 
whiteness engender, and provides as such a valuable tool through which we can explore 
the affective foundations and cracks upon which whiteness is built and shifts. 
As the material of my core chapters illustrates, the heuristic device of skin 
allows me to think through the relations of affect, embodiment and technology that 
produce online representations. Skin shows that it matters how online representations 
feel and how they make us feel. As such, reading online representations through the skin 
combines a close textual analysis with considerations of the materiality, texture and 
affectivity of online representations. It is an affective reading that recognises the 
theoretical, ideological, but also personal underpinnings that orient, regulate, and shape 
the ways in which representations are selected, analysed and rewritten through the act of 
analysis. Thus, it does not claim objectivity, completeness and closure, but rather sees 
the reading of humorous celebrity gossip blogs as an embodied, interactive activity that 
includes a wide range of emotions and connections between different actors (for 
instance, the blogger, the celebrity figure and the reader) and factors (technological 
protocols, patterns of representations, flows of money and labour). Skin is not only the 
fleshly witness of our life, but also the ground on which new contacts and experiences 
are made. If we understand celebrity online representations as skins, then we recognise 
that they are not immaterial but they have a history that is shaped through many non-
human and human bodies: first there is the ‘real’ celebrity body that is captured through 
the paparazzi camera and transformed into electronic data which is stored, manipulated 
and circulated on different devices, computers and screens. At some point this data 
package is encountered by the blogger who is affected by it, chooses it out of many 
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other data packages and creates, through different technological processes, a blog post 
out of it. Then this representation circulates online in its new form, making contact with 
different readers who reshape it again through commenting, tagging or sharing thereby 
accumulating or transforming its affective charge. As this illustrates, the heuristic 
device of skin attunes me not only to the reading body (how it is touched and affected 
by the online celebrity representations), but it allows me also to understand online 
celebrity representations as active, material and affective surfaces that are constantly re-
shaped through the contact with different human and non-human bodies. The question 
that has concerned me in this thesis was how this transformation of affect happens and 
if it can enable us to re-orientate ourselves anew towards traditional ideas about gender, 
sexuality and race, thereby changing the power relations that mobilise them. In the next 
section, I illustrate where the limitations of such a hope lie when I discuss how celebrity 
gossip blogs related to societies of control and its affective labour. 
 
Societies of Control, Affective Labour and Online Platforms 
I now want to explore how my interpretation of online celebrity representations as 
material and affective interfaces that can shift our ideas about gender, sexuality and race 
can be understood in the context of the society of control. Many see affect as a 
dominant modality of power in the contemporary social formation referred to as the 
society of control, which develops out of Foucault’s ‘disciplinary society’ (1991).154  
Whereas the disciplinary society normalised and governed its subject through 
mechanisms of enclosure (the school, the university, the factory, the barracks, the 
family and the church; and by deviance also mechanisms of exclusion like the prison or 
the psychiatry) and worked mainly on the body, societies of control work through 
                                                             
154
 Foucault has located the disciplinary society in the eighteenth and ninetieth centuries in 
Europe, and they reach their height at the outset of the twentieth. The control society develops after 
World War II,  ‘at the far edge of modernity and opens towards the postmodern’ (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 
23) 
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dynamic networks and govern through the soul. This means that power no longer works 
through physical cohesion (like in the society of sovereignty) or institutions that 
discipline the body (like in the disciplinary society), but rather by modulating the affects 
and feelings of ‘dividuals’ through permanent control and instant communication.155 
Tom Holter and Mark Terkessidis (1996) argue that these new mechanism of power 
dissolve the clear division between power and resistance, and that questions about the 
subversive potential of formations in media and popular culture therefore have to be 
carefully explored in the context of the society of control.156 In this social formation, 
‘resistances are no longer marginal but active in the centre of a society’ (Hardt and 
Negri, 2001: 25). Hence the society of control allows us to think through how (online) 
media representations might seem subversive, but are in fact part of mainstream 
industry, a mainstream that Holter and Terkessidis aptly call the ‘Mainstream der 
Minderheiten’ (mainstream of minorities) (1996). Purportedly subversive and resistive 
representations and youth movements are part of the mainstream because – in a society 
of control – difference is no longer something that needs to be flattened out (because it 
might be dangerous to the system), but rather it is recognised as something that can 
produce economic profit and needs therefore to be integrated. Through the example of a 
post about Perez Hilton and Lady Gaga’s wax figure, I have shown how this online 
representation might at first sight seem subversive but actually functions to integrate 
particular gay and lesbian identities into a heteronormative system. 
Shane Gunster illustrates further how quickly and efficiently new differences are 
integrated into the mainstream through commodification: 
While this is most evident in the rapid integration of subcultural styles into the 
fashion and entertainment industries, even activities that are explicitly 
                                                             
155Deleuze argues that, through the shift from disciplinary society to society of control, the 
binary individual/masses dissolved, leaving the dividual, which consist of samples, data and banks. 
156
 For a detailed discussion of the society of control, see: Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
(2001) or David Savat (2012). 
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anticapitalist are not immune: witness, for example, the rapid translation of 
protests against corporate globalization in Seattle, Quebec City, and Genoa into a 
Sony video game titled ‘State of Emergency’ that invites you to run amok as an 
anti globalization anarchist. (2005: 202) 
Societies of control have made capitalism, which was formerly restricted to the factory, 
the main logic of the system. As Gunster’s example shows, this means that the 
subversive potential of difference is now managed and tamed by capturing it through 
the logic of capitalism. From this perspective, it is clear how celebrity gossip blogs like 
Jezebel.com that seem to contest the mainstream portrayal of women may not perform 
any meaningful critique, but rather feed into an industry that is based on the 
consumption of celebrities. In other words, Jezebel.com’s critique of the use of 
Photoshop for a cover image of Jennifer Aniston, for example, is now not read as a 
subversive act that challenges the dominant structures of the system, but rather as a 
tricky marketing strategy that produces content for a niche market: feminist-aware 
women who enjoy celebrity culture.  
Thinking through whether and how humorous online celebrity representations 
can create critical difference raises also questions about affective labour. Affective 
labour is work that is carried out to produce or modify emotions and feelings in other 
people. Hardt argues that societies of control are characterised by a predominance of 
immaterial (i.e. affective) labour because industrial production moved from the second 
sector that produces material goods to the third sector that produces immaterial goods 
such as communication, services and entertainment (1999). Clearly, affective labour, 
and the values that it produces, is not itself new – feminists have long theorised the 
economic and social value of caring and nurturing labour and maternal activities.157 
                                                             
157
 Diane Elson argues that an understanding of economy merely as the sphere of production is 
incomplete, and blends out the sphere of reproduction which consists of women’s unpaid domestic and 
caring work which is essential for the social reproduction of labour power (1998). Similarly, Nancy 
Folbre argues that market economies are sustained by caring and nurturing activities that she associates 
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What is new, however, is the extent to which this affective or immaterial labour is now 
directly productive of capital, and the extent to which this has become generalised 
through wide sectors of the economy.158Throughout the service industries, from fast-
food services, to providers of financial services, to online platforms, the affective labour 
produced through communication and human interaction is a key element in 
contemporary capitalism because it functions to make people feel good about their 
consumer choices, and because they can elicit feelings of ease, excitement and passion. 
Thus celebrity gossip blogs are a vital part of the capitalism of societies of control 
because these online formations regulate, through virtual contact, the feelings and 
affects of their readers. 
Furthermore, societies of control contrive to capitalise on intellectual and 
affective activities that have formerly been coded as gendered and private (Wissinger, 
2007: 234). From this perspective, private activities like reading a blog or engaging with 
social networking portals become new sites for capitalist valorisation. Julie Ann Wilson 
and Emily Chivers Yochim (2013) illustrate the workings of this new affective labour 
using the example of the online platform ‘Pinterest’. They show how the production and 
consumption of online content is as a ‘form of affective labor, and the fruits of this labor 
are valuable to both [users] and marketers’ (2013: n.p.). Pinning something on Pinterest 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
with the heart (2002). She argues that both the monetised values exchanged by the invisible hand of the 
market and the non-monetised values generated and distributed by the invisible heart of care must be 
included in the realm of economy (2002: 231). Wendy Brown argues that the invisibility and 
misrecognition of women’s care work and domestic labor is axiomatic to liberal capitalism (1995). 
Confined to the realm of private life and family, women’s affective work, though crucial for the economy, 
is represented as natural, as the ‘anchor’ for civil society and public life, and as the ‘seat of moral restraint 
in an immoral world’  (1995: 147) but not recognised as work. Amy Wharton and Rebecca Erickson 
explore, through analysis of married or cohabitant female hospital workers, the links between emotions 
and work and affective labour in the family (1995). For more on the link between ‘good’ mother and 
‘good’ worker, see also Martina Klett-Davis (2007) For a transnational account of the paid and unpaid 
chain of care work, see Arlie Russel Hochschild(2000).  
158
 As early as 1983, Hochschild used the term ‘emotional labor’ to refer to the labour that is 
required by an employee to regulate their own feelings (such as anger or envy) in order to give customers 
a good feeling: ‘The flight attendant does physical labor when she pushes heavy meal carts through the 
aisles, and she does mental work when she prepares for and actually organizes emergency landings and 
evacuations. But in the course of doing this physical and mental labor she is also doing something more, 
something I define as emotional labor. This labor requires one to induce or suppress feeling in order to 
sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others – in this case being cared 
for in a convivial and safe place’(Hochschild, 1983: 7). 
  
 233
is work in the traditional sense because it is often the female user undertaking the job of 
an online editor: she has to take time out of her daily routine to choose an object or 
subject that she wants to write about online. She then needs material resources like a 
computer and a good working internet connection so that her post can appear online, 
and she undertakes creative work in thinking about how to represent it online. It is also 
affective labour in the sense that it produces and manipulates feelings: the user might 
feel happy and satisfied to see her post online, but she is also trying to affect other users 
with her work. Corporations behind the network benefit from this free labour that 
creates their online content, and exploit it by gathering the users’ data, which in turn can 
be sold to marketers. Clearly, celebrity gossip blogs work in a similar fashion, except 
that their ways of collecting data for advertisers are at times even more cunning: 
Perezhilton.com, for instance, links celebrity images to online shops in which a similar 
outfit, jewellery or make-up can be bought. This is how the powerful and profitable 
nexus between celebrity culture and consumption is in these gossip blogs exacerbated 
through online technologies. Wilson and Chivers Yochim’s acknowledge that online 
platforms like Pinterest can create ‘good’ feelings by making individual users happy for 
a moment, or that they can enable what they call ‘pockets’ (moments in which our 
contact with online content can make a difference to our everyday life). Still, in the 
larger picture, they argue that these positive affects feed into an economic system that 
constantly works to exploit the most vulnerable of society thereby making ‘real’ 
positive feelings like social security, stability and safety unachievable for many. In this 
sense, Wilson and Chivers Yochim’s work illustrates how online platforms like gossip 
blogs might indeed enable through their affective charge some kind of change 
(pockets),but that they also reinforce what they apparently undermine through their 
humour, unequal power structures of an economic system which privileges while, 
middle-class subjects and their nuclear families.  
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Dean is even more pessimistic about the critical difference that online media 
formations like blogs can enable. She argues that  
contemporary communications media capture their users in intensive and 
extensive networks of enjoyment, production, and surveillance. My term for this 
formation is communicative capitalism. Just as industrial capitalism relied on the 
exploitation of labor, so does communicative capitalism rely on the exploitation of 
communication. (Dean, 2010: 3-4) 
Communicative capitalism increasingly relies on contribution for value production, for 
it is user contribution that keeps communication flowing and networks pulsing with new 
data to mine and exploit. For Dean, this data-overstimulation has two effects: firstly it 
makes communication meaningless, because in these online environments content is 
replaced with affect. Grabbing attention but not arresting it for too long, jumping 
quickly from one data package to the next – this is, according to Dean, the rhythm of 
communicative capitalism. Secondly, this data-overstimulation prevents the formation 
of meaningful difference because communication is cut into fragments and small bits 
that can be easily consumed and enjoyed but that, in the stream of multiple, circulating 
contributions, tend to resist recombination into longer, more demanding theories. 
Hence, when Dlisted.com ridicules Lady Gaga’s Rolling Stone cover photo, possibly in 
order to critique a celebrity industry that desperately tries to sell difference, this act can 
be seen as just one tiny data packet that, rather than creating critical difference, simply 
feeds seamlessly into communicative capitalism. In a similar way to Holter’s and 
Terkessidis’ ‘mainstream of the minorities’, communicative capitalism ‘captures 
critique and resistance, [by] formatting them as contributions to the circuits in which it 
thrives’(Dean, 2010: 2). 159  From this perspective, gossip blogs like Dlisted.com, 
                                                             
159
 Similarly, Richard Grusin writes that in societies of control, capitalism is no longer 
preoccupied with material goods, but rather exploits the intellectual and affective labour that subjects 
perform in digital networks. In these networks, he argues, ‘people and things function actively together to 
create or invent new forms of mediation [and control]’ (76-77), which in turn strengthen the capitalist 
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Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com function to produce and mediate affect, but these 
intensities cannot create lines of flight which enable us to understand gender, sexuality 
and race in alternate ways, outside of the logic of capitalism. Rather, these affective 
intensities weave us deeper into the web of communicative capitalism. As Dean’s 
writing about blogs and micro-blogs such as Twitter illustrates, the attachment, 
detachment, and reattachment of affect becomes ever more rapid and might end in an 
apathetic ‘whatever’ attitude toward all meaningful discourse (Dean, 2010: 61-91). 
Hence, even though affect is exuberant online, it seemingly cannot engender new ways 
of thinking, feeling and living. Humorous celebrity gossip blogs, which, as I have 
argued, can be seen as affect producing machines, are from this perspective void of any 
transformative power. Our encounter with them might give us affective jolts, but, like a 
small injury to our skin, this imprint vanishes over time.  
For Hardt, however, the commercialisation of affect does not mean that affect is 
without any disruptive potential. On the contrary, he argues that, ‘given the role of 
affective labor as one of the strongest links in the chain of capitalist postmodernization, 
its potential for subversion and autonomous constitution is all the greater’(Hardt, 1999: 
90). The subversive potential of affective labour can be explained through Hardt’s 
understanding of affect.  Following a Spinozist-Deleuzian legacy, he conceives affect as 
an autonomous force that has the power to act in excess of the current system. From this 
perspective, affective labour engenders creative forces that might serve capitalism, but 
these forces also work outside of capitalism and enable new subjectivities. If affect, and 
for that matter affective labour, has the potential to bring about change and create real 
difference, then the question is where and how this potential is apparent and palpable. In 
order to unpack this question, I turn to queer scholars who have, in part, informed my 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
system. In this sense, he argues, like Dean, that through their media practices users take part in the 
creation of their own suppression.   
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analysis in the core chapters, especially those instances in which I aimed to gesture 
towards possible ‘lines of flight’.  
 
Skin and Mapping Critical Difference Online 
In the previous section, I explored how seemingly subversive online celebrity 
representations and their online platforms reinforce the capitalist logic of the society of 
control. Regarding strategies of possible resistance, Deleuze, who labels the mole as the 
animal of the disciplinary society and the serpent as the animal of the control society, 
writes that ‘[t]he coils of a serpent are even more complex than the burrows of a 
molehill’ (1992: 7). To put it in another way, societies of control require more complex 
strategies of subversion than disciplinary societies. In this section, I flesh out how my 
reading of celebrity gossip blogs through skin contributes to a critical school of thought 
that aims to detect possible forms of subversion in times of the serpent. The concept of 
skin illustrates that reading blogs is a physical and multi-sensorial experience – the 
ways in which we navigate the cursor or how we touch the screen influence that with 
which we come into contact and what we can experience. In this sense, the heuristic 
device of skin has enabled me to think through the intimate connection between 
touching, moving and feeling. I have argued that through this moving and touching, 
ideas about femininity, queerness and whiteness can be tweaked and revised, thereby 
shifting the ways in which we live and feel these embodied processes and identity 
categories. Clearly, these shifts and affective conversions happen only on a small-scale 
but, as queer theorists like Halberstam (2012) and Muñoz (2009) argue, we need to 
sharpen our gaze in order to detect these barely noticeable movements, because they 
might hold blueprints for alternative ways of living.160 Halberstam argues, for instance, 
                                                             
160
 Ahmed refers to affective points of conversion as moments when the affective economy 
around a subject or object changed. For Ahmed, these conversions from good to bad, or from excitement 
to anxiety do not happen simply as object circulate, but they can happen. She writes: ‘“happy objects” can 
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that the current socio-political dynamics might indeed aim to include particular formerly 
excluded bodies into the framework of the normal in order to stabilise its racist, classist 
and sexist regime.161 Yet if we shift our gaze slightly, we can see that this movement can 
also challenge current structures of power: for instance, the inclusion of particular 
transgender and transsexual bodies has strengthened the system of the ‘normal’, but it 
has also changed the ways in which we understand heterosexuality and can as such 
contribute it its dissolution (Halberstam, 2012: 81). In Chapter Four, I argued that 
celebrity culture (and as such celebrity gossip blogs) plays a crucial role in the 
preservation of whiteness as a dominant norm because it constantly invents new 
versions of whiteness, thereby keeping it flexible. But this dynamic can also serve to 
disrupt whiteness’ privileged position: through the example of a blog post on 
Jezebel.com about the satirical Twitter celebrity Babe Walker, I demonstrated how her 
Twitter account, ‘WhiteGirlProblems’, not only contributes to the increasing flexibly of 
whiteness and its privileges (like many Jezebel.com users argued), but also takes part in 
its deconstruction. The concept of skin made this subversive potential palpable because 
it sharpened my gaze (and my body) for the affective workings of humour, which can 
re-orientate us towards traditional ideas that usually pass unnoticed.    
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that our interactions with technology and 
celebrity culture can enable affective processes which can, in turn, challenge traditional 
ideas about gender, sexuality and race and inform alternative imaginaries. The challenge 
of such a claim is that it is based on intuitions, feelings and affects that are hard to 
‘prove’ because they seem to escape our normal critical framework which aims to make 
visible how representations or cultural formations reinforce dominant discourses and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
become “unhappy” over time, in the contingency of what happens, which is not to say that their happiness 
no longer persists as an impression, available as memory’ (2010: 44-45). 
161
 The consequences of the inclusion of formerly excluded bodies is also theorised by Duggan 
and her concept of homonormativity (2002), and Puar on the figure of the homonational (2005). 
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practices.162 In bringing feminist politics of emotions (Ahmed, 2004, 2010) into dialogue 
with scholarship on digital cultures (Paasonen, 2011), I have aimed to develop a 
framework that shows not only how feelings and emotions circulate online in order to 
reiterate and exacerbate dominant discourses about femininity, queerness and whiteness, 
but also how humorous online celebrity representations can change the affective 
structure that surround a particular celebrity figure. I have suggested that, in these 
moments of affective conversation, the subversive potential of gossip blogs and their 
humorous celebrity representations becomes visible and palpable. I have used skin as a 
heuristic device to read those online representations because it allowed me to not only 
to analyse what is – what we see in front of us – but, more importantly, the complex 
material and affective connections through which these representations become and 
shift. Skin attunes us to the ways in which our interaction with blogs and their online 
representations change how we feel about them and, in turn, how we make meaning out 
of them. Whereas Chapter Two was mainly preoccupied with fleshing out the 
limitations of blogs to create any meaningful difference in our understanding of 
femininity, I have demonstrated through several examples in Chapters Three and Four 
how humorous online celebrity representations can create critical difference. For 
example, in Chapter Three I showed how Dlisted.com renders heteronormativity strange 
by commenting on the sartorial practices of Keira Knightley, Rupert Friend and Richard 
Simmons. In Chapter Four, I illustrated in my discussions of blog posts about 
‘perfectly’ white Gwyneth Paltrow and the orange-skinned cast members of Jersey 
Shore how humorous online celebrity representations and their user comments can 
affectively shift our ideas about whiteness.  
                                                             
162
 This problem can be understood in the context of Sedgwick’s work, in which she famously 
argues that academic research is shaped by a ‘paranoid’ reading, i.e. a reading that is contagious and 
anticipatory, preoccupied with pointing out the oppressive structures. She argues that we need to focus on 
developing ‘reparative’ readings, i.e. queer readings that illustrate alternative understandings (2003). 
According to Sedgwick, there is a lack in contemporary theoretical vocabularies to discuss the value of 
reparative reading. 
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My reading through skin that aims to flesh out moments of affective surprise, 
disruption, resignification and re-orientation may well be critiqued as highly subjective 
and futile, since the affective shifts that it highlights seem marginal. Yet, as scholars 
like Muñoz argue, these affective practices only seem inefficient because normative 
culture and the methodologies that it advocates elide and discount them (2009). Muñoz 
is also eager to develop a lens that can make visible the affective ways in which 
minorities negotiate dominant discourses and practices. For him, the queer 
performances of artists such as Kevin Aviance and Dynasty Handbag work on, with, 
and against hegemonic structures because these performances reject the impasse of the 
present (a present that I understood as a society of control), and enable audiences to 
experience what a ‘better’ world would feel like. More importantly, according to 
Muñoz, the energy and the promises of these queer performances can live on after the 
show has ended, thereby making a real difference to their lives. I agree with Muñoz’s 
tentative arguments, but my analysis of blog posts in Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and 
Perezhilton.com have also considered the role of technology in enabling a lasting 
difference, by which I mean a difference that we can also feel offline. Through my 
discussion of blog posts about Lady Gaga in Chapter Two, as well as Ian Somerhalden 
and Paul Wesley in Chapter Three, I have shown how technologies like Photoshop and 
the technological possibilities of the blog (linking to or including content from other 
websites) determine the feel of a representation and might permanently reshape how we 
read particular representations of gender and sexuality. Overall, I suggest that the 
concept of skin is a suitable tool for sketching out the affective complexities of online 
celebrity representations. Skin has provided me with a lens which makes visible how 
the affects that these representations circulate align us or avert us from ‘affective 
economies’ (Ahmed, 2004a) that are already in place.  
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In this sense, these humorous online celebrity representations are not merely 
sites of banal entertainment but rather they can also be seen as an expression of social 
and political critique. As I demonstrated in my discussion of a post about Kate 
Middleton and Prince William on Perezhilton.com, this overtly cheerful online 
representation touched some Perezhilton.com readers so intensely that they had to vent 
their feelings of contempt in commenting, thereby contesting and critiquing traditional 
forms of privilege. I suggest that in these moments humorous online celebrity 
representations serve as a platform to express populist rage and affectively undertake 
with this a form of social and political critique. Such forms of critique are arguably 
inefficient, however, because laughing about a satirical online representations or writing 
a comment under a blog post cannot change the world. Yet I argue that we can also see 
these affect-laden online expressions as a cacophony of tiny subversive gestures which 
deserve our attention because they are snippets of more prevalent public feelings. I 
suggest further, however, that there is a more sturdy potential for resistance in their 
ability to render strange what we accept as ‘common sense’. I have discussed this 
especially in Chapters Three and Four, in which I highlighted some of the ways in 
which the affective-discursive power of humour. As Gray maintains, humour has ‘at 
least the potential to reevaluate the seemingly flawless logic of many instance of 
hegemonic “common sense”’ (2006: 105), and I would add that its affective jolts can 
also move us, thereby shifting how we orientate us towards the world.163 From this 
perspective, gossip blogs can be seen as small pockets of resistance or disobedience 
because they (sometimes) scramble, in a playful way, our traditional categories of good 
and bad, proper and improper. Through non-sense and humour (and the myriad affects 
that this engenders), these online celebrity representations defamiliarise values and 
                                                             
163 Gray makes this statement in relation to comedy. I still refer to him here because the 
subversive potential of comedy lies, in Gray’s understanding, in its humour.  
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ideas that we have been taught we should cherish. This Verfremdungseffekt can then 
serve to demolish old patterns of living and feeling.  
Halberstam and Muñoz support my argument because they maintain – though 
through different theorisation – that in our socio-political climate, in which cultural and 
political difference becomes quickly integrated into the dominant system, and in which 
capitalism presents itself as the only valid logic, political critique might manifest itself 
in new forms. Rather than necessarily materialising in the form of demonstrations, 
petitions or strikes, it might masquerade ‘as naïve nonsense [while] actually 
participat[ing] in big and meaningful forms of critique’ (Halberstam, 2012: xxv). 
Hence, political action and social critique do not have to take the form of a ‘fixed 
counterdiscourse of resistance’ (Muñoz, 2009: 177), but rather it can find expression in 
the form of art of the so-called failed, in stickers, music videos or – as in my case – in 
humorous online representations that might seem marginal and ephemeral, but which 
affect the reader, stick to her/him and might influence how she/he moves through life.164 
From this perspective, social and political change, engendered through what I have 
called critical difference, is still possible and happens all around us, but these new 
processes need to be theorised in order to develop their potential. My reading through 
skin has aimed to do this by thinking through how the humorous and non-sense online 
representations of celebrities might bring about change, while recognising those unequal 
power structures that stubbornly persist.  
 
 
 
                                                             
164
 Muñoz argues that the practices, ideas and values of the so-called failed, i.e. queer, have the 
potentiality to go beyond the present reality and envision radical alternatives. This is because these non-
mastered aesthetic practices contain in their affective quality, their cynicism, depression and bitchiness, 
the potential for new modes of relating to each other; a belonging together in dissidence and difference 
(2009). James Scott calls these effective forms of resistance and disobedience the ‘weapons of the weak’ 
(1987). 
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Conclusion 
Celebrity gossip blogs are not simply an expression of a society of control, but they can 
also be read as contributing to their maintenance. From this perspective, their online 
celebrity representations grab the attention of readers, and might motivate them to 
laugh, to cringe with disgust, and to react with anger or annoyance. Some of these blog 
posts are received with indifference, but even this reaction can be seen as part and 
parcel of the affective economy of gossip blogs because it motivates the user to scrawl 
further through the content looking for something to arrest her/his attention. Blogs like 
Dlisted.com, Jezebel.com and Perezhilton.com exploit the affective labour of their users 
when they click, tag and comment by selling this data to marketers. From this 
perspective, the mocking and ridiculing of the privileged (the celebrities) functions as a 
new way to target a niche market of celebrity consumption rather than enabling social 
and political critique. Furthermore, celebrities can be read as the incarnation of the ideal 
citizen of a society of control – they propagate ideas of individualism, self-control and 
constant transformation while cleverly benefitting from the economic productivity of 
emotions and affect. Celebrities no longer only embody the rags-to riches myth (enabled 
through hard work or charisma). Rather, in a society of control celebrity status is 
understood as the result of clever marketing (which implies an increasingly highly 
personalised visibility on social network sites and online media) and the right 
connections. Most importantly, however, fame is understood as unstable and fleeting, as 
something the celebrity constantly has to work on. In a society of control, the celebrity 
is no longer a celebrity but constantly has to become a celebrity and monitor and control 
that she/he is still relevant. Stasis is the death of the celebrity, and this is why gossip 
blogs are such a vital part of current celebrity culture. Through these networks (through 
which celebrity representations permanently circulate) every ordinary move like 
walking the dog and going shopping becomes news that floats as a package of data 
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through cyberspace and punctuates our daily lives when it flashes up on our computer 
or cell phone screens. Hence, as I have illustrated in this chapter, concepts like the 
society of control and affective labour enable us to think through how these gossip 
blogs relate to wider political dynamics, and how this interwovenness compromises 
their potential to create critical difference. 
But this Conclusion has also shown how the concept of skin can be productive in 
fleshing out the cracks and gaps through which these humorous online celebrity 
representations can produce critical difference. This thesis has shown how skin, as a 
heuristic device, can help us to see and feel the tiny shifts and movements that online 
celebrity representations can engender. The concept of skin enables a reading ‘against 
the grain’ or a ‘reparative’ reading in the sense that it aims to explore not just the 
manipulative, but also the inventive potential of humorous celebrity representations. 
Whereas the examples of Jessica Lange, Heidi Montag and Jennifer Aniston in Chapter 
Two about the affective production of femininity mainly outlined the limiting potentials 
that these humorous online celebrity representations have, Chapters Three and Four 
demonstrated, through the examples of Ian Somerhalden, Richard Simmons, Keira 
Knightley and Gwyneth Paltrow how these online celebrity representations can 
orientate us in new ways towards ideas of heterosexuality and whiteness. The heuristic 
device of skin draws attention to the creative potentialities that are enabled through our 
affective encounters and interactions with these online representations. As the sensuous 
cover that envelops our body (Shildrick, 2002), skin makes clear that it matters how 
online representations feel. And as the porous interface that is permanently transgressed 
(Kristeva, 1982) and that connects us with our environment, skin allowed me to theorise 
connection itself. How do the different elements on the screen connect? How are these 
online representations (assembled through different bodies and media formats) 
connecting with me – the body in front of the screen – and how is this connection not 
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only shaped by what I see in front of me in the present moment, but also by my history 
and prior experiences? Furthermore, the heuristic device of skin provided me with a 
flexible interpretative framework that allowed me to explore online celebrity 
representations in an original way. Depending on the ways in which a particular online 
celebrity representation lent itself to analysis, I was able to shift my object of 
investigation as well as my approach to it. This methodological flexibility allowed me 
to foreground the most pertinent and salient aspects of my dynamic and fast-changing 
online examples, whilst enabling me to stay open to their surprising forces and startling 
affective moments which make their subversive potential palpable. In this sense, the 
concept of skin helped me to flesh out some the complex ways in which humorous 
online celebrity representations move us, and to theorise how new media formations 
like gossip blogs can produce, through their affective force, a critical difference in our 
everyday life. 
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